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Onshore cross-country pipelines are a critical component of refined product 
transportation in the oil and gas industry. The integrity of those pipelines is key to 
maintaining supply security, protecting the environment and human life. 
However, due to incessant pipeline damages and resultant consequences of fires, 
explosion and environmental pollution because of third-party events in Nigeria, 
stakeholders are looking at solutions to reduce the human, environmental and the 
financial losses.  
The main objective of this research is to develop risk-based models for identifying 
and assessing the oil and gas pipelines failures, including risk reduction decision-
making framework and cost-benefit estimates. One of the major challenges of 
carrying out a pipeline risk assessment in some regions is the lack of reliable and 
objective data for data-driven analysis. The models developed in this thesis 
addressed this shortcoming and allowed the subjective data to be incorporated into 
the analysis.  
Hazards identification and ranking of the failure modes have been carried out 
using a modified FMEA based Fuzzy Rules Base (FRB) and Grey Relations Theory 
(GRT) to accommodate the uncertainty in terms of inadequate data. The results of 
modified approach serve as an input to developing the failure likelihood and this 
involves a Bayesian Network (BN) model of the identified failure mode. The BN 
model has been developed using Hugin software. The results of the BN feeds into 
the Evidential Reasoning (ER) model to aid risk management decision-making. 
Also, cost benefit estimates have been carried out to assess the cost benefit of 
implementing any risk reduction options.  
All the objectives set out in the thesis have been achieved. The research has 
contributed to the stated challenges by identifying the parameters for high failure 
incidences and develop various models and assess contributing failure factors and 
the risk control options to reducing the likelihood of the failure including cost 
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 Research Background   
Pipelines have been the cost effective way of products transportation in large 
volumes, including oil and gas  (BP, 2009; Dawotola et al., 2011). In Nigeria, this 
has resulted in an exponential increase in the total length of the laid downstream 
pipeline for cross country products distribution, from 1978 to 1995, of more than 
5,000km (Ambisisi, 2016). 
Pipelines are designed to contain the products they carry and convey them from 
one point to the other without loss of integrity of the pipeline. However even with 
the best of engineering designs, sometimes failure do occur.  The risk assessment 
often relies on the records and lessons learnt from such failure to help in the design 
and construction improvements which reduce future failures. Pipeline managers 
are experiencing a challenging environment on failures, ranging from material 
quality, in-service defects and the need to extend the life of ageing infrastructure. 
A stricter safety regulatory regime in most countries is being enforced due to the 
much wider impact of pipeline failure and the recent escalation of deliberate 
sabotage (Hopkins, 2008). Although material quality was a concern in developed 
countries some 30 years ago, this is still a concern in developing countries where 
cost often results in procuring and installing pipes of low quality that would not 
have been allowed in developed countries. Defects detection technology has 
advanced and is routinely employed in developed economies. However, such 
sophisticated technologies are not usually utilised in developing countries, again 
due to cost concerns. These, together with the ageing of the infrastructure and the 
recent criminal sabotage, provide a conducive environment for catastrophic 
failures.      
Risk assessment, including Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), is regularly used 
for safety evaluation and land use planning (Haswell et al., 2009; Hopkins et al., 
2009; Pasman & Reniers, 2014) or when bringing pipelines back to service. The 
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same risk assessment principle applies to the wider oil and gas industry and other 
high-risk industries such as nuclear (Apostolakis, 1981). However, the practice has 
never been uniform, resulting in different and often conflicting conclusions, 
depending on the data available, practitioner experience and the company practice 
(Muhlbauer, 2004). Regulators and trade bodies in Europe, America and other 
parts of the world with historical data, aware of the subjectivity of the practice, 
provide guidance to ensure a uniform approach to the process (Haswell et al., 2009; 
Goodfellow et al., 2014). However, this has resulted in industrial and academic 
researchers adopting a historical data based QRA approach, as it is likely to be less 
scrutinised, to satisfy the authorities having jurisdiction. This approach, though 
widely accepted, has the unintended consequence of limiting the value that can be 
gained from the process and reduces the research effort that had been ongoing to 
improve the QRA process. It also results in a poor safety assessment for the 
geographies with either limited historical data or unreliable data (Eze, 2017).  
 
 Problem Statement and Research Motivation  
Even though pipelines are the safest and most cost-effective mode of transporting 
oil and gas for long distances (Furchtgoth-Roth, 2013), when a failure occurs, the 
resulting consequence in terms of safety, economic loss and environmental 
pollution could be devastating. Available data from literature (Onuoha, 2009; 
Rowland, 2010; Ekwo, 2011; Fadeyibi et al., 2011; Omodanisi et al., 2014) indicates 
that since the late 1980s thousands of fatalities, economic losses and environmental 
damage have occurred, linked to pipeline incidents in Nigeria. Incidents like Jesse 
in 1998, with more than 1,000 fatalities and Abule Egba in 2006, with circa 500 
fatalities are among the worst globally. The direct product loss for the cross-
country pipeline system in the country run into hundreds of million dollars per 
annum. One pipeline system alone – system 2B - is estimated to be losing about 
fifty million dollars per annum due to direct product loss (Ekwo, 2011). When 
payments due to compensation, fines, and environmental clean-up are included, 
the annual loss to the economy is significantly higher.  
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The failure of oil and gas pipelines in developed economies have been extensively 
studied and addressed. The data required for analysing and assessing the risks is 
available and reliable, e.g., EGIG (2018) and Concawe (2019) in Europe. This data-
driven assessment results in a consistent downward trend in terms of pipeline 
failure since the 1970s in Europe (EGIG, 2015; Haswell & McConnell, 2015; Cech et 
al., 2018) and a flat-lining of the number of failures in the US in the past 20 years 
(PHMSA, 2017).   
In Nigeria and other developing countries, the absence of reliable failure data and 
effective maintenance and management procedure, amongst other factors, make it 
difficult to conduct an effective assessment of pipeline risks. Such absence also 
makes it difficult to put in place measures to reduce, control or mitigate the 
identified risks. This lack of data makes the application of appropriate risk 
assessment tools ineffective and results in a high pipeline loss incidents with 
devastating consequences. It could be argued that this has led to the gradual 
abandonment of the pipeline system for other modes of refined product transport 
in the country. This further exacerbates the situation, as the pipelines fall into 
further disrepair. Additionally, in the last decade, World Bank (2017) data 
indicates that Nigeria’s population has increased by more than 60 million. The 
population increase is shown to be directly connected with the uncontrolled 
development around the pipeline corridors, leading to increased pipeline accident 
rate.  
The need to bring back the onshore cross-country pipelines in Nigeria to full 
operation has become the main preoccupation of the stakeholders in the country 
(Okafor, 2016). The stakeholders also want to reduce the frequency and the 
consequence of the pipeline failure and extend the asset’s life.  These stakeholder 
desires inform the motivation of this research.   
The uncertainties in carrying out risk assessments due to lack of data or unreliable 
data would render the typical frequentist risk assessment tools unsuitable for 
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assessing pipelines risks in Nigeria and similar countries. Typically, where relative 
frequencies for the identified hazards are limited or uncertain, then subjectivist 
and other non-probabilistic uncertainty analysis approaches seem more 
appropriate. Such approaches include Bayesian Theory, Fuzzy Set Theory, 
Evidence Theory and Plausibility Theory (Aven & Zio, 2011; Aven et al., 2014). 
This study aims to develop novel models of pipeline failure assessment for the 
cross-country petroleum products pipelines under uncertainty. The models would 
help the decision makers in identifying the hazards and analyse the associated 
risks, including the cost-benefits for implementing risk reduction measures. The 
results of this research will help stakeholders in the pipeline industry in their 
decision-making process for risk management, integrity assessment, inspection 
and maintenance plans. 
To address the above challenges, one overarching research question has been 
identified, which is: What are the factors responsible for products pipelines failure and 
what are the best methodologies to minimise the risk? 
 
 Aims and Objectives  
The overall aim of the research is to develop methodologies and models which 
provide decision support tools that address onshore oil and gas pipeline failure in 
Nigeria. The research will develop a framework that decision makers can utilise to 
assess pipeline failure likelihood for effective risk management. The new 
methodologies in the research has been developed from the baseline models 
including Fuzzy Set Theory and Grey Relation Theory, Bayesian Network and 
Evidential Reasoning.  
The objectives of the research are to:  
i. Identify the drivers for onshore cross-country pipeline failures in 
developing countries and particularly in Nigeria. 
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ii. Develop suitable methodologies that identify, screen and assess the failure 
modes of the pipelines and the potential consequence resulting from such 
failure.  
iii. Develop a model that assesses the likelihood of the pipeline failures 
appropriate for countries where data is limited or unreliable.  
iv. Provide a risk-based decision-making framework that helps reduce the 
pipeline’s exposure to the identified risks.  
v. Provide a cost-benefit model for optimum decision-making.   
 
 Scope  
This thesis is based on the research problem that is limited to particular challenges 
identified with Nigeria’s onshore cross-country products pipeline and other 
similar systems where data is often not available or not reliable and also where 
strict adherence to risk management practices are not in line with the global best 
industry practice.  
Therefore, it is important to identify the scope of the work in relation to the wider 
area of pipeline risk management.   
▪ The research is aimed at the countries where lack of failure data or 
uncertainty in the available data makes data-based risk assessment 
unreliable or not possible.  
▪ Usually, the risk assessment process involves failure consequence analysis, 
in addition to the failure likelihood analysis, and these inform the risk-based 
decision making. However, the scope of this research excludes the detailed 
failure consequence assessment, as the main aim of the research is to model 
uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment due to lack of or unreliability 
of data. The failure likelihood and the decision-making models suffer more 
from these uncertainty treatments in this research.  
▪ The modified Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) based hazards 
identification model uses the generic failure mode; however, the ranking 
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relies on site-specific features and the experience of the participating field 
operatives and domain experts. The results would be influenced by those 
individual’s judgment.  
▪ The failure likelihood model developed is underpinned by the peculiar 
integrity management approach used by the local pipeline operator as 
elicited from the operator’s personnel and documentation reviewed. The 
model, therefore, may not be directly portable to other scenarios or systems 
without a full understanding of the system’s approach to pipeline safety 
and integrity management. . 
 
 Structure of the Thesis 
The results of the research in this thesis, developed to include the application of 
the novel approaches to risk-based pipeline failure assessment under uncertainty, 
is presented using methodologies and case studies over a number of chapters and 
covering products pipeline systems in Nigeria. Figure 1-1 shows the outline of the 
thesis, highlighting the main chapters that encompass the thesis including the risk 
assessment models and the case studies.  
Chapter 1 presents the introduction to the thesis and provides the general 
background motivation, aims and objectives, scope and limitation and the thesis 
structure.  
In Chapter 2, the review of the related literature to support the research has been 
carried out. The chapter underpins the research in that it reviewed the body of 
knowledge to understand the research development in the field to date and 
ensures that this work builds upon it. Appropriately carried out literature review 
ensures the work presented in the thesis is original, novel and contributes to the 
body of knowledge in the area investigated. The literature survey reviewed 
includes works on pipeline failures in general and cross-country onshore products 
pipelines in particular. It also reviewed the developments in the area of risk 
assessment and decision-making techniques with an emphasis on assessment and 
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decision making under uncertainty. The uncertainty could be due to lack of or 
inadequate data and knowledge as found in Nigeria and similar countries. Finally, 
the review also assesses the current knowledge on challenges and difficulties of 
managing pipeline systems risks in Nigeria and similar developing countries.  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Thesis Outline 
 
The general synopsis of the research methodology used throughout the thesis is 
detailed in Chapter 3. This includes the methodologies for identifying the hazards 
related to pipeline operation and determination of the failure likelihood using the 
subjectivist approach. The chapter also assesses methodology for risk management 
decision-making including the consideration of the cost benefits estimation of the 
pipeline failure in terms of life safety, economic loss and environmental damages.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the development of the initial step of the risk assessment - 
hazards identification. There are multiple techniques for hazards identification; 
however, the majority of the mainstream techniques are unsuitable for this work 
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due to the uncertainty associated with the lack of, or inadequate data. Therefore, a 
new technique which modifies the traditional FMEA has been adopted. The 
technique, which utilises Fuzzy Set Theory (or Fuzzy Rule Base) and Grey 
Relations Theory, ensures the weaknesses that FMEA has with respect to Nigeria’s 
peculiar challenges are addressed.    
The failure likelihood development is carried out in Chapter 5. The hazard 
identification carried out in the previous chapter has served as the input for this 
chapter. The failure likelihood development utilises the hazard identified with the 
highest score from Chapter 4. The BN model is then used to highlight the 
contributing failure factors to the identified hazard and their interrelationships. 
The model, therefore, provides the managers with dynamic information on how to 
prevent undesired outcomes and could be used for safety management plans. 
In Chapter 6, an Evidential Reasoning (ER) algorithm has been employed to extend 
the previous chapter’s works by identifying the predominant failure factor that 
gives rise to the hazard with the highest score. The predominant failure factor has 
been identified as theft/third-party intentional damage. The ER has been used with 
the help of experts, existing data and the literature to develop the evaluation matrix 
and generate weights and belief degrees for the assessment. The assessment 
aggregates the weights and the belief degrees to determine the probability masses 
and finally, the ER ranking of the interventions. This chapter also assesses the cost-
benefit of the potential interventions against the failure costs which includes life 
safety, direct economic cost and the environmental restoration cost.  
Error! Reference source not found. provides an overview of the relationship b
etween the three previous chapters and how they all come together into the robust 
risk assessment framework in support of intervention decision making and 
resources allocation.  
The overview of the conclusions of the results obtained in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6 are detailed in Chapter 7, including the results’ applicability to the 
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identified research problem. The chapter includes an overview of the techniques 
and models developed in the work, outlining the conclusions derived from the 
results and provides an overview of the limitation of the work and 
recommendations for further research.   
 
 Research Design and Ethics Consideration 
For all the technical chapters, experts’ elicitation has been undertaken, as 
incorporation of experts’ experience is key to the research work. The elicitation 
takes the form of:  
1. Series of questionnaires that have been developed and sent out to individual 
experts to fill in and return to the researcher, who then aggregate the results 
and incorporate into the model. 
2. Virtual workshop and brainstorming sessions, where the experts come 
together and have a focal discussion on the particular research issue and 
provide their expertise for incorporation into the research  
3. Interviews, where individual experts were interviewed and their response 
forms part of the research.  
In all of the options explored in this work, appropriate information about the issue 
being discussed is provided to the experts including, for example, the pipeline and 
fluid details (see Appendix E), the existing safety and instrumentation system in 
place and the operations and management policy.  
The number of experts that participated in the session varies from three in chapter 
4 and five in chapters 5 and 6. More experts participation could have been better 
however the challenge of getting the experts to participate due to their busy 
schedule and the limited research time has limit the number of participants. For 
example, first questionnaire took more than six months to be returned and only 
three have been found to be valid, two others had to be disqualified. On the 
subsequent chapters the questionnaire design and the type of questioning has to 
10 
 
be greatly revamped to simplify it and thus increase the chances of participation 
by the experts.   
The accuracy and reliability of the results depend on the quality and the reliability 
of the experts input and the weighting mechanism. The expertise and the 
competence of the experts used in this work ensure the results are reliable and 
consistent. However, in the future, it may be that using less experienced experts 
may introduce some bias, with a lack of consistency with the acquired data. Under 
such scenario it is recommended that a greater number of experts should be used, 
in addition to using techniques, such as Delphi method, to reduce the potential 
bias and subjectivity of the experts.    
Although the research elicitation does not involve vulnerable people or ethical 
approval, the researcher has undertaken a certified training in research ethics, as 
part of the minimum research requirements at the University to ensure that the 
research has been carried out abiding by the appropriate ethical standards.  
The experts that participated in the study are diverse both in terms of location 
(Nigeria, UK and Middle East) and expertise (outlined in the relevant chapters).    
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  Literature Review 
Overview 
This chapter analyses the up-to-date literature which has influenced this study. It 
reviews the background of cross-country pipelines including past and current 
trends in terms of reported incidents and general operational statistics as they 
affect integrity management. The background information and work carried out 
by previous researchers with respect to the risk assessment steps, such as the 
identification of failure sources, assessment of failure likelihood, and consequence 
and decision support, has also been investigated and outlined in this chapter.  
 
2.1 Cross-country Oil and Gas Pipelines 
Pipelines are an inherently safer means of transporting oil and gas in bulk than 
other modes such as freight trains or tankers. Environmental analysis comparing 
pipelines with other modes of transport, such as rail, finds that pipelines result in 
fewer incidents, fewer human casualties, less environmental damage and fewer 
greenhouse gas emissions (Walker, 2014). A recent study (Furchtgoth-Roth, 2013) 
has shown that transportation of oil and gas by road results in an accident rate of 
circa 20 per billion-ton miles and that of rail is circa 2 per billion-ton miles. When 
compared to pipelines, with an accident rate of 0.9 per billion-ton miles (for natural 
gas) and 0.6 per billion-ton miles (for hazardous liquid), the pipeline system proves 
to be the safest and most cost-effective means of transporting oil and gas. 
In Nigeria and indeed sub-Saharan Africa, the safety indices and the cost-
effectiveness led to an exponential increase in the total length of the laid 
downstream pipeline for cross-country product distribution; from 1978 to 1995, 
more than 5000km of pipeline was built (Ambisisi, 2016). However, due to a 
combination of poor installation, maintenance and operational factors, poor land-
use planning, environmental erosion and deliberate sabotage, the country 
witnessed a significant proportion of pipeline failure per fuel length carried, with 
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devastating human and environmental consequences. Carlson et al. (2015) 
produced a comprehensive study of petroleum pipeline explosions in sub-Saharan 
Africa, reviewing both academic and lay literature covering a ten-year period up 
to 2014. The study shows at least 28 separate petroleum pipeline-related incidents 
which caused injury and or death in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 28 incidents, 23 
occurred in Nigeria with the total number of reported deaths at 1,756. Achebe et al. 
(2012) studied and analysed oil pipeline failures with significant environmental 
consequences in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria between 1999 and 2005 and 
recorded about 146 cases, with an estimated failure rate of 1.14 per 1000km-years. 
Although Achebe et al. (2012) recorded mechanical failure as the most common 
cause of pipeline failure, other studies (Dawotola et al., 2012; Omodanisi et al., 2014) 
have shown external interference and sabotage as the cause of the majority of 
incidents. Another study (Fadeyibi et al., 2011) assesses the pipeline failure 
incidents around the Lagos area between 2000 and 2006, finding nine recorded 
incidents with a total death count of 646. These deaths are from official records at 
the hospitals.   
The rate of fatal accidents is exacerbated by Nigeria’s rapid population increase of 
more than 60 million people, from 120 million to 185 million, since the turn of the 
century (World Bank, 2017), with the resulting attendant uncontrolled 
developments around the pipeline corridors.   
Section 2.1.1 below provides a global overview of the pipeline systems and how 
that compares with that of Nigeria in terms of safety matrices. The comparison is 
limited to the EU and USA pipelines where data are readily available.  
2.1.1 Trends 
The global trend in pipeline failures has been on a downward trajectory for the 
regions and geographies with available data. In Europe, the European Oil 
Company Organisation for Environment, Health and Safety (CONCAWE) and the 
European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) produce periodic pipeline 
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incident reports. The latest report by EGIG (2018) covers a period of 1970 to 2016 
and includes incident statistics of seventeen major gas transmission system 
operators across Europe. The report shows a total incident frequency equal to 0.31 
per 1,000km-years over the 1970 to 2016 period. However, the 5-year moving 
average shows that in the five years leading up to 2016, the average incident 
frequency is 0.13 per 1,000km-years. This 5-year moving average and the overall 
frequency has reduced consistently over the years. The 5-year moving average has 
decreased by a factor of 5 since 1970, from 0.86 to 0.13. In 1970, the total failure 
frequency was 0.87 per 1,000km-years, this is reduced to 0.31 per 1,000km-years in 
2016. For the five years leading up to 2016, the incidents with the highest frequency 
rates are external interference (28%), followed by corrosion (25%), mechanical 
defects (18%) ground defects (15%), hot tap (4%) and others (10%).  
The Concawe report (2019) collects failure data of European cross-country oil 
pipelines, covering the period from 1971 to 2017. Its database has 62 companies 
and agencies operating a total of 32,136km of oil pipelines across Europe, 
transporting about 720Mm3 of crude oil and refined products. Excluding incidents 
of theft, the report indicates a general downward trend of pipeline failure, with the 
5-year moving average reducing from 1.1 per year per 1,000km in the 1970s to 0.15 
per year per 1,000km in 2015. However, a recent phenomenon at the turn of the 
century is pipeline interdiction for products theft, which represents 90% of all 
failures (84 out of the reported 93 in 2015). If pipeline failure due to theft is included 
in the moving average, then the 2015 5-year moving average increases to 0.95. As 
with other geographical areas, third-party activity regarding the intentional theft 
of products has been gaining traction in Europe; 2015’s rate of theft incidents are 
the highest on record and account for nearly half of all theft incidents since records 
began. 90% of all reported theft incidents happened in the reporting years 2013, 
2014 and 2015. Excluding theft, other third-party activities such as accidental and 
incidental damages have recorded the highest failure frequency (39%) over the last 
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5 years, followed by mechanical failure (27%), corrosion (21%) and operational 
factors (12%). 
In the USA, the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
are responsible for recording pipeline failures and their 2017 statistical data 
(PHMSA, 2017) has shown a downward trend for gas pipelines failures, with a 5-
year moving average being reduced by up to 30% since 2010. However, the failure 
data for hazardous liquids indicates an upward trend with a more than 170% 
increase in the 5-year moving average since 1997. The report did not provide a 
breakdown of failure factors as Concawe reports do, but it is likely the rise in the 
failure incidences are as a result of products theft.  
In Nigeria, there are a number of government agencies that keep some records on 
onshore products pipeline incidents. They include the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR). The records are disparate and often contradictory; however, the general 
trend for all the records is a significant rise in pipeline failure from the available 
data. For example, the NNPC (2016; 2012; 2006) statistical bulletins indicate a 5-
year moving average increase in the general failure rates of more than 300% from 
2003 to 2016. The 5-year moving average of the number of pipeline failure incidents 
in 2003 is 700. That increases to 2990 in 2016. Up until 2015, the NNPC statistical 
bulletin has provided a breakdown in the failure causes of between “sabotage” and 
“other” causes. Whilst the sabotage has been increasing consistently, other causes 
have remained relatively constant. For example, in 2004, the failure number due to 
other causes is 39; in 2015 the failure number is 38. The DPR annual statistics 
bulletins (2015; 2014; 2013) also indicate an upward trend in pipeline failures; in 




2.2 Nigerian Pipeline System 
The pipelines covered within this study are the 5001km length for petroleum 
product distribution in Nigeria. The system carries mostly refined products from 
either a refinery or import jetties to local distribution depots. One of the pipelines 
carries crude oil to the three refineries in the country. Figure 2-1 shows the 
geographical distribution of the pipelines. The transmission pipelines, the pumps, 
and the compressor or booster stations and other facilities that form the 
transmission system all fall within the “pipeline system”.  
The pipeline system is distributed across the country and, for operational 
purposes, is divided into five regions with a total of nine pipeline system as shown 
in Figure 2-1 and Table 2-1. Each of the pipelines links the refineries/import jetties 
with depots. The Kaduna refinery is also linked to the Escravos terminal through 
Warri by a crude oil supply pipeline.  
 




Table 2-1  Nigeria Cross-Country Pipeline Network 






350 Commissioned in 1979, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK with a 
designed max flow rate of 350m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The pipeline diameter 
ranges from 12 inches to 15 inches.  
2B a) Atlas Cove – Mosimi – 
Ibadan – Ilorin 
b) Mosimi – Satellite 
(Ejigbo in Lagos) 
c) Mosimi – Ikeja 
513 Commissioned in 1979, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK/ATK with 
a designed max flow rate between 160 to 1200m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The 
pipeline diameter ranges from 8 inches to 26 inches. 
2C Escravos – Warri – 
Kaduna (Crude lines) 
701 Commissioned in 1979, the pipeline is designed to carry crude oil with a designed 
max flow rate between 640 to 3250m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The pipeline 
diameter ranges from 16 inches to 20 inches. 
2CX a) Auchi – Suleja-
Kaduna 
b) Suleja – Minna 
510 Commissioned in 1998, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK with a 
designed max flow rate between 70 to 200m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The 
pipeline diameter ranges from 8 inches to 12 inches. 
2D a) Kaduna – Zaria – 
Gusau 
b) Zaria – Kano 
c) Kaduna – Jos 
1133 Commissioned in 1979, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK with a 
designed max flow rate between 40 to 160m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The 
pipeline diameter ranges from 6 inches to 12 inches. 
2DX Jos – Gombe – 
Maiduguri 
265 Commissioned in 1998, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK with a 
designed max flow rate of 90m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The pipeline diameter 
is 8 inches. 
2E PH – Aba – Enugu – 
Makurdi 
390 Commissioned in 1979, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK with a 
designed max flow rate between 70 to 324m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The 
pipeline diameter ranges from 6 inches to 12 inches. 
2EX_ 
West 
Port Harcourt – Enugu –
Auchi – Benin 
486 Commissioned in 1998, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK with a 
designed max flow rate between 342 to 394m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The 
pipeline diameter is 12 inches. 
2EX_ 
East 
Enugu - Makurdi - Yola. 650 Commissioned in 1998, the pipeline is designed to carry PMS/AGO/DPK with a 
designed max flow rate between 86 to 112m3/hr and pressure of 1450 psi. The 
pipeline diameter is 8 inches. 
17 
 
The pipelines are multiproduct systems for the supply of Premium Motor Spirit 
(PMS), Dual Purpose Kerosene (DPK), Aviation Turbine Kerosene (ATK) and 
Automotive Gas Oil (AGO). One pipeline – System 2C – supplies crude to the 
Kaduna Refinery. To ensure safe operation of the pipeline, they are buried about 
one metre deep on average. More details of the pipeline and fluid characteristics is 
provided in Appendix E 
Similarly, the Nigeria Oil Pipeline Act (LFN, 1990) stipulates a 100-feet-wide (30m) 
right-of-way (ROW) buffer around pipelines, where human activities including 
buildings and farming are excluded. However, recent experience has shown that 
these safety measures have been compromised, resulting in rampant cases of 
pipeline sabotage, third-party interference and large-scale accidents (Onuoha, 
2009). 
Political instability, bad economic conditions and criminality result in a gradual 
poor to non-utilisation of the pipelines. The Nigerian Minister of Petroleum 
Resources is quoted to have indicated that the pipelines, and the depots they serve, 
have been out of service for more than a decade (Okafor, 2016) and within that 
period, the pipelines may not have undergone required maintenance. This, 
coupled with the population increase of circa 60 million in the last decade (World 
Bank, 2017) and, with the attendant uncontrolled developments around the 
pipeline corridors, means that the government desire to bring these pipelines back 
to service requires a rigorous risk analysis for the purposes of safety evaluation. 
2.2.1 Case Study Pipeline System 
The case study application of the models developed in this thesis would be on 
System 2B. The pipeline runs between Lagos and Ilorin in south-western Nigeria. 
The total length of the system is circa 500km with the following sections: SPM 
(Single Point Mooring) to Atlas Cove, Atlas Cove to Mosimi, Mosimi to 
Ikeja/Lagos, Mosimi to Ibadan and Ibadan to Ilorin. Figure 2-1 shows the pipeline 
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location. The relevant pipeline is coloured light green. The system includes the 
following:  
- Oil pipeline,  
- Pipeline manifold,  
- Pigging (pig launchers and receivers), 
- Metering system, 
- Pumps, 
- Utility systems and 
- Future tie-in connections.  
Pipeline 2B is representative of the country’s pipeline system as a whole with 
respect to failure frequency, as it is in the middle quartile overall in the failure 
records across the country. 
 
2.3 Risk Assessment and Decision-Making 
2.3.1 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment, including Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), is now regularly 
used for safety evaluation and land-use planning (Hopkins et al., 2009; Haswell et 
al., 2009; Pasman & Reniers, 2014) or when bringing pipelines back to service. The 
same QRA principle applies to the wider oil and gas industry and other high-risk 
industries such as the nuclear industry (Apostolakis, 1981).  
Applying the principle of risk assessment to the pipeline system during design and 
operation enables better decision-making by forecasting potential failures and 
their resulting consequences. 
Risk assessment is concerned with the concept of hazards and risk. Hazard, as a 
word, is borrowed from the Arabic al-zahr, meaning dice, and referred to the 
ancient game of chance (Muhlbauer, 2004). In relation to safety, a hazard could be 
defined as a physical state with the potential for human injury, damage to 
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property, damage to the environment or some combination of these (Jones, 1992). 
On the other hand, risk is the likelihood or probability of realising such a physical 
state and its magnitude. The risk of a hazard being realised could be reduced either 
by addressing the hazard (that is, eliminating it), reducing the prospect of realising 
the harm that the hazard could cause or reducing the consequences that such a 
realised harm could present.  
Risk assessment is, therefore, an evaluation of the likelihood of undesired events 
happening, the likelihood of harm or damage caused by such events, and a value 
judgement made concerning the significance of the harm. The risk assessment 
procedure is summarised in Figure 2-2 with the main elements highlighted in the 
“risk assessment” box (BSI, 2018b). The process outlined below is consistent with 
common practice and is similar to those adopted in other countries and 
international organisations including Norway (Standard Norway, 2010) and 
International Maritime Organization (IMO, 2018).  
Worth highlighting from the Figure 2-2 is the integrated role of human factors at 
every stage of the risk assessment, indeed human and organisational issues have 
been variously implicated as the principal factors in accidents including in oil and 
gas accidents (Cullen, 1990). 
The development of a risk assessment process is usually driven by the need for 
regulatory compliance of the jurisdiction where the pipelines are located. This 
initially results in assessment tools that are simple and qualitative, adopted to 
satisfy the regulatory requirements. However, as the number of pipeline projects 
increase and the locations of such pipelines get closer to human settlement or 
sensitive environments, a quantitative approach begins to be more widely 
adopted. The current and future trends of safety and risk management in the 
pipeline industry are moving away from qualitative to quantitative risk 




Figure 2-2: Risk Assessment Process (BSI, 2018b)  
 
A qualitative approach generally estimates the risk by using the risk index method. 
It entails assessing and allocating numeric points to the factors behind pipeline 
failure such as mechanical damage, third-party damage, incorrect design and 
adding them together (Muhlbauer, 2004). The resulting sum is the risk index and 
gives a relative risk of a pipeline failure for a selected pipeline segment. However, 
the qualitative approach lacks rigour and is susceptible to the subjectivity of the 
assessor or participant, providing only the relative risks, so it is difficult to 
determine the acceptable risk level.   
On the other hand, the development of QRA has focused on advanced methods of 
calculating the failure probability or assessing failure likelihood and the 
consequences thereof.  QRA has become the predominant risk assessment tool in 

















- Identifying failure modes,  
- Developing failure frequencies, using probabilistic models for release 
frequency, 
- Developing failure consequences including identifying release rates, fire 
modelling, dispersion modelling, developing event trees and  
- Risk estimation involving risk transects and individual risk calculations. 
 
Different approaches have been developed to assess failure likelihood or 
probability, with the two main classes of assessment being the subjectivist as 
espoused in Finetti (1974) and the frequentist as promoted by von Mises (1981). 
Where relative frequencies for the identified hazards are limited or uncertain, then 
the subjectivist and other non-probabilistic uncertainty analysis approach seems 
more appropriate. Such approaches include Bayesian Theory, Fuzzy Set Theory, 
Evidence Theory and Plausibility Theory (Aven et al., 2014; Aven & Zio, 2011). 
The review of relevant literature for the various risk assessment steps is discussed 
further in the sub-sections below. These steps include identifying the sources of 
failure, developing failure likelihood, assessing failure consequences and 
estimating the risk which informs the risk-based decision-making.  
2.3.2 Failure Sources 
The first step in the risk assessment for any pipeline or infrastructure is to identify 
failure sources that may present a risk of pipeline failure. The types and the 
number of failure sources differ depending on the literature under review. For 
example, the CONCAWE report (Cech et al., 2019) identifies the causes as 
including mechanical failure, operational failure, corrosion, natural hazards and 
third-party activity. The UKOPA (Goodfellow et al., 2019) identifies the causes as 
corrosion, external interference, weld defects, ground movement, pipe defect, 
construction damage and others. The EGIG (2018) outlines the causes as being 
corrosion, external interference, ground movement, hot tapping, construction 
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defects, material failure and others. On the other hand, Muhlbauer (2004) identifies 
the causes as being third-party damage, corrosion, design defects, incorrect 
operations, stress and human errors, and sabotage.   
Identifying and forecasting the causes of oil and gas pipeline failure has been 
frequently studied. Many publications propose different approaches, including, 
for example, Bertolini et al. (2006) who developed a goal programming decision 
support system to predict the type and classification of oil spillage for a cross-
country pipeline. Bertolini et al. (2006) use the Classification and Regression 
technique to build a decision tree which is then used to forecast the cause of a 
pipeline leakage. The model is built to identify and differentiate the pipelines that 
are prone to failure due to third-party intervention from the pipelines that are 
prone to failure due to natural hazards. It adopted failure variables such as the age 
of the pipe, pipe diameter, pipeline service type, where the pipes are located and 
the failure detection technology in use. Bertolini et al. (2006) collected data from 
Concawe (Davis et al., 2010) to forecast the cause of failure. 
El-Abbasy et al. (2014b; 2014a) assessed the potential failure sources for pipelines 
by using regression analysis and artificial neural network models. The models 
forecast failure likelihood using failure sources such as mechanical damage, 
operational failures, third-party damages and natural hazard as inputs. The failure 
data has also been taken from Concawe (Davis et al., 2010) for the European cross-
country pipelines. The models were well-validated, although the failure causes 
used are limited to only five variables: the pipe diameter, product type, location, 
age and land use. However, majority of the variables remain constant over the life 
of a pipeline and consequently have done little to influence the results. 
Additionally, this type of approach would be ill suited for application on pipeline 
systems where data availability and reliability is the main challenge.  
A significant body of pipeline failure models in the literature used qualitative 
measures (Alex W. Dawotola et al., 2011; Achilla, 2015) whilst some addressed only 
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one source of failure such as corrosion (Sinha & Pandey, 2002; Ahammed, 1998). 
Such a body of work is therefore not comprehensive and lacks objectivity in 
assessing pipeline failure sources.  
Recent research aims to address such weaknesses by addressing the uncertainty 
created by subjective input. For instance, Senouci et al. (2014) adopted the fuzzy 
logic technique to develop a model that predicts the failure type of hydrocarbon 
pipelines and compares the results with those of El-Abbasy et al. (2014b; 2014a). 
The comparison results prove that the fuzzy-based model developed by Senouci et 
al. (2014) outperforms the regression and Artificial Neural Networks-based (ANN) 
models with respect to the model validity.  
Despite the recent efforts to model and predict the failure causes and types of 
hydrocarbon pipelines by including other causes apart from corrosion, the new 
models still focus on factors that cause failures linked to corrosion or third-party 
damage only. Additionally, little effort is paid to other issues such as the 
interdependency between different factors and addressing the uncertainty and the 
weights assigned to the factors. 
All the failure causes from the various different sources could be combined into 
four broad types: third-party interference, corrosion, mechanical/structural defects 
and operational error. 
2.3.2.1 Third-Party Interference  
The recent trend of pipeline failures indicates third-party interference as the major 
cause of pipeline failure. Between 2013 and 2017, Concawe (Cech et al., 2019) 
recorded 230 incidents related to third-party interference, mostly due to 
theft/intentional damage. The next failure cause, mechanical defects, records only 
four incidents. Third-party interference is subdivided into theft/intentional 
damage and accidental damage.  
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Theft/Intentional Damage  
Pipeline failure due to sabotage or intentional damage has been a major cause of 
pipeline failure in developing countries such as Nigeria and Mexico (Ralby, 2017) 
but it is also becoming a source of concern in developed economies, as outlined by 
Cech in the Concawe report (2019). Initially, the major cause of sabotage, especially 
in developing economies, is thought to be rooted in the economic and social issues, 
mainly in geographical areas where such pipelines are located. Although economic 
and social issues are a contributing factor, the increased incidents of sabotage in 
developed economies indicate the influence of other factors such as politics and 
criminality.  
In Nigeria, sabotage is linked to unemployment and environmental degradation 
(Onuoha, 2009) where the spate of product theft and vandalism has been at a very 
high level since the turn of the century. Figure 2-3 shows examples of third-party-
linked sabotage for stealing oil products in Nigeria.   
The impact of sabotage often leads to the loss of life, extensive environmental 
damage and economic losses. The rate of sabotage can be reduced by applying 
certain failure control measures such as carrying out regular patrols and 
surveillance along pipeline routes (Muhlbauer, 2004). Educating people on the 
dangers of tampering with pipelines and working together with the communities 
that live close to pipelines would also help reduce the likelihood of the sabotage. 
  
Figure 2-3: Intentional Third-Party Interference to Steal Oil Products (Photo 




Accidental damage has often been the major cause of pipeline damage prior to 
sabotage becoming a major concern. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) sponsored 
research (Mather et al., 2001) on gas pipelines indicates that the major contributory 
cause of accidental damage is earth-moving machinery, such as back actors and 
diggers, as a result of drainage work and construction. Different failure control 
measures have been outlined (Muhlbauer, 2004; Pettitt & Morgan, 2009) including 
vibration detection, the creation of a pipeline safety zone, electromagnetic 
techniques and satellite position techniques. 
2.3.2.2 Mechanical/Structural Defects  
Mechanical or structural defects present a major failure threat to the pipelines. 
These defects occur either due to deformation in the pipeline material or because 
of construction defects during the process of fabrication. 
Material Defect 
Material defects can originate during the fabrication process and propagate during 
the operation of the pipeline if left uncorrected, potentially leading to pipeline 
failure. The presence of material defects creates non-uniformity within the material 
layer, giving rise to electrochemical reactions that lead to oxidation and then 
corrosion. Material defects could also lead to other defects such as thinning of the 
pipe walls. 
Construction Defect 
Construction defects are primarily structural defects associated with pipeline 
fabrication and installation during construction projects. These defects include 
scratches, gouges and dents. Construction defects create an opportunity for 
corrosion due to the irregular surfaces or pores created; these permit air 




2.3.2.3 Operational Error  
Operational errors are the failures due to the operation of the pipeline and related 
equipment. Operational errors are mostly human-related errors due to, for 
example, negligence or a lack of knowledge. The error could also be due to 
operational management issues such as the lack of standardised operating 
procedures. The operational error may also be linked to equipment malfunction or 
inadequate instrumentation.  
2.3.2.4 Corrosion  
Corrosion is the loss of material from pipeline as a result of metal (pipeline) 
attempting to revert back to its original form (ore) when in contact with the natural 
environment (Orazem, 2014). For metal pipelines, the type of corrosion that occurs 
is called “electrochemical” corrosion. The process includes an electrical component 
(a transfer of electrons) and chemical component (oxidation and reduction 
reactions) that must be present at the same time, with equivalent reactions. The 
process must contain an anode, a cathode, an electrolyte and an external path. 
Figure 2-4 shows an example of the external corrosion of a pipe. 
 
Figure 2-4: External Corrosion Showing the Measured Pit Depths (Singh, 2014) 
 
Unprotected pipelines, especially the buried cross-country ones, are susceptible to 
corrosion. Corrosion can weaken the structural integrity of the pipeline system and 
make it unfit for transporting petroleum and natural gas.   
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Corrosion on pipelines can be grouped into internal corrosion and external 
corrosion. Internal corrosion takes place within the walls of the pipeline. External 
corrosion includes atmospheric and subsurface corrosion. Atmospheric corrosion 
affects the external wall of the pipelines that are located above ground. Subsurface 
corrosion attacks the surface of pipelines buried under corrosive soil. The type of 
corrosion found in pipelines includes uniform corrosion, pitting corrosion, stress 
corrosion cracking, microbial-induced corrosion and erosion control. 
2.3.3 Failure Likelihood 
Once the failure sources have been identified, the probability or likelihood of a 
failure arising from such failure sources requires identification as part of the risk 
assessment process. Guidance documents (BSI, 2006; Norske Veritas, 2010) provide 
guides for assessing failure likelihood or failure probability for engineering 
systems, including pipelines. Table 2-2 and Table 2-3 provide example approaches 
adopted in the BS EN 60812 (2006) and DNV-RP- F107 (2010) for assessing the 
failure likelihood of oil and gas pipelines.  
Table 2-2: Failure Likelihood Qualitative Ranking (BSI, 2006) 
Likelihood 
Level 
Ranking Description  Frequency Probability(/yr.) 
Very Low 1 Failure unlikely ≤ 0.010 per thousand  ≤ 1x10-5 
Low 2 Relatively few 
failures 
0.1 per thousand 1x10-4 





1 per thousand 1x10-3 
5 2 per thousand 2x10-3 
6 5 per thousand 5x10-3 
High 7 Repeated 
failures 
10 per thousand 1x10-2 
8 20 per thousand 2x10-2 
Very High 9 Failure is almost 
inevitable 
50 per thousand 5x10-2 
10 >100 per thousand ≥1x10-1 
 
Table 2-3: Failure Likelihood Qualitative Scale (Norske Veritas, 2010) 
Category 
Level 
Description  Annual Likelihood  
1 (Low) So low frequency that event considered 
negligible  
≤ 10-5 
2 Event rarely expected to occur 10-4>10-5 
3 (Medium)  Event individually not expected to happen but 






Description  Annual Likelihood  
pipelines has the credibility to happen once a 
year 
4 Event individually may be expected to occur 
during the lifetime of the pipeline  
10-2>10-3 
5 (High) Event individually may be expected to occur 
more than once during the lifetime 
> 10-2 
 
Several research works have been undertaken to assess the probability or 
likelihood of failure for oil and gas pipelines (Dey, 2003; Al-Khalil et al., 2005; Dey 
et al., 2004; Dawotola et al., 2009; Dawotola et al., 2010). They all used multi-criteria 
decision-making models and the judgement of experts to estimate the failure 
likelihood or probability as part of the oil and gas pipeline risk assessment.  
Dey (2003) used expert judgement to develop a risk-based cross-country pipeline 
failure analysis. The paper segmented the pipeline and used expert elicitation to 
assess and rank the pipeline risks in order to prioritise the inspection regime for 
the segments. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used, with the experts’ input, 
to calculate the weights for each pipeline segment. The calculated weights formed 
the basis for assessing the relative likelihood of failure ranking between the 
segments. Dey et al. (2004) used a similar approach to assess the failure likelihood 
for offshore oil and gas pipelines. The work elicits the judgement of experts on the 
importance of different sources of pipeline failures using the AHP approach and 
the relative ranking of the identified failure sources was evaluated based on the 
calculated weights. Subsequently, the expert opinion elicited was applied to rate 
the likelihood of the pipeline failing against each type of failure. This score was 
multiplied by the calculated weights to obtain the failure probability.  
Al-Khalil et al. (2005) also assessed a number of cross-country pipelines carrying 
hydrocarbon products by applying the AHP principle. They identified and 
categorised failure modes such as corrosion, external interference, operational 
issues, structural defects and erosion. Experts were invited to score the likelihood 
of failure and associated cost implication for each pipeline against the identified 
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risk factors, calculating the overall expected cost of pipeline failure for each 
identified failure factor. The ranking forms the basis for pipeline failure repair 
budget and prioritisation. Dawotola et al. (2009; 2010) proposed a model to 
calculate the failure likelihood for different causes of pipeline incidents by using a 
combination of AHP and Fault Tree Analysis. The model ranked the failure causes 
using expert elicitation and AHP weighting aggregation to evaluate the relative 
importance of each failure cause.  
Some recent works apply machine learning to develop models for determining the 
failure likelihood of pipelines. Bersani et al. (2010) applied an Artificial Neural 
Networks-based (ANN) model to predict failure probabilities for different failure 
causes. For each of the identified failure causes, a set of factors was developed as 
independent variables. The results from Bersani et al. (2010) indicate that a good 
prediction of third-party failure was obtained. However, the work did not carry 
out sensitivity studies on the factors used to determine the importance of the 
particular factors selected. Ren et al. (2012) used a model incorporating back 
propagation neural networks to predict the corrosion rate of natural gas pipelines. 
Input provided in the model includes factors such as flow pressure, pipeline length 
and gradient. The model also considered the Reynolds number as an important 
factor in predicting the corrosion rate of various sections of the pipeline. Sinha and 
Pandey (2002) also used ANN to model the likelihood of hydrocarbon pipelines 
failure. The ANN model utilises the loss to a pipeline wall to predict the pressure 
at which the pipe could burst. The estimated pressure was used to forecast the 
remaining strength of the pipelines. 
Inline inspection data is also used frequently as part of probabilistic assessment to 
determine the failure frequency or likelihood. Caleyo et al. (2009) developed 
probability distribution functions of corrosion depth and the rate of wall erosion 
using Monte Carlo simulation. Different curves were proposed for underground 
pipelines considering the properties of various soil types. Noor et al.(2010) used a 
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semi-probabilistic method to forecast the residual life of a corroding offshore 
pipeline based on data from inline inspection tools. The method was developed 
based on the DNV’s RP-F 101 (Norske Veritas, 2010) for corroded pipelines. 
A large number of the research has been conducted and the models developed 
therein were either qualitative, such as in Dey (2003) and Dey et al. (2004), or only 
addressed single failure sources for pipelines, such as corrosion (Ahammed, 1998; 
Sinha & Pandey, 2002; Ren et al., 2012). This means that a number of those studies 
are not fully comprehensive.  
Shahriar et al. (2012) proposed a comprehensive model to assess the risk of oil and 
gas pipelines failure applying Bowtie analysis. The Bowtie analysis makes use of 
the graphical approach to assess different scenarios of pipeline failures. Shahriar 
combined Fault Tree Analysis with Event Tree Analysis to develop the Bowtie 
model. The Bowtie was developed to assess the risk of gas release from a pipeline, 
which is taken as the top event for the fault tree. The model identifies high-level 
failure events, including rupture, corrosion, geological hazards, incorrect 
operation and sabotage. It further identifies the low-level factors associated with 
each high-level event. For example, corrosion has low-level factors that include 
internal corrosion, external corrosion, stress corrosion cracking and corrosion 
fatigue. The ranking and assessment of the failure factors rely on expert opinion to 
assess the fuzzy likelihood of the low-level events.  
Sadiq et al. (2004) used a fuzzy scale to determine the failure likelihood. The work 
uses triangular membership functions to develop the scale used to evaluate the 
likelihood of failure. The scale translated the linguistic terms into fuzzy numbers 
evaluating the likelihood of failure from a very low to a very high level. The 
likelihood of occurrence of high-level events was arrived at by multiplying the 
likelihood attributed to the low-level events. Expert opinion was adopted to rank 
and weight the failure factors, which gives the likelihood of failure of the pipelines. 
The model was built with about 40 low-level events; clearly asking experts to 
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provide their opinion on such a large amount of factors is difficult and time-
consuming and therefore could limit their participation. To minimise this 
limitation, Shahriar et al. (2012) used historical data in combination with the 
elicitation of experts.  
Other researchers (Kabir et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2008; Li et al., 2016; Zarei et al., 2017; 
Ren et al., 2009) have used the Bayesian Network model as part of the risk 
assessment process to assess and prioritise failure of safety systems under 
uncertainty. For instance, Yang et al. (2008) used a combination of fuzzy rule and 
Bayesian Network to prioritise the risk of collision between a Floating Production 
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) system and a shuttle tanker. The model first 
establishes the appropriate fuzzy rule base, estimates the failure factors using 
expert elicitation, conducts risk inference using fuzzy Bayesian reasoning and 
finally assigns utility functions to prioritise the failures. The model has been 
demonstrated to successfully utilise human knowledge to deliver risk criticality 
values in support of safety-based decision-making. The model, though, did not test 
the interdependency of the failure factors and how that may affect the model’s 
sensitivity. 
Various researchers used different failure variables to develop models that forecast 
the likelihood or probability of failure, as outlined earlier . The majority of the 
failure factors used a variation of either EU’s Concawe (2019) or US DOT’s pipeline 
data (PHMSA, 2018) as shown in Table 2-4. 
2.3.4 Failure Consequences 
A number of works have been carried out in the past to estimate the failure 
consequence for an oil and gas pipeline, ranging from qualitative to semi-
quantitative and full quantitative assessments. For example, DNV (2010) 
developed guidance based on a qualitative assessment which provides 
consequence scale with respect to human (life) safety, environmental consequences 
and economic loss. Human safety assessment considers first party – that is, the 
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personnel working for the operating company – and third party – that is, the 
personnel outside the company’s facilities affected by the operating company’s 
operations. The environmental consequences include pollution impacts on the 
ecosystem, coastal environment, farmlands and sealife. The economic loss includes 
production delays and claims arising from loss of revenue from customers.  
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Table 2-5 shows the qualitative ranking of human safety consequences as outlined 
in the DNV guidance (2010). Table 2-6 shows the qualitative ranking for 
environmental damage. The ranking in the table is due to the product spillage and 
type, the weather conditions and the time it takes to reach sensitive areas. Table 
2-7 shows the qualitative ranking of the economic loss consequence which is 
related to the production delay and lost revenue. As outlined earlier, the methods 
in the guidance document are qualitative and rely mostly on expert opinion and 
past loss incidents, therefore giving a good ballpark guidance in the absence of 
detailed assessment.   
Table 2-5: Human Safety Consequence Scale (Norske Veritas, 2010) 
Category Description 
1 (low) No person(s) are injured 
2 (not used) 
3 (medium) Serious injury, one fatality (working accident) 
4 (not used) 
5 (high) More than one fatality (gas cloud ignition) 
 
Table 2-6: Environmental Safety Consequence Scale (Norske Veritas, 2010) 
Category Description Amount of 
Release 
1 (low) None, small or insignificant on the environment. 
Either due to no release or only insignificant release. 
-0 
2 Minor release of polluting media. The released 
media will decompose or be neutralised rapidly by 
air or seawater. 
<1000 tonnes 
3 (medium) Moderate release of polluting medium. The released 
media will take some time to decompose or be 
neutralised by air or seawater, or can easily be 
removed. 
<10000 tonnes 
4 Large release of polluting medium which can be 
removed, or will after some time decompose or be 
neutralised by air or seawater. 
<100000 tonnes 
5 (high) Large release of high-polluting medium which 
cannot be removed and will take a long time to 





Table 2-7: Economic Consequence Scale (Norske Veritas, 2010) 
Category Description Production 
Delay/Downtime 
1 (low) Insignificant effect on operation, small or 
insignificant cost of repair. 
0 days 
2 Repair can be deferred until scheduled shutdown, 
some repair costs will occur. 
<1 month 
3 (medium) Failure causes extended unscheduled loss of facility 
or system and significant repair costs. Rectification 
requires unscheduled operation with pre-qualified 
repair system before further production. 
1-3 months  
4 Failure causes an indefinite shutdown and significant 
facility or system failure costs. Rectification requires 
unscheduled operation without pre-qualified repair 
system before further production.  
Or 
Failures resulting in shorter periods of shut down of 
major parts of (or all of) the hydrocarbon production 
for the field. 
3-12 months 
5 (high) Total loss of pipeline and possible loss of other 
structural parts of the platform. Large cost of repair 
including a long time of shutdown of production.  
Or  
Failures resulting in shutdown of the total 
hydrocarbon production for a longer period. 
1-3 years 
 
Recent work has also been carried out using other approaches, such as probabilistic 
and semi quantitative measures to calculate the pipeline failure consequence. For 
instance, Brito et al. (2009) used event tree analysis to assess the failure consequence 
of natural gas pipelines. The initiating event is taken as the gas release which either 
results from rupture or puncture (failure mode). Both releases are either ignited 
immediately or delayed. Space confinement contributes to the severity of the 
consequence of the initiating event and hence has been accounted for. The 
resulting scenarios include jet fire, fireball, flash fire, vapour cloud explosion, 
detonation or an unignited gas release. To estimate the consequence likelihood of 
the event, additional information such as the environmental, economic and human 
consequences have been included. The case study pipeline has been divided into 
segments and analysis of the consequence likelihood is attempted using the 
probabilistic-based expert elicitation approach.  
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Using probability distribution function to assess the likelihood consequence has 
previously proven difficult for the experts, therefore, Brito et al. (2009) used the 
EGIG (European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group) pipeline accident data instead, 
with some adjustment to allow for factors specific to the pipeline under 
consideration, such as land use and third-party activities. Experts were then asked 
to provide an opinion on the weighting of those factors for different pipeline 
segments. The combination of the two inputs – EGIG data and expert opinion has 
been used to rank the pipeline consequence for the segments. The challenge with 
this approach is the detailed requirement for data input that the experts are 
expected to provide, which could be time-consuming and may dissuade some 
experts from participating.  
Shahriar et al. (2012) also developed an event tree to model post-failure events of 
gas pipelines to estimate the consequences of failure. The critical event in this case 
being natural gas release leading to immediate or delayed ignition and the 
consequences that space confinement could introduce. The output events after a 
gas release were identified as detonation, jet fire, fireball, vapour cloud explosion, 
flash fire and material loss. The occurrence probability of each output event is 
arrived at by combining the gas release probability and the occurrence probability 
of the ignition and space confinement events. The results of each combination 
represent the consequence occurrence probability.  
Shahriar et al. (2012) used sustainability criteria to evaluate the economic, social, 
and environmental consequences of pipeline failures. The economic consequences 
include supply interruption, repair, material loss, property damages and third-
party-related damages. The social consequences include the assessment of 
casualties and public response. The environmental consequences include the spill’s 
impact on the air, endangered habitats, vegetation, soil, and water. The fuzzy scale 
is used to estimate the consequences of each failure scenario by relying on expert 
elicitation. The application of expert elicitation in the analysis combined the 
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objectivity and the subjectivity of the input in the model. However, the weakness 
of this approach is that the experts were not able to provide their opinion on the 
consequence occurrence probability, which is the output event of the pipeline 
failure. 
This thesis did not go into any detail in assessing the failure consequence, rather it 
uses a qualitative scale to inform the research as part of the decision-making 
process.  
2.3.5 Risk Based Decision Support 
Decisions in risk management and engineering involve a selection of different 
options or alternatives, with each alternative having both qualitative and 
quantitative attributes. Generally, the qualitative attributes are assessed using 
human judgement, which has the weakness of being subjective and often 
associated with uncertainties as a result of ignorance, incomplete information and 
fuzziness. Therefore, decisions may not be properly made without fully taking into 
account all the related attributes whilst quantifying their uncertainties (Mokhtari, 
2011; Yang & Xu, 2002; Wang et al., 2006). 
An example of a decision-making model is provided by de Almeida et al. (2015). 
The model is a quantitative one and incorporates the decision maker’s preferences 
and behaviour with respect to risk. This enables alternatives to be prioritised by 
making a hierarchical ranking of the risks. It also allows for a multidimensional 
risk approach to be taken with respect to different consequences. Figure 2-5 shows 
the stages of the model and its structure as used by Brito and Almeida (2009).    
Different decision-making approaches that aim to capture and treat such 
uncertainties have been proposed; these include probabilistic and subjective 
approaches. Within the subjective methods, the Multiple Criteria Decision 
Methods (MCDM) have been widely used to solve practical challenges in 
engineering and particularly in risk, reliability and maintenance realms.   
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MCDM methods can be grouped into three generic categories: Utility-based or 
unique criterion of synthesis methods; Outranking methods; and Interactive or 
multi-objective linear problems (MOLP) methods. Details description and 
examples of MCDM categories is provided in Section 3.4. 
 
Figure 2-5: Structure of Decision Model (de Almeida et al., 2015) 
 
Several researchers have utilised MCDM models to aid decision-making for 
pipeline systems including Dey (2003; 2001), El-Abassy et al. (2015), Dawotola et al. 
(2010; 2009), Fadi et al. (2016) and Brito and Almeida (2009). Other researchers have 
used it for safety synthesis and evaluation, including Wang et al. (1995; 1996) and 
Liu et al.(2005). 
Dey (2001) utilised AHP to propose a decision model that helps decision makers 
and pipeline operators select a suitable type of inspection or monitoring technique 
for pipelines. The pipeline was divided into segments, and datasets specific to each 
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framework in AHP is then developed with five risk factors, which enable pair-wise 
comparison of the alternative pipeline segments. This then allows for the segments 
to have their specific inspection/maintenance requirements based on the assessed 
risk.   
El-Abbasy et al. (2015) developed a model that assesses the condition of oil and gas 
pipelines based on several factors, including corrosion, using both Analytic 
Network Process (ANP) and Monte Carlo simulation. The paper identified the 
pipeline conditions and conducted a questionnaire-based survey which provided 
input into the ANP model. The ANP process has seven steps, from employing 
pairwise comparison to calculation of the final global matrix. Monte Carlo 
simulation has subsequently been used to determine the attribute effect value and 
its probability distribution. 
Dawotola et al. (2010; 2009) proposed a combined AHP and fault tree analysis 
model for the design, construction, inspection and maintenance of oil and gas 
pipelines. The model proposes an optimal selection strategy based on the 
probability and consequence of failure. Dawotola et al outlined the procedure, 
which includes problem formulation, pipeline segmentation, data collection, 
hierarchy structure development, expert elicitation and the fault tree analysis of 
important failure factors.  
Fadi et al. (2016) utilised a combination of ANP, Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) and 
hierarchical Evidential Reasoning (ER) to develop a condition assessment model 
for offshore gas pipelines by using the inspection report from the pipeline operator 
as one input variable. The assessment first used the ANP module to determine the 
factors’ mean final global weights. Then the FST module was used to assign the 
fuzzy thresholds and membership functions for the main model’s inputs and 
outputs. Finally, the ER module was used to determine the degrees of belief for the 
main model’s outputs, which were then defuzzified using the FST module. 
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Several applications of multidimensional risk evaluation and decision models have 
been conducted. Brito and Almeida (2009) contextualise the multidimensional risk 
view for natural and hydrogen gas pipelines by incorporating the decision maker’s 
behaviour with respect to risk and representing it as a utility function. Thus, 
multidimensional risk analysis for natural gas pipelines has been carried out in 
order to calculate the occurrence likelihood of a hazard scenario and the possible 
consequences that could result from a pipeline failure. The model then ranks the 
pipeline sections in a multi-dimensional risk hierarchy, with three-dimensional 
risks considered, including the human, financial and environmental dimensions. 
The risk dimensions are those resulting from the operation of the pipeline 
segments under the study. The final results show the risk hierarchy ranking of 
these segments, which gives insights into the process of managing pipeline risks 
and helps in defining each segment’s mitigating actions. The ranking also allows 
decision makers to allocate resources according to the risk hierarchy. 
Wang et al. (1995; 1996) and Liu et al. (2005) used a combination of Fuzzy Set Theory 
and Evidential Reasoning to identify and synthesize information to assess the 
safety of engineering systems. The model used basic failure parameters to analyse 
the failure events. Fuzzy Set Theory is used, employing membership functions and 
linguistic variables, to define the categories and obtain a safety score. ER is then 
used to synthesise and evaluate the safety system for risk-based decision-making.  
For this research, the evidential reasoning algorithm is deemed the most 
appropriate for synthesising the failure information and supporting the decision-
making process, as outlined in detail in Chapter 3.   
 
 Conclusions 
Several literatures have been reviewed in this chapter outlining the state of the art 
in the area of pipeline risk assessment especially for regions where data is lacking 
or is inadequate. However, from literature reviewed, a constant gap in addressing 
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risk assessment in this domain is the lack of the integration of the multitude and 
complex interdependency between different factors and interrelations of technical 
human and organisational malfunctions. The challenges and limitation have been 
outlined in the relevant sections  
Addressing the challenges of the different factors’ relations and uncertainty of 
factors’ severity weights simultaneously is one of the key contributions of this 
work. The work aims to close the gaps in the existing literature.  
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 Research Methodology and Techniques Adopted 
 
Overview 
A multi-product cross country pipeline installation is a complex system consisting 
of many subsystems that needs to constantly adapt to new approaches and new 
technologies due to the multiple hazards it portends.  One of the major challenges 
regarding the application of the risk assessment process is the associated need to 
develop integrated and flexible approach taking into consideration the human and 
organisational elements.   
To reduce the likelihood of occurrence of accidents, it is essential that scenarios 
that may result in loss of containment are assessed at an early stage in order to 
reduce or eliminate the threat. However, the operation of pipeline systems in 
developing countries is often associated with a high level of uncertainty because 
of lack of or inadequate data, complex socio-economic factors, among others. Its 
operation in such a challenging environment in which both technical and human 
and organizational malfunctions may contribute to a range of possible accidents 
requires a novel techniques and framework to address the identified challenges. 
The approach proposed in this research is novel as it develops a framework for 
identifying pipeline failure, mitigating such failures and assessing the cost benefit 
of the mitigation measures by combining three techniques of safety risk 
management and decision making as described in this Chapter. Another novelty 
in the framework is the inclusion of the concept of risk mitigation as a quantifiable 
benefit, using the estimation of the cost of averting loss of containment in monetary 
terms.   
This chapter provides the outline of the research methodology, research techniques 
and models adopted in the study including hazard identification, failure likelihood 
development and risk-based decision-making. The section outlines the scientific 
background of the research techniques and the justification for adopting the 
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techniques. The application of these techniques and the steps required for the case 
studies are given in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.     
 
 Research Methodology Overview  
This section outlines the approach on how the three models tie up together as part 
of the package for onshore cross-country pipeline risk assessment. Models and 
frameworks developed for the main chapters including Chapter 4 – Modified 
FMEA-Based Hazard Identification, Chapter 5 – Application of Bayesian Networks 
in Developing Failure Likelihood, and Chapter 6 – Pipeline Risk Management 
Decision Support Model. Figure 3-1 shows the framework overview and how the 
three technical chapters are linked.  
Chapter 4 is the initial technical chapter and serves as the preliminary assessment 
chapter where the main hazards that contribute towards pipeline failure are 
identified, assessed and qualitatively ranked. The chapter used the literature 
available, case histories and local experience to identify the failure modes with the 
highest likelihood of occurrence, applying it to the case study pipeline system – 
System 2B – in Nigeria. The identified hazards form the basis for the Modified 
FMEA analysis using Fuzzy Rules Base and Grey Relations Theory, the aim of 
which is to address some of the inherent weaknesses of the traditional FMEA. The 
model ranks the identified failure modes based on their likelihood of occurrence, 
how the failure could be detected and severity of the event, utilising fuzzy 
linguistic terms. The assessment identified the failure mode with the highest 
likelihood of causing loss of containment and with the highest consequences as 
being a leak or a rupture. This failure mode ranked number one using the Fuzzy 
Rules Base approach and ranked second using the traditional FMEA and Grey 




Figure 3-1: Research Framework Overview - Technical Chapters 
 
Chapter 5 uses the results of Chapter 4 as an input, identifying the top failure mode 
as a pipeline failure due to leak or rupture. Chapter 5 then investigates the 
contributing factors of that failure using Bayesian Networks. The Bayesian 
Networks model that has been developed identifies all the factors that contribute 
to pipeline failure due to a leak or rupture and assesses their likelihood. The input 
data for the conditional probability tables of the parent nodes relies on the 
combination of case histories from pipeline operators in Nigeria, the EU and the 
USA. Where data is not available or inadequate, or in order to specify the 
conditional probability tables for the child nodes, expert elicitation using AHP has 
been applied to map the cause-and-effect relationship between failure factors and 
the pipeline failure condition. The results indicate that third-party damage is 
assessed to have a significant contribution on failure likelihood.  
Chapter 6 models risk management decision support using Evidential Reasoning. 
The previous chapters have identified the failure factors and their likelihood 
contribution to a pipeline leak and rupture for the case study pipeline System 2B 
in Nigeria. The failure factor with the most significant contribution to pipeline 
failure has been identified as third-party damage. Therefore, any effort aimed at 
reducing the prevalence of this factor reduces the likelihood of a pipeline failure 
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incident. An Evidential Reasoning model has therefore been developed which 
identifies main attributes as Risk Control Options, with each main attribute having 
a number of basic attributes, all contributing towards risk reduction of pipeline 
failure as a result of third-party damage. The attributes are all grouped into three 
alternatives and these include technical, government and management solutions. 
The results indicate that the most effective interventions that reduce the third-
party damage potential are technical solutions, followed by the management and 
lastly government solutions. Additionally, a cost-benefit estimate has been carried 
out to highlight the cost of pipeline failure and the net benefit of implementing 
some or all of the Risk Control Options to help the operator with decision-making. 
All the models that have been developed take input from the results of the 
preceding chapter. All the models contribute to the overall risk assessment and 
management of the selected case study pipeline, helping the operators and 
decision makers in their management of the pipeline’s integrity. 
 
 Hazard Identification 
Hazards associated with the cross-country pipelines are varied and so are the 
resulting consequences, which include loss of life, destruction of property and the 
environment, disruption to vital supplies, socio-economic setbacks and the loss of 
vital revenue to the government. The hazards of a pipeline system could be 
associated with the pipeline itself, the pigging apparatus, the pipeline manifold, 
the pumps, the metering package or the utility equipment.  
Different models and approaches have been proposed to identify and analyse the 
hazards that may lead to pipeline failure. This section outlines those models and 
tools that have been utilised in this research. 
3.2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is one of suite of risk analysis tools that has gained wide adoption in the oil 
and gas sector. FMEA is a two or three parts study, with failure modes examining 
the manner in which an item or a piece of equipment potentially fails to meet or 
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deliver the intended function and the associated requirements. This may include 
failure to perform a function within defined limits, inadequate or poor 
performance of a function or the occurrence of an unintended or undesired 
function (Carlson, 2014). The effects analysis examines the consequence of such a 
failure on the system, the people or the environment. This may be an identification 
of the top-level effects or multi-levels effects. There could be more than one effect 
for each failure mode but usually the FMEA team would concentrate on the effect 
with the most serious impact for the analysis. If the criticality of the component is 
to be considered, then the process becomes FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis).   
FMEA has its origin in the military and was developed to study problems that may 
occur from a system malfunction. It was first used by the US Army in the 1950s as 
a military procedure under the title MIL-P-1629 “Procedure for Performing a 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis” (Calixto, 2016). Navy-Air then 
turned it into standard MIL-STD-1629 in 1974 (Cameron et al., 2017). The method 
was used for aerospace design and in the following decades other industrial 
sectors begin to apply the model. It is a qualitative approach to clear up failure 
modes in equipment analysis where there is insufficient information and data to 
carry out a quantitative analysis. In simplistic terms, failure modes and their effects 
shall be identified for a piece of equipment which is then followed by identifying 
causes and the required control measures to prevent the failures and implement 
the actions necessary. The process can also be used as an initial screening tool to 
identify high-risk events for further detailed analysis. 
The model is a bottom-up approach to hazard analysis and is a powerful tool for a 
complete risk model (Singh, 2014). Unlike hazard and operability study (HAZOP), 
which is operational function-oriented, FMEA is oriented towards components, 
their functions and potential failure. It supports qualitative hazard identification 
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decisions at design stage or other stages where there is insufficient information or 
when there is a lack of data for quantitative hazard identification.  
The FMEA process is summarised in Figure 3-2.  
 
Figure 3-2: Example of Traditional FMEA Process 
 
Examples of pipeline failure modes include corrosion, external damage and 
material defects. The severity could be marginal, critical or catastrophic and it is 
linked to the ‘effects’ numbers.  
The FMEA can be applied during all stages of the project lifecycle, including 
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product Development FMEA (DFMEA), Process FMEA (PFMEA), and System 
FMEA (SFMEA). 
FMEA, when used during the design stage, has the potential to prevent failures 
thus avoiding a costly redesign, or enabling weaknesses to be identified and 
rectified before going on-site. The FMEA has a qualitative risk prioritisation RPN 
(Risk Priority Number) which is a product of the three characteristics of failure 
Likelihood, consequence Severity and failure Detectability. The RPN gives a 
hierarchy of the criticality of the failures identified and can be arrived at by 
allocating qualitative numbers to the three criteria, often based on expert 
elicitation, loss data and previous experience of the assembled team. Each of the 
three criteria has a numerical ranking which is associated with the qualitative 
explanation for each of the numbers and is usually agreed with the assembled team 
before the commencement of the analysis. Examples of a typical ranking for the 
three criteria are shown in Table 3-1, Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 (BSI, 2018a; Norske 
Veritas, 2010). 
Table 3-1: Failure Likelihood Qualitative Ranking 
Likelihood 
Level 
Description  Probability Ranking 
Very Low Failure unlikely ≤ 1x10-5 1 
Low Relatively few failures 1x10-4  2 
Average Occasional failures 1x10-3 3 
High Repeated failures 1x10-2 4 
Very High Failure is almost inevitable ≥1x10-1 5 
 
 
Table 3-2: Failure Consequence Severity Qualitative Ranking  
Severity 
Level  
Description  Ranking 
Negligible A failure mode which could potentially degrade the system's 
functions but will cause no damage to the system and does 
not constitute a threat to life or injury. 
1 
Marginal System operational with minor performance degradation. 2 
Moderate  A failure mode, which could potentially degrade system 
performance function(s) without damage to system or threat 






Description  Ranking 
Critical A failure mode which could potentially result in the failure 
of the system's primary functions and therefore cause 
considerable damage to the system and its environment, 
but which does not constitute a serious threat to life or 
injury. 
4 
Catastrophic A failure mode which could potentially result in the failure 
of the system's primary functions and therefore cause 




Table 3-3: Failure Detectability Qualitative Ranking  
Detection 
Level  
Description  Ranking 
Highly Likely Controls will almost certainly detect failure. 1 
Likely High chance for the design controls to detect failure. 2 
Reasonably 
Likely  
Reasonably likely chance for the design controls to 
detect failure. 
3 
Unlikely  Remote chance for the design controls to detect failure. 4 
Highly 
Unlikely 




3.2.1.1 FMEA Assessment Steps  
The FMEA assessment steps (Carlson, 2014) include: 
i. Define system boundaries for analysis including identifying system or 
subsystem being analysed. 
ii. Understand the system or the item requirements and functions. Collect 
information on the item, its process disaggregation, failure history if 
available, manuals and Piping and Instrumentation (P & I) diagrams. If 
possible and if the information is available, conduct a Pareto analysis of the 
failure frequencies.  
iii. Define the assessment criteria and agree with the participants, including the 
ranking to use. 
iv. Determine each item’s potential failure modes. 
v. Determine the causes of the failures for each mode. 
vi. Determine the effects and consequence of the failure for each mode. 
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vii. Establish item’s Severity (S) score. 
viii. Determine item occurrence Likelihood (L) score. 
ix. Determine item Detectability (D) score. 
x. Assess the risk priority (RPN) for each failure mode. 
xi. Assess whether the risks are within an acceptable range or not. 
xii. Develop remedial measures to eliminate or mitigate the potential fault or 
failure.  
xiii. Re-assess a revised risk priority for the failure modes. 
 
3.2.1.2 Shortcomings of FMEA 
Although the FMEA process is very powerful and widely adopted in the industry, 
it has many shortcomings which reduce its usefulness. The shortcomings are 
summarised below.  
Subjectivity: the process relies on the subjective judgement of the team members in 
the absence of data for full quantitative analysis, or where the number of failure 
modes is such that quantitative analysis is not possible. 
The subjectivity of the process means that two separate teams assigned to 
undertake FMEA on the same equipment might come up with completely different 
results. 
RPN duplication: the process often results in many duplicate RPN values 
representing different combinations of Severity, occurrence Likelihood and 
Detectability ranking. This may give a misleading conclusion, implying those risks 
have the same priority whilst they may have widely different priorities in reality. 
For example, if two events each have a Likelihood (L), Severity (S) and 
Detectability (D) of 5, 1, 10 and 2, 25, 1 respectively, they both will have a RPN of 
50, which implies the same level of attention is required to mitigate the two risks 
even though they may be different. This may cause misapplication of limited 
resources and or cause a high-risk failure mode to be missed. 
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Disproportionate impact of small variation: small variations in the rating of one 
failure factor may have a significant effect on the RPN depending on the value of 
other factors (Liu et al., 2011). For example, a change in the Detectability (D) factor 
from 1 to 2 will have little effect on the RPN if Likelihood (L) and Severity (S) both 
have lower values of, for example, 1 and 2. However, if S and L have values of 10 
and 10, the change of the D value from 1 to 2 will double the RPN value from 100 
to 200.  
Weighting: another weakness of FMEA is the assumption that all three failure 
factors contribute in equal measure towards the risk factor (RPN) of the event. This 
is simplistic and in practice is unlikely to be the case in most circumstance. The 
Severity failure factor is often more important than other failure factors, which is 
why practitioners would often look at the Likelihood and Severity columns of the 
FMEA in isolation in addition to looking at the overall RPN.   
Non-linear failure modes relationship: the relationship between the numerical 
ranking of the failure factors is not linear. For illustration, Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 
show a linear relationship between the failure Likelihood value and consequence 
Severity, in terms of levels and ranking. However, if both Likelihood and Severity 
are compared with the failure’s Detectability - Table 3-3 – then it shows an inverse 
relationship between the levels and ranking. For example, whilst ranking 1 for 
failure Likelihood is “very low” the equivalent ranking for Detectability is 5 which 
is “highly unlikely”.  
Lacking natural language synthesis: The current measure of using numerical 
rankings to score failure Likelihood, Severity and Detectability which, though 
precise, can be inaccurate and difficult to assign in the absence of quantitative data. 
Natural language utilisation could be preferable for practitioners and operatives, 
especially in developing countries, where the field operating staff are unlikely to 
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be numerate and would struggle with linking an arbitrary number with the state 
of a piece of equipment's potential failure Likelihood, Severity or Detectability.    
A modified FMEA process that addresses some of these limitations is required to 
improve the effectiveness of the process and ensure the FMEA continues to be fit 
for the future. Integrating Fussy Set and Grey Theory would address some of the 
shortcomings. 
3.2.2 Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) 
FST was proposed and developed by Lofti Zadeh (1965) whilst at the University of 
California Berkeley. The theory was initially intended for application on industrial 
controllers but this has advanced and found application in wider fields, including 
engineering, operational research, mathematics, expert systems, pattern 
recognition, robotics, medicine and computer science (Zimmermann, 2010).  
Its application in the area of risk analysis in general and in the risk assessment of 
safety systems in geographical areas where there is limited or unreliable data can 
be revolutionary. This is because FST can explicitly accommodate the subjective 
and the uncertain nature of the input variables. The main benefit of FST is its 
introduction of the continuum of grades of membership and gradual transition 
between states. This enables and extends the Boolean logic from the traditional 
(crisp) variables to human intuitive fuzzy variables that allow for measurements 
and observation of uncertainties. Whilst crisp sets allow for full membership or 
non-membership at all, the fuzzy sets allow for partial membership, assigning a 
degree that ranges from 0 to 1.  
Equally significant is the flexibility offered by the FST in allowing the use of 
linguistic variables in estimating probabilities. The use of linguistic variables 
encompassing words and sentences in a natural or artificial language, as opposed 
to quantitative variables, ensures complex or ill-defined phenomena are better 
characterised and represented (Lavasani, 2010; Pillay & Wang, 2003). 
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The weakness of Boolean logic or the classical set is that they are mutually 
exclusive; an object can either belong to one set or not. This set of precision assumes 
that the structures and parameters of the model are clearly known and there is no 












         (3-1) 
The above indicates that element x in universe X can only be a full member of set 
A or not. With the fuzzy set, the membership can be denoted as:  
( )( ) ( ) , | 0 1A AA x x x X and x =         (3-2) 
where ( )A x  is the membership function of the element x in universe X for the 
fuzzy set A . A ( )A x  of 1 indicates full membership, and 0 indicates no 
membership. Any number in between represents a degree to which ( )A x  belongs 
to a certain membership class.  
Fuzzy numbers can be represented by different graph shapes depending on the 
application context. The most common of the fuzzy numbers are triangular and 
trapezoidal. This study adopts the triangular numbers as they are simple to 
compute and useful in supporting illustration and information processing. These 
can be represented as follows:  
( )
0,
, ( , )
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        (3-3) 
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where m is the mean value, b and c are the lower and upper bounds respectively, 
for the values of ( )A x  above zero. Figure 3-3 shows the graphical representation 
of the triangular fuzzy numbers.  
 
Figure 3-3: Graphical Representation of Triangular Fuzzy Number 
 
There are various operations that can be carried out on triangular fuzzy numbers 
including addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and inverse. For example, 
if there are two fuzzy numbers 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( , , ) ( , , )A b m c and A b m c= = , their basic operations 
are as below:  
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2: , , , , , ,Addition A A b m c b m c b b m m c c =  =      (3-4) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2: , , , , , ,Subtraction A A b m c b m c b b m m c c− = − = − − −   (3-5) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2: , , , , , ,Mutiplication A A b m c b m c b b m m c c =  =    (3-6) 
( ) ( ) 1 1 11 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
2 2 2
: , , , , , ,
b m c





 =  =    (3-7) 
( )
11 1 1 1: , , , ,Inverse A b m c
b m c
−−  = =  
 
      (3-8) 
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( ) ( ): , , , ,change of sign A b m c b m c− = − = − − −      (3-9) 
 
3.2.3 Grey Relations Theory (GRT) 
The proposed approximate reasoning approach for this work is GRT. The theory 
was developed by Deng (1989; 1982) and addresses decisions characterised by 
incomplete information, incorporating known and unknown variables. It also 
explores system behaviour using relational analysis and model construction, and 
deals with uncertain systems with partially-known information through 
generating, excavating and extracting useful information from what is available 
(Liu et al., 2016). GRT can also be used to analyse relationships between discrete 
qualitative and quantitative series whose components are existent, countable, 
extensible and independent (Zhou & Thai, 2016). 
As uncertainty and poor information pervades every aspect of society, GRT 
receives a wide application in different fields including agriculture, medicine, 
geography traffic and the judicial system (Julong, 1989) 
GRT application within a modified FMEA has been shown in a number of works, 
(Chang et al., 1999; Pillay & Wang, 2003; Zhou & Thai, 2016); this is made possible 
as FMEA has all the characteristics that enable GRT to be applied. Its major benefits 
include the ability to assign different weighting coefficients to the failure factors 
and that it does not require a utility function of any form.   
The building of the model involves multiple stages as shown in detail in Chapter 
4, including establishing a comparative series, a standard series and calculating the 
difference between the two series. Using the Chen and Klein formula (Chen & 






















       (3-10) 
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K(x) is the comparative series, ai and bi are the middle numerical values of the 
selected linguistic variable, d is the maximum membership function, c is the 
minimum membership function, a0 is the minimum numerical value of the 
linguistic variable and b0 is the maximum numerical value of the linguistic variable. 
n is the number of decision factors. 
The next step is the determination of the Grey Relations Coefficient, represented 
as ( )0 (1), (1)nx x , which can be obtained using Equation 3-11 below for each Risk 
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  (3-11) 
where 0 ( )x m  is the value from the standard series and can either be the minimum 
or maximum value; ( )nx m  is the value from the comparative series and also can be 
the minimum or maximum.   is an identifier and can be assumed as 0.5 (Julong, 
1989). Finally, the Degree of Relations and ranking of the factor is carried out using 
the following equation 
1
( , ) { ( ), ( )}
n
i j k i j
k
x x x k x k 
=
 =        (3-12) 
where k  is the weighting coefficient for the failure factors and { ( ), ( )}i jx k x k  is the 








  shall be equal to unity. 
 
3.2.4 Modified FMEA 
The traditional FMEA, as outlined earlier, whilst simple and widely adopted in the 
industry, has a number of weaknesses that makes its outcome inconsistent and 




To address these shortfalls, a modified FMEA is proposed, using a combination of 
FRB and GRT approaches. These approaches would correct some of the flaws in 
the traditional FMEA by ensuring that each expert and factor can be assigned a 
weighting, and further expand the RPN so that different risk implications are 
outlined for events with similar RPN values when assessed using the traditional 
FMEA (Pillay & Wang, 2003). 
 
 Failure Likelihood 
Once the failure sources have been identified, the probability or likelihood of a 
failure arising from such failure sources is estimated using a Bayesian Network 
model as part of the pipeline risk assessment process.  
The model input will be obtained by a combination of loss of databases and 
experts’ elicitation. The data used is selected based on its suitability and in 
discussion with the domain matter experts. The BN model has undergone a series 
of verification, validation and sensitivity analyses to ensure a robust model 
structure and reliable results. 
 
3.3.1 Bayesian Network 
Bayes’ Theorem (also known as Bayes’ Rule or Bayes’ Law) is one of the probability 
theories credited to Thomas Bayes in 1763, with further input from people such as 
Laplace and Bernoulli (Olshausen, 2004). At its early stages, the Theorem was 
controversial in the statistics community and therefore never reached its full 
potential for nearly two centuries. The Theorem has experienced a renaissance in 
the last few decades resulting in its wide application in different fields, ranging 
from computing to engineering and medicine.  
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that encodes 
Conditional (or Node) Probability Distribution (CPD) of the underlying variable. 
BNs have two components, the physical graph structure that shows the 
57 
 
interconnections between nodes and the quantitative part that encodes the 
probability distribution. 
3.3.1.1 Conditional Probabilities 
Bayesian Networks use the conditional probability concept of statistics, among 
other concepts, to represent the relationship between the discrete events or 
variables, employing either CPD or joint probability distribution (JPD).  
Events that interact within a given sample space can be best shown in a Venn 
diagram in Figure 3-4. In the diagram, the two events, X and Y, interact in a sample 
space Z. The sum of the two events, termed as a union, represents the probability 
that both events occurred. This is called combined probability and is written as 
( ) /P X Y Z  in probability theory, that is the probability of X union Y given Z. 
Conversely, to find out the commonality of X and Y, which is where the two events 
overlap, the intersection rule is used. For the probability of the two events 
intersecting, called a joint probability, the written form ( ) /P X Y Z  is used.  
 
Figure 3-4: Venn Diagram 
 
The conditional probability of events can thus be derived from the above. For 
dependent events - those events whose outcome influences the probability of the 
other - a general multiplication rule is used to derive the probability equation. 
( ) ( ) ( / )P X Y P Y P X Y =          (3-13) 
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Assuming both X and Y are interchangeable, that is, it does not matter which one 
is X event and which one is Y event, then the equation can be rewritten as below.  
( ) ( ) ( / ) ( ) ( / )P X Y P Y P X Y P X P Y X =  =       (3-14) 
Equation 3-14 is termed the Bayes Theorem and both P(X/Y) and P(Y/X) are the 
conditional probabilities, that is, the probability of X given Y and the probability 
of Y given X. It means a probability that one event is happening given that the 
other has already happened. The conditional probability forms the foundation of 
the Bayes Theorem, in that it is the factors that get updated whenever new 
evidence is obtained, to become posterior. 
3.3.1.2 Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayes’ Theorem relates to conditional and marginal probabilities of events H and 
E, for instance. It describes the probability of an event based on the prior 
knowledge of related events or conditions. The Theorem interprets probability as 
a measure of a degree of belief. This degree of belief is then used to account for 
evidence given a certain proposition.  
The Theorem is developed from the conditional probability product rule as 
outlined in Section 3.3.1.1. Assuming the H event is the hypothesis and E is the 
evidence and we want to assess the relative belief degree of H given E, the Bayes 
Theorem probability (P) is invoked as P(H/E), which is called probability of H 
given E. The Bayes Rule is presented as shown below (Eleye-Datubo, 2005): 
( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )P H E P E P E H P H =         (3-15) 
Dividing through and making the P(H/E) the subject gives Equation 3-16. 
( / ) ( )
( / )
( )




=         (3-16) 
P(H) is called the prior or marginal probability of H and represents the state of 
knowledge of H at the initial stage before the evidence is considered, whilst P(H/E) 
is called the posterior probability and represents the updated knowledge given the 
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evidence E. P(E/H) is the likelihood and also referred to as the conditional 
probability of E given H. P(E) is the marginal probability of E and the evidence to 
enable P(H) to be updated. The inverse of the derivation is taken as the normalising 





=        (3-17) 
For sets of Evidence (E) variables, a joint probability distribution of a hypothesis 
(H), given variables E = {e1, e2,………en} is computed using the conditional 
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
=       (3-18) 
Bayes’ Rule models a probability that updates beliefs about uncertain parameters 
given new data. Once new evidence is observed, the prior probability is updated 
by carrying out posterior probability analysis. It is noted, though, that not all 
Bayesian researchers apply the rule. For instance, Vose (2008) has shown that some 
analysts re-evaluate the prior whenever new data becomes available, effectively 
deferring the application of Bayes’ Rule to an indefinite future. However, as a 
general rule, Bayes’ Rule entails a loop process of continuous updating of the 
hypothesis (H) as new evidence (E) emerges. As more evidence is observed, the 
influence of the prior beliefs reduces in significance; given adequate evidence, the 
results of the Bayesian Rule approach that of the frequentist approach.  
3.3.1.3 Bayesian Networks Formulation 
A Bayesian Network is a tool that models and reasons with uncertain beliefs. A BN 
is described as a network of nodes and directed edges or arcs that outlines the 
causal relationship between random variables. It depicts a graphical probability 
model, DAG, that holds the CPD at its nodes based on the influence from the arcs. 
The DAG is so called due to its directed edges and non-directed cycles of the graph, 




Generally, a Bayesian Network over variable B is a pair of DAG and a set of 
Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs), with one CPT for each variable as b, and its 
parent as a, for example. This can be written as CB|A and maps each instantiation of 
ba to a probability |b a , such that | 1bx = a (Darwiche, 2008). The upper-case letters 
represent variables, lower-case letters represent individual values and bold lower-
case letters represent an instantiation of the values.    
The qualitative component of the BN is the DAG, which consists of nodes and 
edges. The nodes represent variables of interest and the DAG provides the directed 
influence amongst the nodes. The relationship is represented by the connecting 
edges with the arrow showing the influence direction. The connection types depict 
a dependence or independence relationship. Figure 3-5 shows the principles of the 
two types of relationships. 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-5: Bayesian Networks Example with Conditionally Dependent (a) and 
Independent (b) DAG. 
  
In Figure 3-5(a), B which is the child node is conditionally dependent on A which 
is the parent node. In Figure 3-5(b), A1 is conditionally independent of A2. 
 
3.3.1.4 Bayesian Networks Structural Properties 
Bayesian Networks have a defined structural property that propagates conditional 
dependency which determines what node is updated given new evidence. The arc 


















relationship. Understanding the different types of relationships between variables 
and how they are structured is key to determining how to build the directed arcs 
linking the variables; it also enables the identification of the relevance of the 
variables’ relationship visually, without the need for mathematical computation.  
The DAG structure explicitly shows dependence or independence relationship 
amongst variables; this forms the basis for the formulation of a powerful 
determinant of conditional independence called directional separation or d-
separation. d-separation will be discussed further below. 
To understand the different types of connections topology and formalise the 
different notions of conditional independence, the three ways the links can be 
directed, namely serial connection, diverging connection and converging 
connection, are briefly described below (Fenton & Neil, 2012). 
Serial Connection 
Serial Bayesian Networks connection propagates causal and evidential inference; 
this could be either forward propagation, in which case it is causal, or backward 
propagation, in which case it is evidential. Figure 3-6 gives an example of a serial 
connection. Assuming A1 represents pipeline loss of containment due to malicious 
intent, A2 represents pipeline rupture and B represents oil volume spilled. 
Supposing there is evidence of a malicious attack on the pipeline (that is, there is 
evidence for A1), that evidence will inform the belief that the pipeline may be 
ruptured (A2) and also the oil has spilled (B). It can be concluded that the evidence 





Figure 3-6: Serial Connection Example 
If we already have hard evidence (also referred to as instantiation) of a pipeline 
rupture (A2) however, then any evidence or knowledge about A1 becomes 
irrelevant to B, as the hard evidence in A2 blocks the path of A1 to B. Any 
information about A1, after evidence of A2, will not affect our belief in the oil 
volume spilled. This is called conditional independence and is formally written as 
A1 and B are condition-independent given A2.  
Diverging Connection 
In diverging connections, referring to Figure 3-7, the evidence is transmitted from 
the central node (A2) to the diverging nodes A1 and B. Continuing on the analogy 
for the serial connection, assuming A2 represents pipeline failure, A1 represents 
environmental damage resulting from the spill and B represents a fire or explosion 
consequent upon the release. Any evidence that becomes apparent about pipeline 
failure (A2) is propagated on the belief of both environmental damage (A1) and of 
a fire or explosion (B). If further evidence, for instance, becomes apparent 
regarding A1, inserting that evidence in the network in addition to evidence of A2 
already in place will not change the belief in B and vice versa.   
Conversely, if there is no evidence on A2 and new evidence becomes apparent for 
A1, inserting that information into the network will result in the evidence being 
transmitted to A2 and onward to B. 
 
 
Figure 3-7: Diverging Connection Example 
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Therefore, in a BN diverging connection, A1 and B are conditionally independent 
given evidence in A2; information can be transmitted from A1 to B through the 
connection unless evidence is inserted for A2.     
Converging Connection 
The converging connection works in the opposite direction to the diverging 
connection. If we take Figure 3-8 as an example, assuming A1 is internal corrosion, 
B is external corrosion and A2 a failure due to combined corrosion. If there is no 
evidence that the pipeline has failed because of corrosion (A2), then any 
knowledge about A1 (internal corrosion) or B (external corrosion) will not change 
A2 and will not be transmitted further to A1 or B. However, if A2 is instantiated, 
then any further information on either of the two will be transmitted via A2 to the 
other.     
 
 
Figure 3-8: Converging Connection Example 
 
Therefore, in a BN converging connection, A1 and B are conditionally dependent 
given evidence in A2; information cannot be transmitted from A1 to B through the 
connection unless evidence is inserted for A2.     
d-Separation 
In the topology of the connections outlined above, conditions leading to node 
connections being classified as dependent or independent have been established. 




Bayesian Network connections can be analysed to determine whether they are d-
separated or d-connected. This principle, though not the main aim, can be used to 
inspect the influence of evidence on network propagation and hence determines 
whether the model is behaving as expected. It also helps generally to understand 
the BN algorithm better. 
In the previous sections, we have established, based on three types of connections, 
that: 
1. For serial connections, A1 is conditionally independent of B only when A2 
is instantiated. This is written as 
1 2 2/A B A a⊥ =  where a2 represents the 
instantiation (that is, evidence propagation) of the variable A2. 
 
Figure 3-9: Evidence Propagation Serial Connection.  
The greyed-out box is an instantiated variable. Information cannot be passed 
through A2 if instantiated 
 
2. For diverging connections, as with serial connections, A1 is conditionally 
independent of B only when A2 is instantiated. This is also written as 
1 2 2/A B A a⊥ = where a2 represents the instantiation (that is, evidence 
propagation) of the variable A2. 
 
Figure 3-10: Evidence Propagation Diverging Connection. 
In a diverging connection, information cannot be passed through A2 if 
instantiated 








3. For converging connections, this is opposite of the diverging connections in 
that A1 is conditionally independent of B when A2 is not instantiated. This 
is written as 
1 2/A B A⊥  
 
Figure 3-11: Evidence Propagation Converging Connection.  
In a converging connection, information can only pass through A2 if it 
receives evidence 
 
3.3.1.5 Node or Conditional Probability Table 
Determining the prior probabilities for parent nodes P(A1) and P(A2) in Figure 3-5 
is straightforward given hard data. However, it is not often straightforward to 
determine the conditional probability of the children nodes given the influence of 
the parent nodes, that is, P(B|A1, A2). The Bayesian Theory approach would 
require the prior probability details for the distribution to be provided which 
sometimes could be obtained via field data or historical cases. In reality, however, 
this is difficult, especially in geographical areas where the basic data is often not 
available or not reliable and detailed data to form prior probabilities is rare. Even 
where the data is available, it is often not suitable as an input into the Bayesian 
Network analysis. To overcome this unreliability or lack of data, the subjective 
probability distribution is relied upon, often provided by domain experts’ 
elicitation, representing their degrees of belief.   
Different methods have been proposed to address the conditional probability 
distribution, including Noisy-Or (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007) and symmetric methods 
(Das, 2004). The symmetric method will be adopted in this research and, therefore, 







as it addresses some of the problems encountered when using the Noisy-Or 
method. The problems include its inability to consider multiple causes for the 
presence of a child node (leaky Noisy-Or is supposed to address that problem) and 
the fact that the model is asymmetric in nature, that is, it is only true in one 
direction.   
Symmetric Model 
The symmetric model provides input as a set of relative weights which maps the 
relative strength of the parent nodes as they influence child nodes. This is 
represented as a probability distribution table and grows linearly as the number of 
parent nodes increases. The symmetric model can take input either in the form of 
experimental data, expert elicitation or a combination of the two. 
To understand the model, we will use the BN example given in Figure 3-5. Let’s 
assume the two parents nodes A1 and A2 each has three states whilst the child 
node B has two states respectively. The possible states configurations at the child 
node CPT will be 3x3x2 which is 18. The task is to enter meaningful and relevant 
probability values for the 18 states. An 18-state CPT will be difficult to fill with 
hard data or experimental results; it could just be manageable with expert 
elicitation. However, if the states of the child node were to be changed to three 
from two, for example, the possible states’ configuration will increase from 18 to 
27. This will increase further as additional parent nodes are introduced or a new 
state is introduced, leading to a combinatorial explosion.    
The use of a symmetric model would ease the input requirements for such a CPT 
and ensure objective and consistent input. Assuming the two parents nodes A1 
and A2 all have three states of low (L), medium (M) and high (H), whilst the child 
note B has two states of yes (Y) and no (N), the influence of one of the parent states 
over the child state can be represented thus: P(B=yes|A1=low) = P(By|A1l). That is 
the probability of obtaining yes for B given A1 is in the state of low; all other states 
of A1 are assumed absent.   
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Since the model distributes the expert’s opinion on the relative importance of each 
parent to its associated child node (normalised weight), the normalised space 
(P(By|Â1l)) stands for the relative importance of the first parent’s state L to the child 
node assuming all other states do not occur. Thus:  
1( | )B yes A low = = =
1
( / 1 )















( | )nB yes A low = = =
1
( / )













      (3-19) 
  
( / 1 ) ( / ) .......... ( / 1 ) 11P B P B PÂ Bm nl
Â Â+ + + =  
Using axioms of probability theory:  
(( / 1 ) ( / ) .......... ( / 1 ))




l m n l m m h
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P B P B P B P B P B P B
Â Â Â
Â Â Â Â Â Â ÂP B
   =
+ + −  − 
 
If in a normalised space ( / 1 ),( / ),..........,( / 1 )1l m nÂ Â ÂB B B  remain disjointed, then  
( (( / 1 ) ( / )) (( / 1 ) ( / )) .......... )1 1 0l m m hÂ Â ÂP B B P B Â B =  = =  
            (3-20) 
(( / 1 ) ( / ) .......... ( / 1 )) ( / 1 ) ( / ) .......... ( / 1 )1 1l m n l m nÂ Â Â ÂP B P B P B P ÂB B B ÂP P   = + + +  
 
The influence of an individual parent node on the CPT of the child node for each 
Boolean parent node Ar, where r can be 1,2,…..n is obtained as below: 
1 1( | )B yes A yes  = = =  
2 2( | )B yes A yes  = = =  
           (3-21) 
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P B A A A 
=
=         (3-22) 
where: 
r r =  if the state of the parent node r is identical to the state of the child,  
0r =  if the state of the parent node r is not identical to the state of the child node. 
Analytic Hierarchy Process Pairwise Comparison 
To obtain the relative weight of the parent node as it affects the child node, the 
AHP model has been employed. The AHP, introduced by Thomas Saaty (1980), is 
an effective tool for dealing with decision-making, reducing complex decisions to 
a series of pairwise comparisons, helping to synthesise the results. AHP can take 
into account both objective and subjective aspects of decision-making and has a 
self-checking technique to ensure consistency of the output to help reduce biases. 
It works by evaluating a set of given criteria against a set of alternative options 
amongst which the best decision is to be made. The AHP would generate a weight 
for evaluation criteria based on the decision maker’s pairwise comparison of each 
criterion against the other. The more important the criterion, the higher its 
corresponding weight.   
The next assessment involves assigning scores to each option in accordance with 
the decision maker’s pairwise comparison of the options based on that criterion. 
For example, this study has developed a scale from one-ninth (1/9) to nine (9), with 
a value of 1 signifying parity (X is equally important as Y) with the two chosen 
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criteria, where 1/9 signifies absolutely unimportant and 9 signifies absolutely 
important. Table 3-4 shows the numerical weightings and their corresponding 
description of entry Xjk showing the importance of the jth criterion relative to the 
kth criterion. If Xjk>1, then the jth criterion is more important than the kth criterion 
and the opposite is true if Xjk<1. 
Next step in the AHP is the combination of the criteria weights and option scores, 
to determine the global score for each option and thus the consequent ranking. The 
global score for any option is the weighted sum of the scores it gets with respect to 
all assessed criteria.  
Table 3-4: AHP Pairwise Comparison Weighting Numerical Values and 
Descriptors 
Value of Xjk Description 
9 j is absolutely more important than k 
7 j is strongly more important than k 
5 j is more important than k 
3 j is slightly more important than k 
1 j is equally as important as k 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate descriptors 
1/3 j is slightly more unimportant than k 
1/5 j is more unimportant than k 
1/7 j is strongly more unimportant than k 
1/9 j is absolutely more unimportant than k 
1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 1/8 Intermediate values 
 
For instance, to obtain a qualitative judgements from experts on pair of attributes 
iA   and jA  represented in a form of n x n matrix, Equation 3-23 below could be used 
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  (3-23) 
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Where i, j = 1,2,3,…..,n and each ija  is the relative importance of the attribute iA   to 
attribute jA . 
A weight vector, required to indicate the priority of each element in the pair wise 
comparison matrix, is represented in the Equation 3-24 below. The weight 



















  (3-24) 
where ija  is the entry of row i and column j in the matrix of order n.  
to check for consistency of the calculated weights, Consistency Ratio (CR) value is 
assessed using equations from Saaty (1980). 
CR = CI/RI                   (3-25) 
   𝐶𝐼 =
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑛
𝑛−1






















                 (3-27) 
Where n is the number of items being compared, 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the value of the maximum 
weight for n x n matrix, RI is the random index shown in Table 3-5 and CI is the 
consistency index as outlined in (Saaty, 1980). 
Table 3-5: Saaty’s RI Values 
Order of Matrix  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




CI with a value of above 0.10 indicated an inconsistent pairwise comparison whilst 
a CI with a value of 0.10 and below indicates a consistent pairwise comparison 
assessment and considered reasonable (Saaty, 1980). 
3.3.1.6 Hugin Software 
For this assessment, the Hugin software tool has been adopted (Hugin, 2018). The 
software implements the BN algorithms and makes it accessible to non-
programmers using a graphical user interface (GUI) and an applicable 
programmer’s interface (API). The Hugin software can be used to make higher 
number of nodes in BN modelling faster and error free. The graphical 
representation of the node properties in the software simplifies the process of 
network analysis and understanding the results. However using the Hugin 
software for BN modelling must obey the general BN principle, as with any other 
method (Wang & Trbojevic, 2007). The BN principles are: 
i. The Bayesian Networks nodes must be mapped.  
ii. The states of the nodes must be defined by, for example, observing what 
effect the evidence will have on the dependent variables.  
iii. The probability of each state must be provided as that will determine the 
output probabilities.  
 
 Risk-Based Decision-making 
Decisions in risk management and engineering involve the selection of different 
alternatives with each alternative having both qualitative and quantitative 
attributes. Generally, the qualitative attributes are assessed using human 
judgement, which has the weakness of being subjective and often associated with 
uncertainties as a result of ignorance, incomplete information and fuzziness. 
Therefore, decisions may not be properly made without fully taking into account 
all the related attributes whilst quantifying the uncertainties (Mokhtari, 2011; Yang 
& Xu, 2002; Wang et al., 2006). 
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Different decision-making approaches that aim to capture and treat such 
uncertainties have been proposed; these include probabilistic and subjective 
approaches. Within the subjective methods, the Multiple Criteria Decision 
Methods (MCDM) have been widely used to solve practical challenges in 
engineering and particularly in risk, reliability and maintenance realms. 
3.4.1 Evidential Reasoning 
An MCDM can be described as a method of choice among decision alternatives in 
the presence of multiple and often conflicting criteria (Xu & Yang, 2001). The 
method considers the decision makers’ preference structure and their value 
judgements. The judgements and preferences will inform the choice of the 
alternatives and by doing so, the multiple criteria will be analysed simultaneously 
(de Almeida et al., 2015). 
MCDM methods can be grouped into three generic categories:  
• Utility-based or unique criterion of synthesis methods. 
• Outranking methods. 
• Interactive or multi-objective linear problems (MOLP) methods. 
The unique criterion of synthesis methods uses an analytical combination of all 
criteria in order to produce a global evaluation or score for all alternatives and as 
such is determined based on a global score that synthesises all the criteria. These 
methods, for a deterministic set of consequences, may be referred to as multi-
attribute (utility) value theory. The outranking methods are those that often 
produce a final recommendation with no scores for the alternatives but rather 
consider the incomparability relation and use that to produce a partial pre-order. 
ELECTRE (ELimination and Choice Expressing Reality) and PROMETHEE 
(Preference Ranking Organization METHod for Enrichment of Evaluations) 
methods are good examples. MOLP methods are those associated with discrete or 
continuous problems These are often mathematical programming that deals with 
decision problems in which the optimisation of conflicting and multiple objective 
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functions is the key. Decisions made with these methods are implicitly defined as 
a mathematical function constraint. The aim of MOLP is often to find a decision 
alternative that is as near to the ideal solution as possible and often associated with 
concepts like “distance from ideal” and “reference point” (Wierzbicki, 1980).  
Most MCDMs handle problems quite well. However, when there is information 
uncertainty for a particular problem, it is often impossible for most MCDMs to 
assess it as they will only give it a single number output, which will not capture 
the uncertainty adequately (Shan, 2015). Different solutions have been proposed 
to address these concerns including Probability Theory (PT), Dempster-Shafer 
Theory and Fuzzy Set Theory.  
Probability Theory can represent a subjective degree of belief or objective 
frequency and address uncertainty about the current knowledge by a probability 
distribution. The new knowledge is then learned by conditionalization. However, 
Probability Theory has limitations, such as its inability to adequately capture 
ignorance and the constraint that the sum probability of all possible states must be 
equal to one. Ignorance is captured in Probability Theory by assigning equal 
probabilities to all possible states; however, this can also be used to represent 
randomness and it is difficult to differentiate the two. On the second weakness that 
forces the sum probability of all states to be one, this invariably implies that a belief 
in one state must lead to a decrease in belief in another. This has been shown to be 
not necessarily the case in real life (Zadeh, 1965).  
Dempster-Shafer Theory is also a powerful tool that was proposed to 
accommodate and quantify uncertainty to address the two limitations outlined 
under Probability Theory. However, studies have shown that when this method is 
applied to problems requiring aggregating conflicting evidence, the ensuing 
results may be irrational. The assessment for certain problems can also result in an 
exponential increase in computational complexity (Buchanan & Shortliffe, 1984). 
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Fuzzy Set Theory, on the other hand, handles uncertainty by using fuzzy 
membership functions to represent imprecise information. Fuzzy Set Theory is 
discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2. It works well when applied to MCDM 
problems, however, the concern is how it defines information, rather than its 
measurements. Therefore when applied to measurement-oriented problems, the 
final fuzzy set - whose assessment is individually aggregated – find it generally 
difficult to arrive at any accurate prescription (Kangari & Riggs, 1989). 
As a result of the above-mentioned weaknesses of the existing MCDMs, Evidential 
Reasoning (ER) has been developed, which is a modification of the Dempster-
Shafer Theory. ER is considered a good alternative that addresses the weaknesses 
of Probability Theory and Dempster-Shafer Theory. It aims to provide a rigorous 
reasoning process for aggregating conflicting information. This is achieved by 
using an extended decision matrix in which each attribute of an alternative is 
described by a distributed assessment using a belief structure (Xu & Yang, 2001; 
Shan, 2015). For example, a distributed assessment for a quality of intervention 
measures to prevent pipeline loss of containment could be {(Excellent, 25%), 
(Good, 30%), (Average, 35%), (Poor, 10%), (Worst, 0%)}, which means that the 
intervention is taken as Excellent with a 25% belief degree, Good with a 30% belief 
degree, Average with a 35% belief degree, Poor with a 10% belief degree and Worst 
with a 0% belief degree. Using a belief structure approach, ER is able to deal with 
MCDM problems with uncertainties and the hybrid nature of the information.  
The uncertainties relate to (Xu & Yang, 2001): 
• The absence of data, where no data is available to assess an attribute. This 
results in the allocation of zero-sum total belief degrees in the distributed 
assessment for that attribute. 
• The incomplete description of an attribute, where the data is partially 
available. This results in the allocation of the total sum of belief degrees in 
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the distributed assessment to be between zero and a hundred for that 
particular attribute.  
• The random nature of an attribute is when some attributes are random in 
nature. This results in a probability distribution that will be transformed 
into degrees of belief in the distributed assessment of the attribute.  
The hybrid nature of the information relates to: 
• A mixture of data from incommensurable criteria. 
• A mixture of data from qualitative and quantitative criteria. 
• A mixture of data from deterministic and probabilistic criteria. 
The ER method has been widely adopted, since its development, in MCDM 
problems such as engineering safety analysis (Liu et al., 2005), pipeline leak 
detection (Xu et al., 2007) and maritime safety and security (Wang et al., 1995; Liu 





 Modified FMEA Based Hazard Identification 
Overview 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been used as a safety assessment 
tool in various industries, including oil and gas, for systems integrity assessment 
and as part of the risk assessment process. The results of the traditional FMEA, 
expressed as the Risk Priority Number (RPN), are often sufficient where historical 
data input is available and the data is reliable. However, even where data is 
available, the process is noted for its drawbacks as outlined in Section 3.2.1.2. In 
developing countries where data is lacking or unreliable, an improved and better 
approach could be ground-breaking. 
This chapter proposes the application of a modified FMEA approach by FST based 
Fuzzy Rule Base (FRB) with linguistic terms and a Grey Relation Theory (GRT). 
The modified approach addresses some of the drawbacks of the traditional FMEA 
process and is more intuitive for field operatives and practitioners. It also allows 
for the incorporation of expert knowledge and experience into the model.  
 
 Introduction 
Failure to detect, prevent and mitigate losses associated with pipeline systems can 
be attributed to an inadequate hazard identification process. Hazard identification 
is the first part of risk analysis and entails identifying sources of hazards, areas of 
impact and events that would result in unwanted releases, which could develop 
into fires, explosions or environmental damage. Inadequate hazard identification 
may be a result of applying wrong hazard identification tools, which may lead to 
a wrong diagnosis or non-identification of the hazards. 
Lack of reliable data on the failure history, maintenance and management of the 
pipelines makes any hazard identification and risk analysis process difficult (Shan 
et al., 2017). The use of a novel approach with the modified FMEA is shown in this 
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chapter to be more appropriate under a scenario similar to Nigeria's pipeline 
systems, which lacks the data for a data-driven assessment (Iqbal, 2018).   
Hazards associated with cross-country pipelines are varied and so are the resulting 
consequences, which include the loss of life, destruction of property and the 
environment, disruption to vital supplies, socio-economic setbacks and the loss of 
vital government revenue. The hazards of a pipeline system could be associated 
with the pipeline itself, the pigging apparatus, the pipeline manifold, the pumps, 
the metering package or the utility equipment. A fault, failure, blockage, leakage 
or loss of supply are some of the main hazards that can affect the pipeline system. 
The main contributors to pipeline failure in Nigeria include deliberate damage, soil 
erosion and lack of maintenance.  
This chapter carries out detailed hazard identification of a selected section of 
Nigeria's cross-country pipeline – called ‘Section 2B’. A detailed description of the 
system is given in Chapter 2. 
 
 Methodology 
This modified hazard identification methodology is developed to provide a 
framework upon which the pipeline risk assessment work will be anchored. FMEA 
is used to identify, screen and rank hazards according to their perceived risk levels. 
This enables the risks that meet a certain threshold to be assessed further or 
mitigated. The FMEA process has been improved by modifying it to include Fuzzy 
Rule Set and Grey Relation Theory to enable a better and more refined ranking, 
using linguistic terms. This modified FMEA has been used for fishing vessel 
hazard identification and ranking (Pillay & Wang, 2003) and tanker equipment 
failure (Zhou & Thai, 2016), among other applications.  
This subsection presents the general outline of the methodology and the steps 
involved in carrying out the analysis. Descriptions of the techniques used are given 
in Chapter 3. The methodology and the steps involved in carrying out the case 
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study assessment are outlined in Section 4.2.1 for the FMEA, Section 4.2.2 for the 
Fuzzy Set Theory and Section 4.2.3 for the Grey Relation Theory. Section 4.2.4 
provides the modified FMEA framework based on the combination of Sections 
4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, including assessment steps and data/input required.   
4.2.1 FMEA 
The traditional FMEA has been used as the basis of the initial stage of the pipeline 
risk assessment. The method is then modified using the FRB and GRT as 
enumerated in Section 4.2.4. The FMEA approach provides the baseline for the 
study and affords comparison with the modified approach, so as to assess the 
potential improvements which the new approach may provide.  
FMEA activity is often recorded in a worksheet or bespoke software. An example 
of the worksheet is given in Figure 4-1 and consists of eleven columns, from the 
identification of the system through to the safeguards in place.  
The first column (S/N) in Figure 4-1 provides the number of failure modes that are 
being assessed. The number to be assessed depends on the complexity of the 
system being considered and the level of refinement required for the assessment.  
The second column (System) identifies the system or the subsystem that is being 
assessed. This could be a unit or a whole complex. For the pipeline system that is 
being evaluated in this assessment, the entire system is divided into subsystems 
encompassing the geographical coverage of the pipeline and includes associated 
equipment like the pigging and the pumps.  
The third column (Item) lists the number of items that are being assessed, which 
represents the equipment, listed in column five (Equipment), whose failure mode 
is to be identified and analysed. The fourth column (Event) represents an event, 
which is the failure mode identified in column six (Failure Mode). This would be 





Figure 4-1: Example FMEA Worksheet (from main worksheet used for this work) 
 
Column seven (Cause) outlines the cause(s) of the failure, including both primary 
and secondary causes. These include, for example, corrosion, structural failure and 
sabotage. The next column, column eight (Detectability), details the systems in 
place, if any, to detect or reveal the failure and includes provisions such as alarms, 
surveillance and third-party reporting. Columns nine (Effects – Local) and ten 
(Effects – System) summarise the effect of the failure event both local to where the 
event has taken place and systems-wide. Examples of such effects include leak, 
lack of flow and inability to operate the pipeline. The final column (Safeguards) 
provides the safeguards put in place to reduce the likelihood and the potential 
consequence of any failure event and includes, for example, leak detection, impact 
protection and burial depth of the pipes. 
After the worksheet has been filled with the causes and their detectability, and the 
effects have been agreed, the numerical ranking is assigned as shown in Figure 4-2. 
Usually every member of the FMEA team will assign their ranking and the average 





Figure 4-2: Example FMEA Results (from result summary sheet used in this thesis) 
 
4.2.2 Fuzzy Set 
4.2.2.1 Fuzzy Rule Base Method  
The proposed Fuzzy Rule Base (FRB) method improves the traditional FMEA by 
doing away with the utility functions when determining the Likelihood, Severity 
and Detectability ratings during the assessment. It also offers a new way of 
determining the risk rankings of failure events. The new method – FRB – 
compensates for lack of data by integrating the experts’ elicitation into the analysis 
to arrive at the results. The use of linguistic variables ensures the method aligns 
with natural or artificial language synthesis for decision making under 
uncertainty.  
The process is achieved by following the proposed steps outlined in Section 4.2.2.2 
through to Section 4.2.2.7 below. 
4.2.2.2 Expert Selection 
The first task of the assessment includes selecting and appointing multiple experts 
with relevant experience on pipeline operations and management or any other 
equipment being assessed. The expert selection process ensures that the broad 
spectrum of the equipment’s life cycle is covered by their experience, including but 
not limited to, design, construction, operation, maintenance and process safety. 
The proposed experts being used for this study are all experienced in the pipeline 
industry, including those working for the pipeline infrastructure owner and 








































1 1 1 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 2.3 2.7 3.3 21 
2 1 2 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 4.0 1.3 4.3 23 
3 1 3 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/rupture 3.0 3.0 3.3 30 
4 1 4 Oil Pipeline Blockage 2.7 2.0 3.3 18 
5 2 1 
Pipeline Manifold/Block 
Valve 




relevance of their experience and competence, a weighting could be introduced for 
a holistic consideration of each expert’s contribution. This can be achieved by using 
the following expression.  
1




A x C a x
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=           (4-2) 
i
C  is the degree of competence of experts i, ( )ia x  is the given proposition and 
( )A x  is the weighted failure factor. 
The weighting outlining the degree of competence of the experts is determined 
based on their relevant experience in pipeline design, operations and management. 
The weighting has been agreed on upfront by all the stakeholders participating in 
the study.  
The next step is to agree on the assessment baselines with the selected experts, 
including the qualitative ranking of the Likelihood, Severity and Detectability 
ratings and their linguistic variables. The ranking could be 5-point or 10-point, 
depending on the agreed criteria. However, the 5-point ranking criteria will align 
with IF-THEN rules (Wang, 1997). For this study therefore, the 5-point ranking 
criteria will be used, as outlined in Table 3-1, Table 3-2 and Table 3-3.  
4.2.2.3 Fuzzy Membership Function Construction 
The next step is to set up the fuzzy membership functions for the Likelihood, 
Severity, Detectability and Risk factors. These membership functions will be based 
on the five linguistic variables equivalent to the qualitative ranking that was 
established in Section 3.2. 
The fuzzy membership function will be developed with the experts' involvement 
and agreement. The selection criteria of the experts and the eventual membership 
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function developed should be realistic and non-biased, resulting from the 
collective agreement of all the experts.  
Using the experts’ contribution, the membership function can be generated thus 
(Pillay, 2001): if n experts are asked for x X  to evaluate the suggestion that “x 
belongs to A” as either true or false, where A is a fuzzy set on X that represents a 
linguistic term associated with a given linguistic variable. For x X  value and 
assuming ( )ia x  represents the response of expert i, when the x value is true 
( ) 1
i












         (4-3) 
could be taken as the probabilistic interpretation of the built membership function.  
The five linguistic terms vary depending on the failure factor chosen. For example, 
the Likelihood factor has very low, low, average, high and very high as linguistic 
terms. The five linguistic terms have been chosen based on the guidance from (BSI, 
2018a; Norske Veritas, 2010) and to align with the 125 IF-THEN rule (Wang, 1997). 
The full linguistic terms and their descriptions are given in Table 3-1, Table 3-2 and 
Table 3-3. The membership functions can be represented graphically for the three 
failure factors and the Risk factor, as shown in Figure 4-3, Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5 
and Figure 4-6.   
4.2.2.4 Brainstorming using Traditional FMEA Approach 
The traditional FMEA approach is used to brainstorm on the failure factors by the 
selected experts using the linguistic terms. For each failure factor identified, each 
expert will assign a linguistic term for it covering the potential Likelihood, 
consequence Severity and its Detectability. Each of the linguistic terms assigned by 
the experts is then converted into ranking values and, together with the agreed 
weight of each expert, Equation 4-3 is used to determine the weighted ranking for 





Figure 4-3: Membership Function for Likelihood 
 
 





Figure 4-5: Membership Function for Detectability  
 
4.2.2.5 Application of IF–THEN Rule 
Once the experts provided their linguistic terms for each of the failure factors, those 
linguistic terms are converted into numerical values using Table 3-1, Table 3-2 and 
Table 3-3 and the average weighted values obtained for each of the potential failure 
factors. The membership function diagrams, outlined in Figure 4-3, Figure 4-4 and 
Figure 4-5, are then employed to obtain belief degree values. For example, if the 
crisp weighted value for the Likelihood of a potential failure is 2.3, the 
corresponding membership functions and belief degrees will be 0.67 low, 0.33 
average.  
The 125 IF-THEN rules base (Wang, 1997) is then invoked to obtain the consequent 
Risk linguistic variables for each of the failure factors identified. The IF-THEN rule 
provides structured statements by using continuous membership functions. The 
rule requires inputs, which are the three failure factors combined in a structured 
manner to give an output variable that determines the linguistic term and belief 
degree for the Risk priority. The Risk linguistic terms could be “0.5 very low and 0.5 
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low” or “0.1 moderate and 0.9 high”.  The 125 rule is derived from the combination 
of the five linguistic terms for the three failure factors, given a total possible 
combination of 53 = 125. One of the novelties of this work is that it added belief 
structure to the consequent terms such that, for example, consequent terms for very 
low likelihood, a likely detection and marginal severity is 0.57 very low and 0.43 low.  
Without belief structure the consequent terms would be very low and low. The same 
consequent linguistic terms are shared with other combinations like very low 
likelihood, highly likely detection and negligible severity.  The belief structure ensure 
that each consequent term is unique to each combination and are mapped to that 
combination’s risk profile. Appendix A shows the complete 125 IF-THEN rules, 




Figure 4-6: Membership Function for Risk Priority 
 
The membership function diagram gives two outcomes of membership functions 
and belief degrees for each failure factor. For example, a crisp weighted value of 
86 
 
2.3 for a failure Likelihood will give 0.67 low and 0.33 average membership 
functions and belief degrees. If it is repeated for the three failure factors, this gives 
6 membership functions and belief degrees, resulting in 8 IF-THEN rule 
combinations for each of the potential risk factors. Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 show an 
example assessment of one Risk factor. 
Table 4-1: Membership Functions and Belief Degrees Example 
Failure Factors Ranking Membership Function 
Likelihood 2.3 0.67 low, 0.33 average  
Severity 3.3 0.67 moderate, 0.33 critical 
Detectability 2.7 0.33 likely, 0.67 reasonably likely 
 
Table 4-2: IF-THEN Rules for an Example Potential Failure 
 IF-THEN Rules 
 If Likelihood is Severity is Detectability is Then Risk would be 
1 low moderate likely 
0.79 low, 0.21 
moderate 
2 low moderate reasonably likely 
0.53 moderate, 0.47 
low 
3 low critical likely 
0.58 low, 0.42 
moderate 
4 low critical reasonably likely 
0.84 moderate, 0.16 
low 
5 average moderate likely 
0.53 moderate, 0.47 
low 
6 average moderate reasonably likely 1 moderate 
7 average critical likely 
0.84 moderate, 0.16 
low 
8 average critical reasonably likely 
0.76 moderate, 0.24 
high 
 
4.2.2.6 Truth Value of the Membership Function 
Using the min-max inference method (Zadeh, 1992; Wang et al., 2004; Dantsoho, 
2015), a fuzzy membership function of the Risk factor is arrived at using the IF-
THEN consequences. The minimum or truth values of the rule are assumed as the 
lowest non-zero belief degrees of the antecedents’ rule for the failure factors. Those 
truth value belief degrees are then used as the consequent (Risk) values together 
with the linguistic terms. For example, if a potential Risk factor has 0.67 low 
Likelihood, 0.33 likely Detectability and 0.67 moderate Severity, the fuzzy truth 
values for the consequent Risk factor will be the lowest combination of non-zero 
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belief degrees as ((min (0.67, 0.33, 0.67, 0.79), low) and (min (0.67, 0.33, 0.67, 0.21), 
moderate) giving 0.33 low and 0.21 moderate. The Risk factor’s consequent linguistics 
terms are obtained using the IF-THEN Rule. Table 4-3 provides truth values 
example based on the IF-THEN results from Table 4-2. 
Table 4-3: Example of Truth Values for Consequent Risk Factors 
 Minimum Values 




Detectability is And the Risk 
is 
Then Min value 






0.79 low, 0.21 
moderate 

















0.58 low, 0.42 
moderate 













































0.33, moderate & 
0.24, high 
 
In most instances, the same linguistic terms for the Risk factors appear more than 
once, sometimes with the same or a different truth value. In such instances, the 
maximum of the truth values of the consequent Risk factor with the same linguistic 
term would be selected. In Table 4-3 above, the consequent linguistic term “low” 
has truth values of 0.16, 0.33 and 0.47. The resultant Risk membership 
function/value is therefore 0.47, low. Table 4-4 shows the maximum truth values 
for the two linguistic terms.  
Table 4-4: Max Truth Value 









 0.33, low 0.21, moderate 0.24, high 
 0.47, low 0.53, moderate  
 0.33, low 0.33, moderate  
 0.16, low 0.33, moderate  
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 0.33, low 0.33, moderate  
 0.16, low 0.33, moderate  
  0.33, moderate  
  0.33, moderate  
Max 0.47, low 0.53, moderate 0.24, high 
 
The belief degree with support value for this potential Risk factor is 0.24 high, 0.53 
moderate and 0.47 low. 
4.2.2.7 Defuzzification using Expected Utility Method 
The expected utility method, developed by Yang (2001), is adopted here for the 
defuzzification process. Defuzzification aims to combine the linguistic terms and 
the support values to create a crisp value representing the risk results, which 
enables ranking of all the identified risks. The ranking determines the prioritisation 
of the decision-making in selecting the failure modes to expend resources on or to 
assess the risk further in detail.  
The expected utility method is derived thus (Dantsoho, 2015): 
Assuming  
- 𝐻𝑛 is the evaluation grade, and 
- 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) is the evaluation grade’s utility value.  
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) can be arrived at by using experts’ preference or, if there is no such 
preference, by assuming the value to be equidistantly distributed in a normalised 










         (4-4) 
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where 𝑉𝑛 is the ranking value for evaluation grade or linguistic term (𝐻𝑛) under 
consideration, 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the ranking value for the most ideal evaluation grade (𝐻𝑛) 
and 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the ranking value for the least preferred evaluation grade (𝐻1).  
The expected utility value, ( ( ))u S E , for the potential risk can be calculated using:  
1




u S E E u H
=
=         (4-5) 
𝛽𝑛(𝐸) is the belief degree for the evaluation grade 𝐻𝑛. 
Combining the two equations will give the following expression, which will be 
used to determine the utility value.  
min
1 max min













        (4-6) 
For example, the belief degree and support value for the Risk identified in Table 
4-4 is 0.24 high, 0.53 moderate and 0.47 low; using equation 4-6, the utility value will 
be: 
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = 0.24 𝑥 (
4−1
5−1
) + 0.53 𝑥 (
3−1
5−1





Vmax   5 
Vmin   1 
Vn(high)  4 
Vn(moderate) 3 
Vn(low)  2 
βn(high)  0.24 
βn(moderate) 0.53 
βn(low)  0.47 
 
4.2.3 Approximate Reasoning 
The proposed approximate reasoning approach for this work is the Grey Relation 
Theory (GRT). GRT application within a modified FMEA has been shown in 
numerous studies (Chang et al., 1999; Pillay & Wang, 2003; Zhou & Thai, 2016); this 
is made possible as FMEA has all the characteristics that enable GRT to be applied. 
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Its major benefits include the ability to assign different weighting coefficients to 
the failure factors and the fact that it does not require a utility function of any form 
(Chang et al., 2001).   
The building of the model involves multiple stages, as shown in Section 4.2.3.1 
through to Section 4.2.3.5. 
4.2.3.1 Establish Comparative Series 
Comparative series are the linguistic terms for the Likelihood, Severity and 
Detection factors, and the decision factors for the case to be assessed. The 
comparative series are obtained using the Chen and Klein formula (Chen & Klein, 
1997) as reproduced in Equation 3-10. 
Figure 4-7 shows an example input for the equation of an “average” Likelihood 
ranking.  
 
Figure 4-7: Example Input for Chen And Klein Expression 
 
The comparative series for use in this project can be expressed as  




( ) , ,nx l L D S=  represents the failure factors of Likelihood, Detectability and Severity 
of the failure mode nx .  
If there are failure modes of 1 2( , ,...... )nx x x  for instance and the linguistic terms for 
the failure modes are 
1 1 1
( ( ), ( ), ( ))x L x D x S , 
2 2 2
( ( ), ( ), ( ))x L x D x S ,…. ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
n n n
x L x D x D , then 
the series can be represented as a matrix as shown in Equation 4-7. 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
. . . .
. . . .
( ) ( ) ( )n n n n
x x L x D x S
x x L x D x S
x
x x L x D x S
   
   
   
   = =
   
   
      
      (4-7) 
 
4.2.3.2 Determine the Standard Series  
This is the objective series that represents the desired level of risk and is expressed 
as
0 0 0
( ), ( ), ( )x L x D x S . Since the ideal level of risk is no risk at all, the standard series 
could be taken as the lowest level of all the failure factors for the linguistic terms, 
for example, very low for the Likelihood failure factor. The standard series could be 
represented as: 
0 0 0 0[ ( ), ( ), ( )]x x L x D x S=         (4-8) 
 
4.2.3.3 Determine Difference Between Comparative and Standard Series 






( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
. . .
. . .












    
       (4-9) 
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where 0 0( ) ( ) ( )n nm x m x m = − , x0(m) is the standard series and xn(m) is the 
comparative series. 
 
4.2.3.4 Grey Relation Coefficient 
The Grey Relation Coefficient, represented as ( )0 (1), (1)nx x , can be obtained using 
Equation 3-11 for each Risk factor of the failure modes identified. 
 
4.2.3.5 Grey Relation and Ranking 
The final stage of the assessment is calculating the Degree of Relations and the 
ranking of the failure modes. To obtain the degree of relation, the weighting 
coefficient of each failure factor will have to be decided depending on its 
contribution to the severity of the consequent event.    
The Grey Relation is obtained by using Equation 3-12. 
4.2.4 Modified FMEA Methodology 
The traditional FMEA, as outlined earlier, whilst simple and widely adopted in the 
industry, has a number of weaknesses that make its outcomes inconsistent and 
may inadvertently result in directing limited resources to wrongly prioritised 
risks. The drawbacks were described in Section 3.2.1.2. 
To address the shortfalls, a modified FMEA is proposed, using a combination of 
FRB and GRT approaches. These approaches would correct some of the flaws in 
the traditional FMEA by ensuring that each expert and factor can be assigned a 
weighting. This would further expand the RPN so that different risk implications 
are outlined for events with similar RPN values when assessed using the 
traditional FMEA (Pillay & Wang, 2003). 
The methodology for the modified FMEA, which is the underlying method for this 
chapter, is proposed as follows: 
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i. Define pipeline system boundaries for analysis, including identifying the 
system. 
ii. Obtain the details of the equipment on the selected pipeline section and its 
component functions and gather all the data available for the system. 
iii. Generate equipment failure modes using brainstorming session or by using 
a historical failure data, if available. 
iv. Using experts’ elicitation, establish Likelihood, Severity and Detectability 
values of each identified failure mode using linguistic terms. Where 
quantitative data is available, this will be incorporated into the assessment. 
v. Defuzzify the failure factors to obtain crisp values for use with the 
membership function graph. Include the weighting for each of the experts 
based on their relevant expertise. 
For Fuzzy Base Rule: 
vi. Use fuzzy membership function, IF-THEN rule, min-max rule to establish 
the failure Risk belief degree and support value. 
vii. Defuzzify the belief degree and support value using the expected utility 
value and rank the risk numbers obtained.   
For Grey Relation Theory:  
viii. Establish comparative and standard series and calculate the difference 
between the two. 
ix. Introduce weighting to each of the failure factors. 
x.  Calculate the degree of relation and rank the risk numbers obtained.   
Figure 4-8 shows the flowchart of the proposed approach.   
4.2.5 Data Required 
The data required for the analysis varies depending on the assessment approach. 




Figure 4-8: Modified FMEA Approach 
 
FMEA approach. However, the majority of the input data required is common to 
both the two approaches and includes: 
i. What does the pipeline system or subsystem do? 
ii. The function of the item or subsystem being assessed.  




iv. What will happen if it fails?  
v. The Likelihood of failure - occurrence Likelihood (L). 
vi. The consequence of failure - Severity (S). 
vii. The predictability of failure - Detectability (D). 
In addition to the above, the modified FMEA requires information on the agreed 
linguistic terms and the corresponding ranking, as well as the selected linguistic 
variables for each failure factor and the agreed weighting assigned to each expert 
and each failure factor.     
 
 Case Study: Application to Cross-Country Pipeline 
The proposed modified FMEA incorporating FRB and GRT is implemented in an 
example case study of one of Nigeria’s pipeline systems, which is System 2B. The 
system is described in Chapter 2. 
The modified FMEA case study will investigate all the equipment highlighted 
above. However, not all potential failure modes will be identified. This study will 
outline the common failures based on case histories, experts’ input and those 
failures with the most severe outcomes. The study will review the failure modes, 
their causes, the effect of those failures locally on the equipment itself and globally 
on the system as a whole. It will also highlight the systems in place to reveal such 
failures and any safeguards in the system to reduce or mitigate the consequences 
of the failures.  
Generic failure events have been generated from the possible failures of each 
equipment obtained from global case history for similar pipelines, literature 
(Muhlbauer, 2004), the local failure data and input from field operatives and 
experts, based on their experience. These are provided in Table 4-5. 
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Failure Mode Cause 
1 1 1 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupture 
External leakage from pinhole, flange 
or following impact or welding 
failure. 
2 1 2 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupture 
Deliberate - pipeline damage for 
product theft or vandalism. 
3 1 3 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupture 
Pipeline failure due to corrosion and 
structural weakness. 
4 1 4 Oil Pipeline Blockage Line restricted by a partial or complete 
blockage. 





External leakage from pinhole, flange 
or following impact or welding 
failure. 





Deliberate - damage for product theft 
or vandalism. 





Pipeline failure due to corrosion and 
structural weakness. 
8 2 4 Pipeline 
Manifold/Block 
Valve 
Blockage Line restricted by a partial or complete 
blockage. 





Actuated valve failed to shut. 





Actuated valve failed to open. 





Actuated valve failed, partly open. 
12 3 1 Pumps Product Leak External leakage from pinhole, flange, 
seals, following impact or sabotage. 
13 3 2 Pumps Pump Fault Pump reduced performance due to 
bearing, impeller problem or partial 
blockage. 
14 3 3 Pumps Pump Failure Pump stops due to power loss or shaft 
breakage. 
15 3 4 Pumps Pump Failure Pump stops due to loss of common 
power supply. 
16 3 5 Pumps Pump Failure Standby pump fails to start on 
demand when duty pump fails. 
17 4 1 Utility Loss of Supply Loss of utility or power. 
18 4 2 Utility Reduced 
Supply 
Restriction in supply due to faulty 
instrument, valve, controller or pump. 
19 4 3 Utility Electrical 
Over-supply 



















Failure Mode Cause 




Flow mismatch or inaccurate reading. 
21 5 2 Metering 
Package 
Product Leak Leakage from pinhole, flange, 
following impact or sabotage. 
22 5 3 Metering 
Package 
Blockage Line restricted by partial or complete 
blockage, for example, a stuck sphere. 




Leakage from pinhole, flange, 
following impact or sabotage. 
24 6 2 Pig Launcher/ 
Receiver 
Blockage Line restricted blockage, for example, 
stuck sphere across main isolation 
valve. 
25 6 3 Pig Launcher/ 
Receiver 




Unable to isolate pig unit due to 
jammed, passing or failed valve. 
26 6 4 Pig Launcher/ 
Receiver 
Door Failure Unable to seal pig unit due to jammed 
or failed door mechanism. 




External leakage from pinhole, flange, 
following impact or sabotage. 
 
Three experts have been selected for the assessment; their position and expertise 
are summarised in Table 4-6. For anonymity, both their names and the 
organisations they represent are not shown in the table but have been documented 
for the record.  
Table 4-6: Experts Selected for the Research 
No Area of Expertise  Organisational Sector  Years of Experience 
1 HSE Engineer Pipeline regulator >10 years 
2 Project Engineer Pipeline infrastructure 
owner and operator 
>10 years  
3 Loss Prevention Engineer Pipeline consultants >5 years 
 
4.3.1 Traditional FMEA 
The aim of the modified FMEA process is to improve the traditional process. In 
order to appreciate the proposed improvement and to afford comparison, it is 
proposed that this study undertakes a traditional FMEA using numerical rankings 
as the basis for comparison. The process entails the selected experts to identify the 
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numerical ranking of each failure mode representing the failure Likelihood, 
consequent Severity and its Detectability.  
In assigning the numerical ranking by the experts, the operator of the pipeline has 
provided as much information about the state of the pipeline as possible. The 
summary of the numerical ranking is shown in Table 4-7. Details and the 
description of the failure modes and failure factors are given in Appendix B. 











































1 1 1 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 2.3 2.7 3.3 21 
2 1 2 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 4.0 1.3 4.3 23 
3 1 3 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 3.0 3.0 3.3 30 
4 1 4 Oil Pipeline Blockage 2.7 2.0 3.3 18 
5 2 1 
Pipeline 
Manifold/Block Valve 
Product Leak/Rupture 1.7 2.0 3.3 11 
6 2 2 
Pipeline 
Manifold/Block Valve 
Product Leak/Rupture 2.7 2.3 4.3 27 
7 2 3 
Pipeline 
Manifold/Block Valve 
Product Leak/Rupture 2.7 2.7 4.0 28 
8 2 4 
Pipeline 
Manifold/Block Valve 
Blockage 2.3 2.0 3.7 17 
9 2 5 
Pipeline 
Manifold/Block Valve 
Line Valve Failure 1.7 1.7 3.3 9 
10 2 6 
Pipeline 
Manifold/Block Valve 
Line Valve Failure 1.3 2.7 3.0 11 
11 2 7 
Pipeline 
Manifold/Block Valve 
Line Valve Failure 2.3 3.3 2.7 21 
12 3 1 Pumps Product Leak 4.0 1.3 3.0 16 
13 3 2 Pumps Pump Fault 3.3 2.7 2.7 24 
14 3 3 Pumps Pump Failure 3.3 1.0 3.7 12 
15 3 4 Pumps Pump Failure 3.7 1.0 4.0 15 
16 3 5 Pumps Pump Failure 2.7 2.0 4.0 21 
17 4 1 Utility Loss of Supply 3.7 1.0 4.0 15 
18 4 2 Utility Reduced Supply 2.7 3.3 2.3 21 
19 4 3 Utility Electrical Over-supply 3.0 1.3 3.7 15 
20 5 1 Metering Package Instrumentation Fault 3.0 3.3 2.0 20 
21 5 2 Metering Package Product Leak 3.0 2.7 3.0 24 
22 5 3 Metering Package Blockage 2.7 2.3 3.3 21 
23 6 1 Pig Launcher/Receiver Product Leak/Rupture 3.7 2.7 3.3 33 
24 6 2 Pig Launcher/Receiver Blockage 2.0 2.0 3.3 13 
25 6 3 
Pig Launcher/Receiver Valve Failure/Problems 
with Valve Sequencing 
2.0 2.0 2.3 9 
26 6 4 Pig Launcher/Receiver Door Failure 2.3 2.0 2.7 12 
27 7 1 
Future Tie-in 
Connection 




4.3.2 Fuzzy Base Rule Modified FMEA 
The modified FMEA using the Fuzzy Base Rule has been applied to the 2B Pipeline 
system’s hazards identification. The process uses the same experts’ input as the 
traditional FMEA but utilises the FRB linguistic terms in allocating ranking for the 
failure modes, which is the failure occurrence Likelihood, Severity of failure and 
its Detectability. The fuzzy terms include, for example, very low, low, average, high 
and very high for Likelihood failure mode. The details of the linguistic terms for the 
failure modes are outlined in Table 3-1, Table 3-2 and Table 3-3.  
The experts’ selection and their weighting, based on their relevant experience, is 
outlined in Table 4-8 and forms the basis of obtaining the average ranking of the 
failure modes as shown below.   
Table 4-8: Experts’ Weighting 
No Area of Expertise  Relevant Experience Weighting 
1 HSE Engineer 0.33 
2 Project Engineer 0.33 
3 Loss Prevention Engineer 0.33 
 
The equal weighting used in Table 4-8 enables comparison to be made between the 
results of the modified approaches and that of the traditional approach. Section 4.4 
shows the impact on the results when the experience of the experts is reflected in 
the assigned weighting where 0.4, 0.1 and 0.5 are assigned to the HSE, Project and 
Loss Prevention Engineers respectively. 
The linguistic terms assigned by each expert for each of the failure modes are 
converted into the relevant numerical ranking and each is then multiplied with the 
weighting as was established in Equation 4-1.  Table 4-9 gives two examples of the 
experts’ assigned linguistic terms for failure Likelihood, Severity and Detectability 
failure modes and their corresponding numerical value equivalent, including the 
weighted ranking for the failure mode. 
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An example calculation of how the numbers in Table 4-9 have been arrived at is 
given below.  
For product leak failure Likelihood,  
(1) 1 11 2 12 3 13A C a C a C a= + +  
A(1) = (4× 0.33) + (4× 0.33) + (4× 0.33) = 4.0 
For blockage failure Likelihood,  
(2) 1 21 2 22 3 23A C a C a C a= + +  
A(2) = (3× 0.33) + (2× 0.33) + (3× 0.33) = 2.7 
The weighted ranking is required in obtaining belief degrees with support values 
Table 4-9: Example Linguistic Terms and Ranking Oil Pipeline.  
Failure 
Mode 









High High High 4 4 4 4.0 



















Catastrophic Critical Critical 5 4 4 4.3 
Blockage Catastrophic Moderate Marginal 5 3 2 3.3 
 
One of the strengths of the FRB system is its continuity of membership, allowing 
the use of the crisp values to obtain membership functions and belief degrees. 
Figure 4-3, Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 are employed to obtain the membership 
functions and the belief degrees for the Likelihood, Severity and Detectability 
values respectively.  
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The belief function for the Likelihood of a failure due to a product leak with 4.0 
ranking is 1 high. The belief function for the Likelihood of failure due to a blockage 
with a 2.7 ranking is 0.33 low and 0.67 average. This is shown in Figure 4-9 and 
Figure 4-10. 
 
Figure 4-9: Membership Function of Product Leak Failure Likelihood with 4.0 
Ranking 
 




Table 4-10 shows the membership functions and their belief degrees values for an 
oil pipeline product leak and blockage failure modes for the Likelihood, Detection 
and Severity values. 
Table 4-10: Membership Functions for Oil Pipeline Failure Modes 
Failure  
Mode 
Likelihood Detectability Severity 
Ranking  M’ship 
Function 
Ranking  M’ship 
Function 




4.0 1, high 1.3 0.67, highly 
likely & 
0.33, likely 
4.3 0.67, critical & 
0.33 
catastrophic 
Blockage 2.7 0.33, low 
& 0.67, 
average 
2.0 1, likely 3.3 0.67, moderate 
& 0.33, critical 
 
The next step is applying the 125 IF-THEN rules with a belief structure (Wang, 
1997) to the linguistic terms to determine the consequent Risk function of the 
failure modes.  
For example, for the product leak failure mode that is being used, the consequent 
risk function would be determined as (See Table A1.2):  
If Likelihood is high 
Detectability is highly likely 
Severity is critical 
Then the Risk is 0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
Once the Risk linguistic variables are determined, the min-max rule is used to 
obtain the minimum truth value of the belief degrees. For example, for the product 
leak failure mode that is being used, one of the minimum values of the consequent 
Risk factor is determined as:  
If Likelihood is 1, high 
Severity is 0.67, critical 
Detectability is 0.67, highly likely 
And Risk 0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
The minimum value for the Risk factor is, therefore 0.42 moderate and 0.58 low. The 
0.42 is the minimum value of 1 (for Likelihood), 0.67 (for Severity), 0.67 (for 
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Detectability) and 0.42 (for Risk) associated with moderate. In the same vein, 0.58 is 
the minimum value of 1, 0.67, 0.67 and 0.58 associated with low. Table 4-11 shows 
the rest of the minimum values of the consequent Risks for the product leak and 
blockage failure modes.  
The maximum rule is then applied to determine the maximum truth value 
associated with each of the Risk linguistic variables. Table 4-12 shows how the 
maximum rule has been applied to determine the truth value. 
The Risk linguistic terms and their respective maximum belief values are then used 
to arrive at the expected utility value, which is the final element required to 
prioritise the failure modes. The expected utility values are obtained using 
Equation 4-6.  
For the product leak failure mode, the expected utility value is  
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = 0.58 𝑥 (
2−1
5−1
) + 0.42 𝑥 (
3−1
5−1




For the blockage failure mode, the expected utility value is: 
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = 0.47 𝑥 (
2−1
5−1





Product Leak Blockage 
Vmax = 5 Vmax = 5 
Vmin = 1 Vmin = 1 
Vn (low) = 2 Vn (low) = 2 
Vn (moderate) = 3 Vn (moderate) = 3 
Vn (high) = 4   
βn (low) = 0.58 βn (low) = 0.47 
βn (moderate) = 0.42 βn (moderate) = 0.53 
βn (high) = 0.33   
u(S(E)) = 0.603 u(S(E)) = 0.383 
 






Table 4-11: Application of IF-THEN and Min Rules to Determine Risk Linguistic Variables and Min Membership Function.   












1, high 1, high 1, high 1, high     



































































































0.67, average 0.67, average 









0.33, critical 0.33, critical 
Detectability 
is 










0.58 low, 0.42 
moderate 




















0.33, low & 
0.21, 
moderate 
0.33, low & 
0.33, 
moderate 





& 0.47, low 
0.53, 
moderate 










Table 4-12: Application of Max Rule to Determine Maximum Value for Risk 
  Pipeline – Product Leak Pipeline Blockage 
Risk membership function/value for 
Low Moderate High Low Moderate 
0.58, low 0.33, moderate 0.14 high 0.33, low 0.53, moderate 
0.58, low 0.33, moderate 0.33 high 0.33, low 0.53, moderate 
0.33, low 0.33, moderate 0.14 high 0.33, low 0.33, moderate 
0.33, low 0.33, moderate 0.33 high 0.33, low 0.33, moderate 
 0.33, moderate  0.47, low 0.21, moderate 
 0.33, moderate  0.47, low 0.21, moderate 
 0.42, moderate  0.16, low 0.33, moderate 
 0.42, moderate  0.16, low 0.33, moderate 




4.3.3 Grey Relation Theory Modified FMEA 
The application of the GRT to the modified FMEA is similar to that of the FRB in 
that it requires similar inputs and shares similar natural language utilisation. The 
input values for the Likelihood, Severity and Detectability factors are the linguistic 
variables, which have the same meaning as described in Section 4.2.2. The 
linguistic terms for the Likelihood of failure are very low, low, average, high and very 
high; the linguistic terms for Severity are negligible, marginal, moderate, critical and 
catastrophic, whilst the linguistic terms for Detectability are highly likely, likely, 
reasonably likely, unlikely and highly unlikely.  
Using the Chen and Klein formula, the comparative series of the failure factors are 
obtained. The Chen and Klein formula is outlined in Equation 3-10. 
The comparative series calculation is undertaken for the linguistic terms provided 
by the experts for the three failure factors. As an example, the Likelihood linguistic 
term selected by expert #3 for the pipeline product leak failure factor used in the 
previous example is high, thus the comparative series is: 
(4 0) (5 0)
( )










Table 4-13: Fuzzy FMEA Ranking 
No 
Equipment 




1 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupture 
0.67, low & 0.33, average 0.67, moderate & 0.33, critical 0.33, likely & 0.67, reasonably likely 0.47, low & 0.53, moderate & 0.24, 
high 
0.563 
2 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 1, high  0.67, critical & 0.33, catastrophic 0.67, highly likely & 0.33, likely 
0.58, low & 0.42, moderate & 0.33, 
high 0.603 
3 Oil Pipeline 
Product 
Leak/Rupture 1, average  0.67, moderate & 0.33, critical 1, reasonably likely  0.67, moderate & 0.67, high 0.838 
4 Oil Pipeline Blockage 0.33, low & 0.67, average 0.67, moderate & 0.33, critical 1, likely  0.47, low & 0.53, moderate 0.383 





Leak/Rupture 0.33, low & 0.67, average 0.67, critical & 0.33, catastrophic 0.67, likely & 0.33, reasonably likely 






0.33, low & 0.67, average 1, critical  0.33, likely & 0.67, reasonably likely 0.33, low & 0.67, moderate & 0.49, 
high 
0.785 
8 Pipeline Manifold/Block Valve Blockage 0.67, low & 0.33, average 0.33, moderate & 0.67, critical 1, likely  0.58, low & 0.42, moderate 0.355 
9 Pipeline Manifold/Block Valve Line Valve Failure 0.33, very low & 0.67, low 0.67, moderate & 0.33, critical 0.33, highly likely & 0.67, likely 









Line Valve Failure 0.67, low & 0.33, average 0.33, marginal & 0.67, moderate 0.67, reasonably likely & 0.33, 
unlikely 
0.47, low & 0.53, moderate & 0.24, 
high 
0.563 
12 Pumps Product Leak 1, high  1, moderate  0.67, highly likely & 0.33, likely 
0.67, low & 0.37, moderate & 0.08, 
high 0.413 
13 Pumps Pump Fault 0.67, average & 0.33, high 0.33, marginal & 0.67, moderate 0.33, likely & 0.67, reasonably likely 
0.33, low & 0.67, moderate & 0.24, 
high 0.598 
14 Pumps Pump Failure 0.67, average & 0.33, high 0.33, moderate & 0.67, critical 1, highly likely  0.67, low & 0.33, moderate 0.333 
15 Pumps Pump Failure 0.33, average & 0.67, high 1, critical  1, highly likely  0.58, low & 0.42, moderate 0.355 
16 Pumps Pump Failure 0.33, low & 0.67, average 1, critical  1, likely  0.33, low & 0.67, moderate & 0.24, high 0.598 
17 Utility Loss of Supply 0.33, average & 0.67, high 1, critical  1, highly likely  0.58, low & 0.42, moderate 0.355 
18 Utility Reduced Supply 0.33, low & 0.67, average 0.67, marginal & 0.33, moderate 0.67, reasonably likely & 0.33, unlikely 
0.47, low & 0.53, moderate & 0.24, 
high 0.563 
19 Utility Electrical Over-supply 1, average  0.33, moderate & 0.67, critical 0.67, highly likely & 0.33, likely 0.67, low & 0.33, moderate 0.333 
20 Metering Package Instrumentation Fault 1, average  1, marginal  
0.67, reasonably likely & 0.33, 
unlikely 0.53, moderate & 0.67, low  0.433 
21 Metering Package Product Leak 1, average  1, moderate  0.33, likely & 0.67, reasonably likely 0.67, moderate & 0.24, high & 0.33, 
low 
0.598 
22 Metering Package Blockage 0.33, low & 0.67, average 0.67, moderate & 0.33, critical 0.67, likely & 0.33, reasonably likely 0.47, low & 0.53, moderate & 0.24, high 0.563 
23 Pig Launcher/Receiver Product 
Leak/Rupture 
0.33, average & 0.67, high 0.67, moderate & 0.33, critical 0.33, likely & 0.67, reasonably likely 0.67, moderate & 0.33, high & 0.33, 
low 
0.665 
24 Pig Launcher/Receiver Blockage 1, low  0.67, moderate & 0.33, critical 1, likely  0.67, low & 0.33, moderate 0.333 
25 Pig Launcher/Receiver Valve Failure  1, low  0.67, marginal & 0.33, moderate 1, likely  0.67, low & 0.21, moderate 0.273 





Leak/Rupture 1, low  0.33, marginal & 0.67, moderate 
0.67, reasonably likely & 0.33, 




The input for the calculation and the results are shown in Table 4-14. 
Av K(x) is the average of the comparative series of the three experts, taking into 
consideration the weight assigned to each expert based on their relevant 
experience and expertise.   
 
Table 4-14: Comparative Series - Product Leak/Blockage Failure Modes 
  Likelihood Detection Severity 










 HI HI HI HL HL LI CA CR CR 
d 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a0 3 3 3 0 0 1 4 3 3 
b0 5 5 5 2 2 3 5 5 5 
ai 4 4 4 1 1 2 5 4 4 
bi 4 4 4 1 1 2 5 4 4 
K(x) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.91 0.75 0.75 






 AV LO AV HL LI RL CA MO MA 
d 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a0 2 1 2 0 1 2 4 2 1 
b0 4 3 4 2 3 4 5 4 3 
ai 3 2 3 1 2 3 5 3 2 
bi 3 2 3 1 2 3 5 3 2 
K(x) 0.58 0.42 0.58 0.25 0.42 0.58 0.91 0.58 0.42 
Av 0.53 0.42 0.64 
Note: HI is high, HL is highly likely, CA is catastrophic, CR is critical, AV is average, LO 
is low, LI is likely RL is reasonably likely, MO is moderate and MA is marginal. 
 
The comparative series of the two failure modes are summarised as below, using 
Equation 4-7. 
For product leak 
( ) 0.75 0.31 0.80cS leak  =    
For blockage 
( ) 0.53 0.42 0.64cS blockage  =    
Once a comparative series is obtained, a standard series is also calculated; this 
enables the difference between the two to be assessed. The standard series are the 
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ideal failure factors values to be aimed at, which for Likelihood should be very low, 
for Severity should be negligible and for Detectability should be highly likely.   
Using Equation 3-10, the standard series for the three failure factors is calculated 
as 0.25. 
(1 0) (2 0)
( )





− + − − − + −
=
 
The difference between the standard series and the comparative series for the two 
failure modes is shown below. The difference is obtained by subtracting the 
standard series from the average comparative series for the three failure factors 
using Equation 4-9.   
For the product leak, the difference (D0) is: 
0
0
( ) 0.75 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.80 0.25
( ) 0.50 0.06 0.55
D leak
D leak
 = − − − 
 =  
 
For the blockage, the difference D0 is: 
0
0
( ) 0.53 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.64 0.25
( ) 0.28 0.17 0.39
D blockage
D blockage
 = − − − 
 =  
 
The next step is obtaining the Grey Relations coefficient, ( )0 (1), (1)nx x , for the 
three failure factors – Likelihood, Severity and Detectability. This is obtained by 
























































         = 0.796 
Finally, the degree of relation is calculated using Equation 3-12, taking into account 
the agreed weighting coefficient for each of the failure factors.   The input for the 
two failure modes is shown in Table 4-15.  
Table 4-15: Example Degree of Relations Input 
Equipment 
Description 





Oil Pipeline Product Leak Likelihood 0.565 0.33 
Severity 0.540 0.33 
Detectability 0.921 0.33 
Oil Pipeline Blockage Likelihood 0.701 0.33 
Severity 0.627 0.33 
Detectability 0.796 0.33 
For the product leak failure mode, the degree of relation would be:  
Γ = (0.565 ×0.33)+(0.540 ×0.33)+(0.921 ×0.33) 
Γ = 0.676 
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For the blockage failure mode, the degree of relation would be:  
Γ = (0.701 × 0.33)+ (0.627 ×0.33)+(0.796 × 0.33) 
Γ = 0.708 
Note that for Grey Relation, the higher the value obtained for a failure mode, the 
lower the relative risk the failure has compared to other failure modes.  
Table 4-16 shows the input and the results of all the failure modes.  
















1 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupt
ure 
Likelihood 0.75 0.33 
0.69 Severity 0.63 0.33 
Detection 0.70 0.33 
2 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupt
ure 
Likelihood 0.57 0.33 
0.68 Severity 0.54 0.33 
Detection 0.92 0.33 
3 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupt
ure 
Likelihood 0.66 0.33 
0.65 Severity 0.63 0.33 
Detection 0.66 0.33 
4 Oil Pipeline Blockage Likelihood 0.70 0.33 
0.71 Severity 0.63 0.33 
Detection 0.80 0.33 
5 Oil Pipeline Line Valve 
Failure 
Likelihood 0.85 0.33 
0.76 Severity 0.63 0.33 







Likelihood 0.70 0.33 
0.66 Severity 0.54 0.33 







Likelihood 0.70 0.33 
0.66 Severity 0.57 0.33 




Blockage Likelihood 0.75 0.33 
0.71 Severity 0.60 0.33 






Likelihood 0.85 0.33 
0.78 Severity 0.63 0.33 






Likelihood 0.92 0.33 
0.76 Severity 0.66 0.33 






Likelihood 0.75 0.33 
0.69 Severity 0.70 0.33 
Detection 0.63 0.33 
12 Pumps Product 
Leak 
Likelihood 0.57 0.33 
0.72 Severity 0.66 0.33 


















13 Pumps Pump Fault Likelihood 0.63 0.33 
0.68 Severity 0.70 0.33 
Detection 0.70 0.33 
14 Pumps Pump 
Failure 
Likelihood 0.63 0.33 
0.74 Severity 0.59 0.33 
Detection 1.00 0.33 
15 Pumps Pump 
Failure 
Likelihood 0.60 0.33 
0.72 Severity 0.57 0.33 
Detection 1.00 0.33 
16 Pumps Pump 
Failure 
Likelihood 0.70 0.33 
0.69 Severity 0.57 0.33 
Detection 0.80 0.33 
17 Utility Loss of 
Supply 
Likelihood 0.60 0.33 
0.72 Severity 0.57 0.33 
Detection 1.00 0.33 
18 Utility Reduced 
Supply 
Likelihood 0.70 0.33 
0.69 Severity 0.75 0.33 
Detection 0.63 0.33 
19 Utility Electrical 
Over-
supply 
Likelihood 0.66 0.33 
0.73 Severity 0.59 0.33 





Likelihood 0.66 0.33 
0.69 Severity 0.80 0.33 





Likelihood 0.66 0.33 
0.67 Severity 0.66 0.33 
Detection 0.70 0.33 
22 Metering 
Package 
Blockage Likelihood 0.70 0.33 
0.69 Severity 0.63 0.33 







Likelihood 0.59 0.33 
0.64 Severity 0.63 0.33 




Blockage Likelihood 0.80 0.33 
0.74 Severity 0.63 0.33 






Likelihood 0.80 0.33 
0.78 Severity 0.75 0.33 






Likelihood 0.75 0.33 
0.75 Severity 0.70 0.33 







Likelihood 0.80 0.33 
0.71 Severity 0.70 0.33 




 Results and Discussion 
The results of the analyses have been provided in Section 4.3.1 for the traditional 
FMEA, Section 0 for the Fuzzy Base Rule FMEA and Section 4.3.3 for the Grey 
Relation Theory FMEA. The results are also summarised and the rankings 
compared in Table 4-17. The results show the variation of the Risk rankings 
depending on the FMEA approach adopted. However, they broadly agreed with 
each other.  


























































1 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 21 0.563 0.690 9 9 9 
2 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 23 0.603 0.676 7 5 6 
3 Oil Pipeline Product Leak/Rupture 30 0.838 0.650 2 1 2 




























Line Valve Failure 21 0.563 0.690 11 9 9 
12 Pumps Product Leak 16 0.413 0.716 17 14 17 
13 Pumps Pump Fault 24 0.598 0.676 6 6 7 
14 Pumps Pump Failure 12 0.333 0.740 23 20 22 
15 Pumps Pump Failure 15 0.355 0.721 18 17 19 
16 Pumps Pump Failure 21 0.598 0.687 8 6 8 
17 Utility Loss of Supply 15 0.355 0.720 18 17 18 
18 Utility Reduced Supply 21 0.563 0.690 11 9 9 
19 Utility Electrical Over-supply 15 0.333 0.725 18 20 20 
20 Metering Package Instrumentation Fault 20 0.433 0.695 13 13 13 
21 Metering Package Product Leak 24 0.598 0.674 5 6 5 
22 Metering Package Blockage 21 0.563 0.690 9 9 9 
23 Pig Launcher/Receiver Product Leak/Rupture 33 0.665 0.641 1 3 1 
24 Pig Launcher/Receiver Blockage 13 0.333 0.739 21 20 21 
































































Product Leak/Rupture 18 0.383 0.707 14 15 14 
 
The analyses assume that all the experts have the same weighting in terms of 
experience and all the failure factors have the same weighting. The results indicate 
that each of the approaches produces similar but different risk priority rankings, 
but with the majority of the results broadly following the same pattern. The 
potential failures that have the same input produce fairly similar results. For 
example, failure events 15 (pump failure) and 17 (loss of supply) have the same 
linguistic variables and qualitative ranking. With the equal weighting that has 
been applied to the experts and the failure factors, the resulting risk ranking for 
the traditional FMEA is 18 for both events, the ranking of the FRB approach is 17 
for both events whilst the GRT ranking is 19 and 18, respectively.  
As it would be expected when the experience of the experts is taken into 
consideration by assigning a weighting of 0.4, 0.1 and 0.5 to experts 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively, the FRB ranking has changed from 17 to 25 for the two failure events. 
The impact of the use of a failure factor’s weighting in the GRT can also be seen on 
the failure items 15 (pump failure) and 17 (loss of supply). The two failure events 
have the same weighting of 0.33 for the Likelihood, Severity and Detectability 
factors, giving a risk ranking of 19 and 18 respectively. However, when the 




FMEA has been a versatile tool in safety assessments to maintain systems integrity 
and anticipate and prevent failures. The process is effective when there is historical 
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data for a precise numerical input. However, where there is inadequate or 
unreliable data, especially in developing countries, the FMEA can produce a 
wrong output, resulting in the misdirection of limited resources and the creation 
of a false sense of security (Liu et al., 2011). The use of the FRB and GRT ensures 
that, in addition to the limited data available, the experience of experts and 
operatives will be incorporated. Additionally, the use of linguistic terms ensures 
that the input is more aligned with the natural language synthesis, which is more 
familiar to field operatives and practitioners.  
The modified FMEA approach has several benefits and these are summarised 
below:  
• It provides an opportunity to incorporate experts’ experience and 
knowledge as part of the input where data is limited or uncertain.  
• It augments the lack of data, allowing for more refined and representative 
results. It affords the operatives and experts the chance to express the failure 
modes in the language they normally use on a day-to-day basis. 
• The process makes up for the weakness of the traditional FMEA where a 
small variation of one failure input can produce a disproportionate impact 
on the results.  
• It introduces a weighting to both the input of experts based on their 
experience and to each failure factor, thus ensuring that the results reflect 
the actual contribution of each expert and which failure factor has the most 
or least impact on the results. 
The approach still suffers from some of the drawbacks of the traditional FMEA, 
such as the fact that it still relies on the subjective input of the selected experts and 
the assumptions made by the analyst. 
The comparison of the results of the modified approach with that of the traditional 
approach provides a partial validation of the approach. Sensitivity studies would 
115 
 
have provided additional support to the partial validation process; however, time 
constrain did not allow the sensitivity studies to be carried out.   
The modified FMEA proposed in this chapter can be a useful additional tool for 




 Bayesian Networks Application in Estimating Failure 
Likelihood 
Overview 
This chapter reviews the Bayesian Network (BN) model and its application in the 
pipeline risk assessment in geographical areas where data is inadequate or not 
available. The chapter proposes a model which has been applied to a case study 
focusing on estimating the failure probabilities of the 2B pipeline system in 
Nigeria. The failure factors identified are the leak and rupture of the pipeline, 
which are the highest ranked factors determined from the analysis in Chapter 4. 
The model input has been obtained by a combination of loss databases and experts’ 
elicitation. The data used is selected based on its suitability and in discussion with 
the domain matter experts.  
The BN model has undergone a series of verification, validation and sensitivity 
analyses to ensure a robust model structure and reliable results.    
 
 Introduction 
The pipeline industry in developed economies has a structured process of data 
collection in regard to pipeline failures, which informs the failure probability 
analysis. However, in developing countries where data is either unavailable or 
unreliable, failure probability analysis may produce unreliable results. This, in 
addition to peculiar local environmental and other conditions, leads to higher-
than-average pipeline failure scenarios. These scenarios are vulnerable to 
escalation into catastrophic events with a significant loss of life, in addition to 
economic losses. For example, Nigeria’s premier oil company, NNPC, is reported 
to have said that in the first half of 2019, the country lost about 22 million barrels 
of oil to pipeline theft (George, 2019).  
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To ensure a more reliable assessment of the likelihood or probability of the failure, 
the BN model is adopted as described fully in Section 3.3. The approach is apt for 
this research because it accommodates data uncertainty, or the lack of it, and can 
integrate the expert’s knowledge. The model is especially good at updating the 
uncertainty whenever new data becomes available.        
The BN can be constructed in a variety of ways, depending on the available 
information and the intended application. For example, the BN can be constructed 
either using the traditional knowledge engineering sessions with domain experts 
and automatically synthesizing them with high level specifications or by learning 
from data, or both.  
Before receiving new information (evidence), the BN represents ‘a priori’ beliefs 
about the failure that it models. By obtaining new information or data about the 
state of one or more of the variables, the BN can then be updated to represent ‘a 
posteriori’ beliefs about the problem.  
This chapter shows a methodology and a case study on how to input and update 
the variables in the BN.  
 
 Methodology 
5.2.1 Developing Failure Likelihood with Bayesian Networks 
Developing Bayesian Networks involves a clear delineation of the domain it is to 
represent. The nodes, their states and their directional arcs must be properly 
defined; this ensures that there is no misinformation or misinterpretation in terms 
of the relationships between the nodes and what each represents.  
The main advantage of the Bayesian Network is its ability to deliver meaningful 
results using its graphical structures from the input data. Therefore, precision in 




As part of the analysis, a BN assessment using Hugin (2018) has been developed 
for a section of a cross-country pipeline’s failure probabilities. The model is built 
with input from relevant past case histories, literature and experts’ elicitation.  
To develop the node, a determination must be carried out of the parent or root 
nodes and the child or the target node. The root nodes are not directly influenced 
by any other node in the BN and it is defined as a level-1 node (first stage). The 
child node is defined as a level 2 node (second stage) and the target node is defined 
as the level 3 node (third stage). 
5.2.2 Construction and Data for BN Modelling 
To analyse primary pipeline failure data and predict failure characteristics using 
the BN model, a generic model building and analysis procedure has been adapted 
and is explained in this section. The steps as outlined here are key to error-free 
analysis and form part of the quality control procedure that ensures that the model 
performs consistently as expected irrespective of the domain of application. It also 
ensures processes and results comparability. 
The number of steps and the details contained vary from application to application 
and are also dependant on the level of modelling details envisaged. However, the 
basic procedure shares a similarity and has been adapted for this work as described 
below. 
5.2.2.1 Identification of a Set of Variables Appropriate to the Problem 
This step entails identifying the number of variables that are required in the model. 
In identifying the variables, care must be taken to ensure that the number is kept 
to the minimum that is necessary to provide expected results. In this research, the 
determination of the factors that affect cross-country pipeline integrity and loss 
prevention mechanisms are the main driver of the variables’ development. To 
reduce complications and difficulties that will arise from unwieldy variables (and 
hence the data for the Conditional Probability Tables - CPTs), the number of the 
parent nodes for each child node is limited to three. This ensures all the necessary 
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identified major factors affecting pipeline failure are included whilst the variables’ 
number is kept manageable for a less complicated assessment. The granularity of 
the analysis is balanced with the practicality of the available information and 
modelling effort.  
5.2.2.2 Creation of Nodes Corresponding to all Variables Identified 
Having identified all the variables, this step involves creating nodes that will 
describe the problem to be addressed. The nodes represent the relevant variables 
identified in Section 5.2.2.1. The nodes’ development involves a determination as 
to whether each node will be discrete, continuous or if it will have several states.    
5.2.2.3 Identification of a Set of States for Each Variable 
The states of each variable are to be determined based on the available data, the 
modeller’s perspective and the limit of complexity envisaged. As identified in 
Section 5.2.2.2, the states of the nodes could be discrete, continuous or involving 
several states.  
5.2.2.4 Specification of the State of Each Node 
For this assessment, a Boolean state with the option of “yes” and “no” has been 
adopted. Only the top-level node has three states – leak, rupture and operational. The 
use of three states as opposed to two that were used on other nodes is to mirror the 
major failure modes mostly associated with pipelines, that is, “leak” and 
“rupture”. The “operational” state indicates that the pipe did not encounter any 
failure and thus is still operational. 
5.2.2.5 Identification of a Node’s Dependency  
The identified nodes are connected to the influencing/influenced nodes via the arc 
connections. This creates the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that the BN relies on 
for information parsing and probability propagation. The nodes which represent 
the cause and effect are linked to one another via directed edges or arcs.  
120 
 
The connection is enabled via the software package adopted. The model ensures 
that the assessment nodes established are connected, as appropriate, to the 
variables identified, and the levels of information propagation via arc direction are 
correct.  
5.2.2.6 Construction of Conditional Probability Table  
CPT for each node will be set at this step and can be specified based on either 
available data or expert elicitation. The number of probabilities required depends 
on the structure of the model. This is where the decisions made in Section 5.2.2.1 
will either simplify this stage or make it complex.  
In this assessment, the information that makes up the CPT is obtained from the 
Concawe database (Cech et al., 2018), the US DOT (PHMSA, 2017) and the NNPC 
(NNPC, 2016), among others. Where direct data is not available, expert elicitation 
and a symmetric model (Riahi et al., 2014) is used to complete the CPT. 
5.2.3 Analysis and Decision-Making 
Once all the data required is provided, and the correct connections are made, the 
next stage is ensuring that all the values entered for the CPT are normalised so that 
each set of nodes has a sum total value equivalent to 1.  
The model is then executed for results and decision analysis. This includes 
extracting marginal probabilities and interrogating the data to extract the belief 
values for certain assumptions and inputs. The baseline model gives the marginal 
probabilities of the end event, given the various input conditions of the 
contributing variables. These baseline results can be interrogated further given 
additional evidence to observe the impact of that new evidence on the final results. 
The analysis can then be used for “what if” scenarios to better understand the 
impact of each input variable or sub-variable.  
Predictive, diagnostic and sensitivity analysis can also be carried out as part of the 
decision-making process and model validation (refer to Section 5.2.4) to provide 
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insight, supporting managers in predicting the consequences of certain decisions 
or the impact of a certain intervention. It can also help with post-accident analysis, 
where the failure is diagnosed to find the likely contributing factors leading to it.  
5.2.4 Validation and Sensitivity Studies 
5.2.4.1 Validation and Sensitivity Analysis  
The validation process entails checking for the accuracy of the model’s 
representation of the real system. A correctly validated model offers confidence to 
the users that the results are a good representation for the given assumptions 
made.  
There are several approaches for model validation, ranging from subjective to 
objective statistical assessment. The common approach for validation is based on 
a series of tests. For this model, the validation process will be in the form of 
sensitivity studies as described in Section 5.2.4.1, employing the three axioms as 
outlined by Jones et al. (2010).  
To ensure that the BN model behaves as expected, a sensitivity analysis will be 
carried out. The aim is to test how sensitive the model is to the incremental or 
decremental changes to the input on the nodes. A representative model will have 
a relative increase or decrease in the results for a similar increase or decrease in the 
input.  
A sound model with logical inference reasoning should be able to pass the 
following three axioms (Cai et al., 2013). 
Axiom 1: A slight increase/decrease in the prior subjective probability of each 
parent node should certainly result in the effect of a relative increase/decrease of 
the posterior probabilities of child nodes. 
Axiom 2: Given the variation in subjective probability distributions of each parent 
node, its influence magnitude to child node values should be kept consistent. 
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Axiom 3: The total influence magnitude of the combination of the probability 
variations, from x attributes, on the values should always be greater than that of 
the set of x-y (y∈x) attributes. 
5.2.4.2 Verification  
In the context of this analysis, the model verification aims to confirm that the model 
is correctly implemented as it was conceptually designed, that any errors identified 
with the model are fixed and that the model implementation is correct. For this 
model, a verification process has been adopted that involves logic flows and 
examines the model output for reasonableness under different input parameters.  
 
 Case Study: Application to Pipeline System 2B 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The BN model described in Section 5.2 is used in this chapter, with a case study 
demonstrating the model's practical application for a cross-country onshore 
pipeline failure analysis. Pipeline 2B is the case study pipeline system. Description 
of the pipeline is provided in Section 2.2. The case study will be a continuation of 
Chapter 4, where a modified FMEA approach has been utilised to identify and 
rank all potential failure modes for the pipeline system. The failure mode that 
ranks highest is the pipeline’s loss of containment due to a leak or rupture. This 
case study will take the failure mode and assess all its contributing variables for 
the purposes of analysis and the decision-making process.  
The BN model incorporates a symmetric model and AHP pairwise comparison 
technique to generate conditional probability tables for nodes with multiple 
parents where data is insufficient or not available. The proposed model is then 
analysed for prediction and diagnosis of the problem assuming certain evidence. 
Verification and sensitivity analyses have been carried out to ensure that the model 
is constructed correctly and behaves as expected. This provides a level of 




5.3.2 Events Flow 
To identify the initial variables for the modelling, assessment of the primary failure 
factors that affect onshore oil and gas pipelines, both globally and locally in 
Nigeria, has been carried out. As a result of incomplete information on the Nigeria 
and Africa’s pipeline failure factors, it has been decided that the European and 
American experience will be used to augment the primary failure factors that will 
inform the variables. Within the selected regions, Europe and the USA, the 
database for the onshore cross-country refined products pipelines is the most 
relevant. There are issues around regional nomenclature and differences in 
recording techniques, but the main failure factors are broadly similar and are 
grouped under tier 1 factors, listed below, that lead to a pipeline leak or rupture.   
For a pipeline to fail, there is either going to be (i) a human interference consisting 
of a third-party or operational damage, (ii) a mechanical failure consisting of 
corrosion and a material defect or (iii) a natural hazard. These are the tier 1 factors. 
Directly beneath each of the tier 1 factors are tier 2 factors. The tier 2 factors cause 
the occurrence of the main (tier 1) factors, and the root events (tier 3) are the basic 
failure factors. These are outlined in Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1.  
The Concawe database (Cech et al., 2018) is more appropriate for Nigeria’s system 
compared to the US DOT database (PHMSA, 2017) and therefore the Concawe 
nomenclature and the majority of its data has been used in this research.  
5.3.3 BN Model Development 
This section details and describes all the variables outlined in Figure 5-1 that form 
the BN model, including assumptions made and the states of the variables.  
5.3.3.1 Root and Mid Events  
A. Human Intervention 
Damage events due to human intervention are those related to a third party or due 
to operational upheaval. They are a result of an intervention by an operator or a 
third party. These events are described below. 
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• Fitting defect 
• Failure of equipment 
body 








• Material  
• Construction 




• Flood/heavy rain 
• Earth movement 
• Lighting 










• Operator damage 
• Incorrect installation  
• Incorrect operation  














• 3rd party excavation 
damage  





• Incidental  
• Accidental  
• Theft  
Corrosion 
• Internal 




• External  




• Electrical arcing  
• Vehicle not engaged in 
excavation  
• Previous mechanical 
damage  
• Others  
  
 
A.1 Third-Party Damage 
A significant factor that is particularly specific to Nigeria, or a similar 
developing economy that is battling with insecurity, is the third-party 
related pipeline interference. Generally, third-party damage is any failure 












A significant sub-category of third-party related issues is theft. Several 
referenced publications (Achebe et al., 2012; Anifowose et al., 2012; 
Omodanisi et al., 2014; Carlson et al., 2015) and popular media (Campbell, 
2017; Ezeobi, 2018; Ugwu, 2018) indicate the level of petroleum product lost 
as a result of theft and vandalism in Nigeria.   
The other hazards relevant to third-party interference include accidental 
and incidental damages.  
Third-party damage can be reduced by applying some of the more common 
risk reduction measures, including pipeline safety zones, increased wall 
thickness, increased depth of cover, warning marker posts, plastic marker 
tape, concrete slabbing, a physical barrier within the pipeline trench, 
vibration detection, regular inspections of pipelines right of way (ROW) and 
intelligent pigging. 
A.1.1  Accidental  
Accidental third-party damage can be caused by such activities as 
construction work, agricultural activity and underground 
infrastructure. For onshore cross-country pipelines that pass through 
farmlands, high density areas and road construction sites, accidental 
damage remains a big failure factor.  
A.1.2  Incidental  
Incidental third-party damage includes damage that is undetected 
when it originally occurs, but which results in failure at some point 
later in time.  
A.1.3  Theft/Intentional 




A.2  Operational Damage 
This is a failure that occurs either due to a system malfunction or human and 
organisational error. An example of such a failure can be a failure of control 
and safety system, resulting in a pressure surge. 
Operational damage can have catastrophic consequences, especially when 
the operational upset happens outside the design boundaries of the 
pipelines.  
A.2.1 Human and Organisational Error 
Human and organisational error has been variously mentioned as the 
biggest factor in oil and gas accidents (Cullen, 1990). Factors that 
contribute to human and organisational errors can be categorised into 
individual, organisational and systematic errors (Bai & Bai, 2005). 
Individual errors are those made by an operator that contributes to an 
accident, often caused by insufficient knowledge, fatigue, lack of 
training or experience. The organisational error can be defined as 
institutional due to, for example, poor communication, unsafe 
activities, lack of appropriate equipment and a lack of systems 
capable of supporting operator activities.  
A.2.2 System Malfunction 
Errors can also be observed with a human-machine interface, such as 
the equipment in use, the structures present, the software in use, or 
an instruction manual. These are described as system (hardware) 
errors and procedure (software) errors that eventually result in an 
operator making decisions that result in accidents. 
  
B. Mechanical Failure 
B.1  Material Damage 
Material damage affects the structural integrity of the pipelines and is 
divided into three categories – material and welding defects, construction 
128 
 
defects and design defects. Their influence on pipeline failure varies and 
depends on the rigorous quality control process applied during the design, 
manufacturing and construction of the pipelines.  
B.1.1 Material Defect 
Material and weld defects account for an insignificant percentage of 
pipeline failures due to advancements in material science and 
fabrication. These defects mostly take place as a result of pipeline 
deformation or because of construction defects that occur during the 
manufacturing and construction of the pipeline.  
B.1.2 Construction Defect 
A pipeline’s raw materials, such as steel, can be defective during the 
construction or manufacturing process where impurities remain in 
the molten steel. These impurities can cause an incomplete bonding 
of the material in the steel plate or the solid round steel billet used to 
produce a pipe. The defect, if not discovered during the hydrostatic 
pressure testing that occurs before the pipeline is placed in service, 
will eventually grow during the pipeline’s operational life until a 
failure occurs (Sulaiman, 2017). 
B.1.3 Design Defect 
Design defects are failure-induced factors that occur from the 
conceptual design stage, including the selection and appropriate 
combination of materials and controls.  
B.2  Corrosion 
Corrosion plays a significant role in pipeline integrity issues in the oil and 
gas industry. Corrosion accounts for over 25% of assets failures (Capcis 
Limited, 2001) and is found to be prevalent in every stage of the production 
cycle. For cross-country refined products pipelines, the failure rate ranges 
from 14% to 18%.  
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Corrosion occurs as a result of the deterioration of the pipelines due to the 
electrochemical action of the coating and other materials on the pipeline. The 
electrochemical action is detrimental to internal corrosion, especially when 
the fluid being transported has corrosive properties. There are generally 
three identified types of corrosion – internal, external and stress-induced.  
For Nigerian pipelines, the rate of internal pipeline corrosion due to locally 
refined oil is limited because of the so-called sweet crude oil that is 
predominantly produced in the country. However, there are also significant 
numbers of refined products imported into the country whose corrosive 
properties are unascertained.   
B.2.1  Internal 
For internal corrosion, the fluid’s properties – including its corrosive 
elements (either sweet or sour) – determine the rate of corrosion of the 
pipeline’s internal lining. Major elements contributing towards 
pipeline corrosion include, for example, hydrogen sulphide, sulphur 
dioxide and carbon dioxide. Other factors that affect the internal 
corrosion rate of the pipeline include fluid temperature, flow rate and 
the protection measures in place. 
B.2.2  External 
External corrosion is caused by the properties of the external 
environment in contact with the pipeline. These external 
environments are water, soil, air or a mixture of them. The pipeline 
under consideration in this study is mostly buried in a shallow trench, 
therefore it is predominantly covered in soil. However, the 
temperature, water content and the type of soil present are all 
additional factors. External protection measures may be present to 
help reduce the rate of corrosion and elongate the pipeline’s useable 




B.2.3  Stress Corrosion 
The effect of stress as it applies to an onshore cross-country pipeline 
is less important compared to offshore subsea pipelines. However, as 
the pipeline crosses different terrains and geological formations, parts 
of the pipeline will pass through rivers and above-ground formations. 
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) may happen when a pipeline under 
stress poses a lag crack or breaks. Typically, two major forms of stress 
which contribute to the stress corrosion are internal pressure and 
residual stress. SCC is considered in this study, together with the load 
from external forces. 
 
C. Natural Hazards 
Natural hazard accidents are accidents that may be caused by pipelines 
traversing unstable mountainous terrain, where landslides, flash-flooding and 
land subsidence are responsible for pipeline failure. Two sub-events are 
included in the assessment – ground movement and other natural hazards. 
C.1 Ground Movement 
Ground movement includes landslides and earth movements such as those 
resulting from mining and heavy rain. Earth movement resulting in gully 
erosion is a common occurrence in southern Nigeria and along the pipeline 
route and is, therefore, a significant factor.  
C.2 Other Natural Hazards 
Other natural hazards include extreme temperatures and land subsidence. 
These are uncommon failure factors and therefore represent an insignificant 
percentage of the failure statistics.   
5.3.3.2 Top Event  
Top events are the events whose results the analysis aims to obtain. In most cases, 
all the input information and evidence in other nodes propagation feeds into them; 
they are usually the subject of interest in the analysis.   
131 
 
D. Pipeline Failure – loss of containment  
The pipeline condition is represented as the top event. This gives the final results 
of the analysis and could determine whether the pipeline is in operational 
condition or if it has lost its integrity.  
5.3.3.3 Assumptions  
The BN model is developed based on certain assumptions. These assumptions 
need to be declared so that they can inform the user of the model and support 
informed decision-making.  
The model is developed with a specific focus on:  
- Countries or geographical areas where there is inadequate or unreliable 
data for quantitative risk analysis of the pipeline. 
- Areas where there are above-average incident rates of third-party-related 
damages to the pipeline, especially those relating to hot-tapping and 
criminal destruction.  
The scope of the top events is limited only to two classes of pipeline failure - leak 
and rupture.   
The model is developed with the aim of highlighting the principle of its application 
in pipeline risk analysis in geographical areas with the features outlined above, 
irrespective of the data entered or the data source. Therefore, the accuracy of the 
input data will not affect the model’s validity, rather, inaccurate data will only 
affect the end results.  
The assessment is limited to finding out the likelihood of the loss of containment 
for the pipeline. It does not assess the consequences in terms of the human, 
economic, political or environmental effects.  
Several data sources appropriate to the model have been used, including the 
Concawe database (Cech et al., 2018), the US DOT database (PHMSA, 2017) and 
the NNPC database (NNPC, 2016). The choice of the data depends on its relevance. 
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The predominant data source for the primary variables is the Concawe database. 
However, where NNPC data is available, it has been used. In the event of 
particular cases, such as operational damage, the US DOT database is deemed 
more relevant and has therefore been used. Where no data is available, expert 
elicitation has been utilised.    
5.3.3.4 Model Structure  
The BN model has been developed based on the details outlined in Section 5.3.3.1, 
which shows the relationship between failure factors and their conditional 
dependencies. The BN simulates the cause and effect of pipeline failure and the 
various factors affecting it, including mechanical factors, corrosion damage, 
human and organisational failure, and third-party damages. The Hugin 
representation of the Bayesian model is shown in Figure 5-2. The description of all 
nodes and their states is given in Table 5-2. 
 
 




Table 5-2: Variables used in the BN and their Descriptions 
Variables States Description 
Human Damage 
Yes/No This is the total likelihood of all human 
related interventions resulting in 
pipeline integrity issues 
    Third-Party Damage 
Yes/No  Total likelihood of pipeline failure due to 
all third-party related activities 
 Incidental Damage 
Yes/No  Likelihood of pipeline damage due to an 
event that is not immediately obvious 
but later developed into a failure 
 Accidental Damage 
Yes/No  Damage due to accidental intervention, 
like construction or farming 
 Theft/Intentional 
Success/Failure  A failure likelihood due to deliberate 
damage, to tap the pipeline content or to 
vandalise the system 
     Operational Damage 
Yes/No Likelihood of damage due to unintended 
operations 
 System Malfunction  
Yes/No  Failure due to mechanical, 
electrical/electronic systems malfunction 
 
Human (and org) 
Error 
Yes/No  This is the potential for human and 
organisational error, like lack of training 
or quality assurance (QA) to cause 




This is the combined contribution of the 
mechanical-related defects affecting 
pipeline integrity  
     Material Defect 
Yes/No  Likelihood of defective materials used in 
design and construction contributing to 
pipeline failure 
 Material 
Yes/No  Likelihood of defective materials only 
contributing to pipeline failure 
 Construction 
Yes/No  Likelihood of defective construction only 
contributing to pipeline failure 
 Design 
Yes/No  Likelihood of defective design only 
contributing to pipeline failure 
     Corrosion Yes/No Pipeline failure due to corrosion 
 External Corrosion 
Yes/No  Corrosion damage due to external 
corrosion 
 Internal Corrosion 
Yes/No  Likelihood of corrosion damage due to 
internal corrosion 
 Stress Cracking 
Yes/No  Likelihood of corrosion damage due to 
applied stress on the pipeline 
Natural Hazard 
Yes/No The likelihood that a pipeline has failed 
due to natural related events like flash 
flood and frost  
 Ground Movement 
Yes/No  Likelihood of ground movement 




Yes/No  Likelihood of other types of natural 
hazards affecting pipeline integrity 
Pipeline Failure – Loss 
of Containment  
Leak, Rupture, 
Operational 
Likelihood of all of the above resulting in 




5.3.4 Parameter Estimation 
5.3.4.1 Pipeline Failure Data  
The pipeline failure data relevant to the pipeline system under consideration has 
been collected and used to inform the model. The most relevant data applicable to 
this assessment is the Concawe database (Cech et al., 2018). Even though this 
database is for European cross-country pipelines, a qualitative assessment carried 
out and the opinion of the experts sought as part of this BN model development 
indicate that it is the most relevant to Nigeria’s pipeline system. The Concawe 
report (Cech et al., 2018) documents loss of containment incidents in European 
cross-country pipelines and their underlying statistics from 1971 to 2016. The 
pipelines covered in the report include over 140 pipeline systems provided by 66 
pipeline operators, with a total length of about 38,000 km. The reported throughput 
of the pipelines is in the region of 755Mm3 of refined products and crude oil. The 
report analyses the short and long-term trends of containment loss.  
Most of the failure factors identified and their long-term failure trends are deemed 
appropriate for use in this assessment in the absence of local specific data for 
Nigeria’s pipeline systems, with the exception of operational and third-party 
factors. For operational factors, the high quality of management regimes and 
supervision means that failure probabilities in the European pipelines are very low 
compared to those of Nigeria; the US DOT database for operational factors is more 
suitable in this instance.  
Additionally, third-party intervention and especially theft/intentional and 
incidental damages are very low for both the Concawe and US DOT databases 
compared to the reported incidences for Nigeria. The patchy data obtained from 
Nigeria is very unreliable but seems to indicate that a significant percentage, up to 
ninety percent of failures, is due to third-party intervention, specifically intentional 
and theft. However, the domain experts consulted for this work, as outlined in 
section 5.3.4.2, agreed that the Concawe data, which has an up to sixty percent 
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reported failure probability due to third-party damage in 2015, should be used but 
adjusted upwards.  
In all other areas where direct data is not available, or if it is not applicable in the 
given context, expert elicitation, as explained in Section 5.3.4.2, has been adopted. 
Table 5-3 shows the data sources for each variable. 
Table 5-3: Variables and Data Sources 
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5.3.4.2 Expert Elicitation 
The key strength of the BN method is the opportunity to integrate the input of 
subject matter experts in the absence of hard data for some of the variables required 
for the analysis. In this model, probability tables for some of the child nodes cannot 
be completed with the hard data available. As a result, expert elicitation is utilised 
to compensate for the lack of data. Typically, the direct estimates from such experts 
for the nodes are elicited for the probabilities. However, this approach often leads 
to inconsistencies and unreliable results due to subjective biases, especially when 
a node has more than two states (Chin et al., 2009). The experts also find it difficult 
to provide input for the high number of conditional probabilities in CPTs. 
To address these shortcomings, an AHP pairwise comparison is adopted to elicit 
expert input into the model. The AHP method is combined with the symmetric 
method, described in Section 3.3.1.5, to efficiently obtain the data and integrate it 
into the model. The method simplifies decision-making by the domain experts in 
that they are only presented with two variables to compare at any given time. Their 
decisions are reduced to compare two factors in terms of their importance. This 
approach reduces the potential bias inherent in their responses.  
A questionnaire has been developed for the AHP pairwise comparison for all 
variables for which expert input is required. The questionnaires were sent to the 
selected experts for their response. The sample questionnaire is shown in 
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Appendix C. The experts are chosen based on their relevant experience and 
qualification. The backgrounds of these experts are summarised in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4: Experts Selected for the Research 
No Area of Expertise  Organisational Sector  Years of 
Experience 
1 HSE Engineer Pipeline regulator >10 years 
2 Project Engineer Pipeline infrastructure owner and 
operator 
>10 years  
3 Loss Prevention 
Engineer 
Pipeline consultants >5 years 
4 Pipeline Engineer Contractor >5 years 
5 Research Engineer Academic  >3 years 
 
AHP Questionnaire and Pairwise Comparison  
Expert elicitation has been obtained for all children nodes where data is not 
sufficient to fill the prior probabilities. Questionnaires in the form of AHP and 
pairwise comparison have been utilised. The process of obtaining the AHP results 
from the questionnaire is outlined here. 
Each expert received a questionnaire similar to the one shown in Table 5-5 for the 
child nodes entitled material defects and corrosion. Details of all the questionnaires 
are shown in Appendix C. Once the questionnaire responses come back, they are 
summarised in the matrix table, as shown in Table 5-6. The table shows the relative 
importance of each variable compared to the others. For example, when 
considering material defects, the design factor (DF) is less important than the 
construction factor (CF), hence the value is 0.5, where the two intersect. The value 
for the opposite statement–construction factor (CF) being more important than the 








1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Material Defect 
To achieve the stated objective, how important is a 
design failure, compared to construction failure? 
              x                   
To achieve the stated objective, how important is a 
design failure, compared to failure due to material 
quality? 
                x                 
To achieve the stated objective, how important is a 
construction failure, compared to failure due to 
material quality? 
                  x               
Corrosion 
To achieve the stated objective, how important is an 
external corrosion, compared to internal corrosion? 
                              x   
To achieve the stated objective, how important is an 
external corrosion, compared to stress cracking? 
                                x 
To achieve the stated objective, how important is an 
internal corrosion, compared to stress cracking? 




The next step is assessing the weighting ratio of each of the variables as a 
percentage of the total for each child node using Equation 3-24. A total sum for 
each column in Table 5-6 is required to assess the weighting. Then each of the 
ratings in the table is divided by the total for each column. This gives the ratio of 
each rating as a percentage of the total for each variable. For example, column DF 
has a total of 2.5; each of the column ratings of 1, 0.5 and 1 will have a ratio equal 
to ,  and  respectively.  
To obtain the relative weighting for each variable, an average weighting across the 
row of the matrix is calculated. For the EC variable under corrosion, the average 
weighting of the three variables of 0.06, 0.04 and 0.07 is 0.05 (refer to Table 5-7). To 
ensure that the assessment is behaving as expected and is devoid of errors, the total 
of each variable’s values along each column and the total of the average weighting 
should sum to 1. Table 5-7 gives the relative weighting figures from the standard 
matrix for two child nodes – material defect and corrosion.  
The average weightings in Table 5-7 are the values required along with the 
symmetric model to populate the node probability table of each respective child 
node. 
Table 5-6: Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
Material Defect  Corrosion 
 
DF CF MQ  EC IC SC 
DF 1.00 2.00 1.00 EC 1.00 0.13 0.11 
CF 0.50 1.00 0.50 IC 8.00 1.00 0.50 
MQ 1.00 2.00 1.00 SC 9.00 2.00 1.00 
        
Total 2.50 5.00 2.50 Total 18.00 3.13 1.61 
Note: DF is a design fault, CF is construction fault, MQ is material quality EC is external 




Table 5-7: Standard Matrix Relative Weighting Calculation 
Materials Defect Weight  Corrosion Weight 
DF 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 EC 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 
CF 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 IC 0.44 0.32 0.31 0.36 
MQ 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 SC 0.50 0.64 0.62 0.59 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
However, to ensure that the above assessment has been carried out in compliance 
with the AHP procedure and that the results are within the acceptable consistency 
bounds for a pairwise comparison, a consistency check is carried out using 
Equations 3-25, 3-26 and 3-27. Note that a consistency check is only carried out for 
a 3×3 matrix in this work. The other matrix, 1×1, does not require a consistency 
check (Saaty, 1987). 
To carry out the consistency check, a consistency ratio calculation will first be 
undertaken. This is carried out by multiplying the standard matrix relative 
weighting in Table 5-7 with the three values of each variable in Table 5-6. 
For example, the first value in column SC of Table 5-6 is multiplied with 0.05, 
which is the first relative weighting in Table 5-7. The calculated values for the SC 
are 0.49 (9 × 0.05), 0.72 (2 × 0.36) and 0.59 (1 × 0.59), respectively. The next step is to 
find the sum weight by adding the calculated figures above, giving 1.8 (0.49 + 0.72 
+ 0.59) and dividing it with the relative weighting of the SC variable, 0.59. The sum 
weight of the SC variable is thus 3.06 (1.8/0.59). 
Table 5-8 below shows the complete results for the material defect and corrosion 
variables.  
Table 5-8: AHP Pairwise Comparison Matrix Consistency Check  
Row Total Sum Weight 
Material defect 
DF 0.40 0.40 0.40 1.20 3.00 
CF 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.60 3.00 






Row Total Sum Weight 
Corrosion 
EC 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.16 3.01 
IC 0.44 0.36 0.29 1.09 3.04 
SC 0.49 0.72 0.59 1.80 3.06 
 
To calculate the consistency index,  is calculated first. This is arrived at by 
adding the sum weights and dividing the total by the number of variables (3) in 
the matrix.  







= =  
The consistency index is then calculated using Equation 3-26 by subtracting the 
number of variables (3) from the , divided by subtraction of one (1) from the 









The consistency ratio (CR) is thus calculated using Equation 3-25 by dividing the 
Consistency Index (CI) (0.02) with the Random Index (RI). The RI for the 3 × 3 
matrix is 0.58. A consistent pairwise comparison assessment should produce a CR 




Consistency Index = =  
For all the AHP pairwise assessments carried out, this calculation procedure has 
been undertaken, first to obtain the weighting ratios for input into the symmetric 
model and also to ensure that the consistency of the results is in line with the Saaty 
RI values (Saaty, 1987).  
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Symmetric Method and Relative Weight Development 
The determination of conditional probabilities requires the filling of the CPT, using 
the symmetric model and relative weight development that has been introduced 
in Section 3.3.1. The application of the symmetric model in the CPT development 
is shown below, with the two example nodes – material defect and corrosion - used 
to show the process. The required input for the assessment includes the failure 
probabilities of the parent nodes, obtained from historical data, and the AHP 
pairwise comparison, derived from the expert elicitation. The AHP pairwise 
comparison method has been used to identify the relative influence of each parent 
node to the associated child node. That relative influence is shown as the average 
weighting in Table 5-9. The average weighting of each variable is multiplied with 
its failure probability to obtain the variable’s specific importance. This is then used 
to calculate the symmetric method weighting r , and that would be the input 




ω =1 . n is the number of decision 
factors. 
Table 5-9 shows the process and the results for the child nodes material effect and 
corrosion. Appendix C shows the AHP questionnaire and the results. 
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Note: The failure probabilities for the main failure factors – material defects and corrosion 
- is obtained from Concawe (2017) for data from 1971 to 2015 which is more conservative 
than the five-year moving average. The failure probabilities for the variables, e.g., DF, CF, 
is derived by weighting each sub-variable, based on its recorded failures, against the main 
factors’ failure probabilities. 
 
The sum of the relative weights for each of the two variables is:  
1 2 3
1




material defect   
=
= + + = + + =  
1 2 3
1




corrosion   
=
= + + = + + =  
From the values calculated in Table 5-9, and using Equation 3-21, the node or 
conditional probability table is completed, as shown in Table 5-10. The values for 
material defect (MD), are arrived at as below, for a probability of material defect 
leading to pipeline failure being ‘yes’. The probability for ‘no’ is 1 minus that of 
‘yes’.  
1 2 3( | , , ) 0.395 0.209 0.395 1MD yes MQ yes CF yes DF yes    = = = = = + + = + + =  
2 3( | , , ) 0 0 0.209 0.395 0.605MD yes DF no CF yes MQ yes   = = = = = + + = + + =  
1 3( | , , ) 0 0.395 0 0.395 0.791MD yes DF yes CF no MQ yes   = = = = = + + = + + =  
3( | , , ) 0 0 0 0 0.395 0.395MD yes DF no CF no MQ yes  = = = = = + + = + + =  
1 2 3( | , , ) 0 0.209 0.395 0.605MD yes MQ no CF yes DF yes    = = = = = + + = + + =  
1 2 3( | , , ) 0 0.209 0 0.209MD yes MQ no CF yes DF no    = = = = = + + = + + =  
1 2 3( | , , ) 0 0 0.395 0.395MD yes MQ no CF no DF yes    = = = = = + + = + + =  
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1 2 3( | , , ) 0 0 0 0MD yes MQ no CF no DF no    = = = = = + + = + + =  
Similar process is used to obtain the CPT for the corrosion and the results are 
shown in Table 5-10. 
Table 5-10: Node Probability Table for Material Defect and Corrosion 
Material Defect 
Material Yes No 
Construction Yes No Yes No 
Design Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No 
Yes 1.000 0.605 0.791 0.395 0.605 0.209 0.395 0 




External Corrosion Yes No 
Internal Corrosion Yes No Yes No 
Stress Cracking  Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No 
Yes 1 0.81 0.50 0.31 0.69 0.50 0.19 0 
No 0 0.19 0.50 0.69 0.31 0.50 0.81 1.00 
 
5.3.5 Analysis of the Model 
The model has now been built, and all prior probabilities have been computed 
based on the failure data and the AHP pairwise comparison method applied. 
Figure 5-3 shows the BN nodes for the probability of a pipeline failure, including 
its marginal probabilities.   
The BN shows that the likelihood of pipeline failure resulting in full rupture is 
7.51% per year whilst that of a leak is 14.72% per year. The leak likelihood being 
double compared to that of a rupture’s likelihood is not surprising because the 
biggest threat to oil pipelines in Nigeria is theft due to drilling intended to create a 
tapping point on the pipeline (Ralby, 2017). The other threat is the deliberate 
destruction of the pipeline system by insurgency, which is rife in the country for 
political and socio-economic reasons (Hopkins, 2008).  
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To assess the robustness of the model, predictive, diagnostic and sensitivity 
analyses have been performed. 
 
Figure 5-3: BN Model Showing Marginal Probabilities for Pipeline Failure 
 
5.3.5.1 Evidence Propagation   
In undertaking BN model analysis, certain assumptions are made, and certain 
inputs are provided based on data which may not be directly relevant to this 
particular case. Evidence propagation gives the analyst the opportunity to observe 
changes in probability distribution if some of the assumptions were to be 
amended, either in isolation or in combination with other changes. For instance, in 
order to find out what combination of factors must be avoided, different scenarios 
and combinations of events can be propagated as new evidence and compared 
with the baseline probability distribution. Figure 5-3 shows that human-related 
intervention has a higher failure likelihood on the selected Nigerian pipeline 
system, with a 30.76% failure likelihood, compared to mechanical failure which 
has a value of 4.19% and natural hazards which have a value of 0.75%. However, 
it is also known that the pipelines are ageing, and the impact of climate change on 
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them can be devastating. The operator may wish to model a situation whereby one 
or both of the failure factors were realised and how that affects the probability 
distribution. On the other hand, the significantly higher number of politically 
motivated pipeline destruction events and criminally linked hot taps may be 
brought down by deliberate government policy and an increase in security 
provisions. The operator may want to find what is likely going to be the impact of 
the policies on the pipeline failure probability distribution.  
To propagate any evidence and assess the impact of those scenarios compared with 
the baseline results, two scenarios have been generated thus:  
Scenario 1: the government’s effective security policies and political intervention 
result in a significant drop in third-party intervention due to intentional and 
incidental damages. This scenario will assume a best-case scenario of a 5 percent 
failure factor for those variables compared with the baseline model.    
Scenario 2: the ageing pipeline may deteriorate further with time, resulting in 
increased cases of corrosion failure and material defect. This scenario will assume 
a worst-case scenario of a 90 percent failure probability for those factors, compared 
with the baseline model.  
Table 5-11 shows the baseline model input and the results compared for the two 
scenarios. The baseline model results indicate failure probabilities of 14.72% for 
leaks and 7.51% for ruptures. The pipeline remains operational 77.77% of the time. 
The scenario 1 results (best case) give an indication of the level of loss reduction 
that is possible if efforts were to be made to reduce the occurrence of the two factors 
– theft and incidental damages. A reduction of up to 75.00% and 55.00% for leaks 
and ruptures is possible if the failure probabilities of theft and incidental damages 
can be reduced from the baseline 30.00% and 22.00% down to 5.00% and 5.00% 
respectively. The leak and rupture failure probabilities are reduced from 14.72% 
and 7.51% to 3.90% and 3.30% respectively. Pipeline availability increases from 
77.77% to 92.80%. 
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Table 5-11: Evidence Propagation 
Variables Best Case 
(Scenario 1) 
Baseline Model Worst Case 
(Scenario 2) 
Probability Distribution 
 Y N Y N Y N 
Human Damage 6.6 93.4 30.8 69.2 30.8 69.2 
     Third Party Damage 7.0 93.0 33.8 66.2 33.8 66.2 
 Incidental Damage 5 95 22.0 78.0 21.6 78.4 
 Accidental Damage 5.2 94.9 5.2 94.9 5.2 94.9 
 Theft/Intentional 5 95 30.0 70.0 30.0 70.0 
     Operational damage 12.0 88.0 3.8 96.2 3.8 96.2 
 System Malfunction  1.3 98.7 1.3 98.7 1.3 98.7 
 Human (& org) Error 4.8 95.2 4.8 95.2 4.8 95.2 
Mechanical Failure 4.2 95.8 4.2 95.8 90 10 
     Material Defect 6.2 93.8 6.2 93.8 90 10 
 Material 6.9 93.1 6.9 93.1 90 10 
 Construction 7.3 92.7 7.3 92.7 90 10 
 Design 6.9 93.1 6.9 93.1 90 10 
     Corrosion 3.8 96.2 3.8 96.2 90 10 
 External Corrosion 11.0 89.0 11.0 89.0 90 10 
 Internal Corrosion 2.6 97.4 2.6 97.4 90 10 
 Stress Cracking 0.6 99.4 0.6 99.4 90 10 
Natural Hazard 0.8 99.2 0.8 99.2 0.8 99.2 
 Ground Movement 1.5 98.5 1.5 98.5 1.5 98.5 
 Other Natural Hazards 0.5 99.2 0.5 99.2 0.5 99.2 
Pipeline Failure – Loss of 
Containment  
O L R O L R O L R 
92.8 3.9 3.3 77.77 14.72 7.5 39.8 27.3 32.9 
Note: O is when the pipeline is operational, L is leak and R is rupture.  
For scenario 2, which assumes a worst-case scenario of progressive pipeline 
deterioration due to ageing and lack of maintenance, the availability of the pipeline 
drops significantly, from 77.77% to 39.80%. The scenario assumes a 90.00% failure 
probability from a mechanical failure, which encompasses material defect and 
corrosion. All other factors remain the same. The failure probabilities for leaks and 
ruptures jump twofold and fourfold from 14.72% and 7.51% to 27.30% and 32.90% 
respectively. 
From the above analyses, the importance of evidence propagation in decision-
making and forecasting is clear. The assessment easily allows the decision-maker 
to assess the infinite combination of what-if scenarios in order to see what impact 
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it will have on the operation. This will help direct scarce resources into areas where 
they will have the most impact.  
Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5 show the BN model and failure probabilities for the two 
scenarios.  
5.3.5.2 Posterior Probabilities Assessment 
The main advantage of Bayesian Network modelling is its ability to support the 
decision-making process by allowing for an update to the model in the presence of 
new observation or evidence. That evidence can be propagated in either direction.  
However, diagnostic analysis, which is the determination of the posterior 
probabilities of the parent nodes given new evidence for the child node, is the most 
popular (Khakzad et al., 2011). Therefore, diagnostic analysis inference will be used 
to calculate the posterior probability distribution of each risk factor in case of a 
confirmed pipeline failure.   
 






Figure 5-5: Evidence Propagation Scenario 2 – Increased Risk due to Ageing 
Pipeline 
 
The first part of diagnostic analysis assesses the impact of evidence given for the 
node pipeline failure on its parent nodes. The effect of such evidence can easily be 
propagated backwards to see which of the parent nodes has the most impact on 
the confirmed condition of a pipeline. Two different pieces of evidence have been 
propagated – a confirmed pipeline leak and a confirmed pipeline rupture. Figure 
5-6 and Figure 5-7 show the BN model with both leak and rupture evidence 
inserted. The new failure probabilities for the parent nodes – human, mechanical 
and natural hazard – as a result of the evidence are also shown. For comparison, 
the baseline model failure probabilities are 30.76%, 4.19% and 0.75% for human 




Figure 5-6: Posterior Probabilities for Parent Nodes Given Evidence of a Leak 
 
 
Figure 5-7: Posterior Probabilities for Parent Nodes Given Rupture Evidence  
 
Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-9 show a 3-D chart showing the changes in failure 
probabilities as a result of new evidence. In Figure 5-8, the impact of new evidence 
on the parent node is clear, with the highest change affecting human intervention, 
which increases from 0.31 to 0.96 for a confirmed leak and from 0.31 to 0.80 for a 
confirmed rupture. This shows, counter-intuitively, that the impact of human 
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intervention resulting in a pipeline leak is greater than such impact resulting in a 
pipeline rupture. This can be explained by the fact that the human intervention 
factor is skewed by a disproportionate failure rate due to third-party 
theft/intentional intervention, as shown in Figure 5-9, and there are more incidents 
of theft via hot-tapping than there are for the intentional destruction of the 
pipelines for political reasons.  
Conversely, the failure probabilities of both mechanical failure and natural 
hazards have been affected more by new evidence due to a confirmed rupture than 
due to a confirmed leak, as shown in Figure 5-8. There is an increase of two times 
for a leak and of five times for a rupture for both mechanical failure and natural 
hazards respectively. Unlike human damage, the contribution of primary variables 
to the failure probability changing is spread amongst both the corrosion and 
materials defect factors and not skewed by a single factor, as shown in Figure 5-9.  
 
Figure 5-8: Posterior Probabilities for the Parent Nodes Given New Evidence 
 
Figure 5-9 also shows how the new evidence only accentuates the contribution 
made by the largest three factors to the overall failure probability. For the baseline 
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model, the three largest primary failure rate contributors are theft/intentional 
damage (22%), incidental (18%) and external corrosion (8%). Upon finding new 
evidence of a confirmed leak, the contribution of theft/intentional damage to the 
overall failure probability jumps to 65%, that of incidental damage to 32% and that 
of external corrosion to 10%.  
The results obtained in this analysis are generally in agreement with the Concawe 
database (Cech et al., 2018), with the exception of the outsized contribution of theft 
or intentional damage and incidental damage. These are particularly high due to 
the peculiar challenges resulting from a prevalence of criminality and politically 
motivated actions. The European pipeline database also shows an astronomical 
increase in third-party damage due to intentional actions, from two incidents in 
2012 to 87 incidents in 2015. The prevalence of incidental damage has not seen any 
increase in Europe, but it has seen an increase in Nigeria due to a significant 
population increase over the past two decades and encroachment into the 
pipeline’s right of way due to weak implementation of the law.  The encroachment 
into pipeline’s right of way, including construction activities and farming, 
increases the likelihood of damages occurring, which subsequently lead to pipeline 
loss of containment.  
The revised failure probabilities due to new evidence can be further interrogated 
by providing additional evidence. For example, given the assumption that a leak 
is more likely to occur as a result of theft/intentional damage, inserting a 100% 
chance of failure due to intentional damage reduces the failure probability 
contribution of other factors; incidental damage contribution is reduced from 18% 
to 10%, whilst external corrosion reduces from 8% to 6%. This intercausal inference 
attempts to explain the contribution of other variables by reducing their failure 





Figure 5-9: Primary Variables’ Posterior Probabilities Given New Evidence 
 
The main benefit of diagnostic analysis such as this is affording fault diagnosis and 
investigation by identifying the variables that are more likely to contribute to a 
pipeline failure. Additionally, the diagnostic analysis can be used to identify 
factors that will likely cause a certain failure in the future, hence concentrating the 
mind of the operator on what to focus on. By performing these analyses, the 
posterior joint probabilities of all the variables, given new evidence of an event, are 
very useful for safety evaluation. Additionally, the causal path of an accident can 
be identified using this model, thus reducing the need for dependence on subject 
matter experts at all times.    
5.3.6 Validation and Sensitivity Analysis 
5.3.6.1 Validation 
In ensuring the robustness of the model, a validation process, which aims to 
provide reasonable confidence that the model meets the minimum specifications 
in order to produce sound and realistic results, is necessary. However, a full 
validation will be time-consuming; a partial validation is therefore performed 
based on the sensitivity analysis results as enumerated in Eleye-Datubo (2005). 
The validation is limited to the usability and face validation aspects. These include: 
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- The sensitivity analysis carried out in Section 5.3.6.2 supports the 
validation because it assesses the results of the model for small 
incremental changes to the inputs. The Hugin software has an in-built 
parameter sensitivity analysis which has been deployed for this 
assessment. The outcome indicates that the model results are sensible for 
the level of changes in regards to the input variables.  
- The face validation evaluates the results generated by a model and 
compares it with the failure statistics in the public domain. In this case, the 
results of the model are compared with the Concawe database (Cech et al., 
2018), as outlined in Section 5.3.5. The results generally agreed with the 
data with the exception of the theft and intentional damage variable 
within third-party intervention.   
5.3.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis measures the sensitivity or responsiveness of the model’s 
results to a variation of the inputs. The accuracy, robustness and reliability of the 
model are linked to the posterior probability distribution for changes to the input 
of the likelihood value. Sensitivity analysis offers the confidence that is necessary 
to show that the model is built correctly and produces results that are within the 
bounds of reality. This section examines the BN properties by applying 
incremental changes to the likelihood input values and observing the output 
values to ensure that it follows a similar trend. As outlined in Figure 5-9, the most 
influential variables have been identified and they will assist in the analysis, as 
they will affect the model more than other variables with an insignificant influence 
on the model.  
Parameter sensitivity or one-way sensitivity analysis has been used for this 
analysis and this is incorporated into the Hugin software. The sensitivity function 
is such that the probability of causes (Pc) is a function of the parameter 
( | )iz P Y y = =  where yi is the one state of variable Y and π is the combination of the 
states for Y’s parent nodes (Sulaiman, 2017).  
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The sensitivity analysis is carried out by selecting the hypothesis variable (in this 
case a pipeline failure), the desired state(s) of the hypothesis variable (in this case a 
leak) and finally selecting the parameter variable. The parameter variables can be 
parent nodes of the hypothesis variable or they can be any other nodes whose input 
variation will influence the outcome of the hypothesis variable. For the parameter 
variables, the primary failure factors have been chosen and only the yes state is 
assessed.  
Figure 5-10 shows the sensitivity graph of various variables against pipeline failure 
(leak). When assessed against the three axioms outlined 5.2.4, it can be seen in 
Figure 5-10 that a slight increase and decrease in the prior probabilities of the 
parent node, 3rd party damage, results in a relative increase and decrease in the 
child node, human factor.  Also, the magnitude of the influence of the parent node, 
3rd party damage, to the child node, human factor, remain consistent for the 
assessed input variation.  
Figure 5-11 shows a graph of sensitivity analyses output for a given evidence. It 
can be observed that theft/intentional damage has the highest sensitivity value, 
implying that the incremental increase of this variable results in the greatest 
influence on the outcome of pipeline failure. This would be aligned with the 
outcome of the analysis in Figure 5-9, where the posterior probability distribution 
for theft is shown as the largest and the most significant influence for any new 





Figure 5-10: Sensitivity for Pipeline Failure (Leak) Against Other Variables 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Sensitivity Values for Given Evidence 
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 Discussion and Conclusion 
The Bayesian Network model described in this chapter enumerates the cause and 
effect relationship that can be established between failure factors and pipeline 
failure conditions for the pipeline systems where there is inadequate or unreliable 
data. The proposed model, as indicated in Figure 5-3, shows the variables, the 
causes and effects, evidence propagation and the incorporation of uncertainty into 
the analysis. 
This chapter is an extension of Chapter 4, where the Modified FMEA model has 
identified and ranked the failure factors responsible for loss of containment in the 
pipeline, with the most common factor identified as pipeline failure due to a leak 
or rupture. The BN model then looks at this failure mode in detail, including all 
the initiating failure factors, that is, the contributing factors behind a pipeline leak 
or rupture. 
Identifying and inserting conditional probabilities for the primary failure factors is 
straightforward. However, specifying marginal probabilities for the CPTs of the 
child nodes is challenging in the absence of relevant data. Generally, the CPTs are 
filled using elicitation of domain experts. This is not usually simple if the node has 
multiple states or multiple probability tables, as it burdens the experts and is prone 
to biases. To address this shortcoming, both the AHP pairwise comparison method 
and the symmetric model have been adopted to generate the CPT by synthesising 
the experts’ opinions. This approach ensures that the seeming weakness of the BN 
is addressed. 
The BN model for this chapter has been used to show the contributing factors 
behind pipeline failures and their interrelationships. The model therefore provides 
managers with dynamic information on how to prevent undesired outcomes and 
can be used for a safety management plan.  
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The assessment carried out in this chapter can be used to predict pipeline integrity 
issues and diagnose recent loss events to identify the most likely responsible 
failure factor. The assessment can also be used to update the degree of beliefs given 
any new information or evidence. The predictive analysis serves to provide 
valuable information during the design and operation of the system and helps in 
directing resources to the factors with the most influence on a particular integrity 
issue. The diagnostic analysis helps to determine the critical failure factors that 
may lead to a catastrophic loss event. The diagnostic analysis can also help with 
the identification of an accident event path. Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5 show the 
predictive analysis, which outlines the marginal failure probability of the loss 
events. Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7 outline the diagnostic analysis, which shows the 
significant failure factor that contributes towards the pipeline failure. The human 
damage node is shown as the parent node that has the most influence on the 
rupture state of the pipeline failure node.  
Table 5-11 shows the evidence propagation in the presence of new information, for 
example, if the operator wants to assess the impact of certain actions or spending 
on pipeline integrity improvements. It shows that if the third party and incidental 
damage probabilities were to be reduced, from 30.00% to 5.00% and from 21.60% 
to 5.00% respectively, this would lead to a reduction in the hypothesis variable, by 
fourfold for leak and twofold for rupture. On the other hand, if the material defect 
and corrosion probabilities were to be increased from 6.20% to 90.00% and from 
3.80% to 90.00% respectively, the hypothesis variable will see an increase in failure 
probability. This jumps from 14.72% and 7.50% to 27.30% and 32.90%, respectively.  
Model validation and sensitivity analysis have been carried out to ensure that the 
model has been built and is operating within the bounds of expectation and that 
the model is sensitive to the incremental changes of the input variable. The 
sensitivity analysis is especially important as it also gives an indication of the 
variable with the most influence on the final event. As indicated in Figure 5-10, 
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theft/intentional damage is found to have the most influence on the leak failure 
state of the pipeline failure variable. The sensitivity analysis shows that the BN 
developed to help in pipeline failure identification decision-making is reliable and 
accurate, although the accuracy can be improved with more objective data.   
The next chapter deals with decision making and CBA including the evaluation of 
the performance of the safety and prevention barriers using Evidential Reasoning 
(ER) which is considered more suitable than using BN.    
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 Pipeline Risk Management Decision Support Model 
Overview 
This chapter outlines a decision support model based on Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
and Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA) to support the reduction of pipeline loss of 
containment as a result of third-party damage, particularly theft/intentional third-
party damage. The model identifies the main Risk Control Options (RCOs) as main 
attributes. Each RCO has basic attributes which contributes to the overall risk 
reduction or elimination of the threat. The attributes have been grouped into three 
categories: technical or technological solutions, governmental solutions and 
company or managerial solutions. The CBA looks at the costs to the operator 
associated with the loss of containment in regard to human safety, the economic 
and environmental aspects. These costs are required to reduce or eliminate the 
threat using a number of RCOs. The benefit for each of the options in monetary 
terms is the damage cost averted by introducing the RCO.  
As outlined in Section 3.4, ER is chosen because it is able to deal with MCDM 
problems with uncertainties, aggregation of conflicting information and the hybrid 
nature of the information. This fits in with the challenges of analysing different and 
often conflicting information and data that has been identified for this thesis in 
general and this chapter in particular.  
The results provide guidance for the infrastructure operator by reducing the 
complexity of the decision-making into a simple hierarchical output. The results 
also show the attributes of each decision, their effectiveness in reducing the failure 
likelihood and the estimated cost of each attribute. The operator would then be 
able to select one or more risk reduction attributes and will immediately see how 
the RCO reduces the failure likelihood. It would also give the operator an idea of 
the budgetary expenditure required to implement the RCO. 
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Sensitivity analysis and validation of the ER model has also been undertaken to 
ensure that the model is fit for its intended purpose and that it provides reasonable 
results under the anticipated circumstances.   
 
 Evidential Reasoning Decision-Making  
Chapter 3 outlined the detailed review of decision making techniques and their 
weaknesses. Evidential Reasoning (ER) has been used to develop the model in this 
chapter because it addresses the weaknesses of Probability Theory and Dempster-
Shafer Theory and provides a rigorous reasoning process for aggregating 
conflicting information.  
As outlined in Chapter 3, The ER method has been widely used, since it was first 
formulated, in solving MCDM problems in different area including engineering 
safety analysis (Liu et al., 2005), pipeline leak detection (Xu et al., 2007) and 
maritime safety and security (Wang et al., 1995; Liu et al., 2005). 
 
 Evidential Reasoning Application/Methodology 
This section provides a methodology for the proposed ER model that is applied to 
the problem of loss of containment due to third-party intervention in a pipeline. 
The methodology takes into account and builds upon the previous work carried 
out as part of the suite of risk assessment processes for cross-country pipelines. 
6.2.1 Identification of Predominant Failure Factors 
This is the first step in the modelling process. In this step, the predominant failure 
factors are identified. These are the factors that will rely on the Evidential 
Reasoning algorithm for insight. Generally, the failure factors should be identified 
from a separate study which forms the foundations for the analysis. For this study, 
the identification of the major failure factors for the pipeline under consideration 
has been carried out in Chapter 4. The identified failure factors and their potential 
consequences have been assessed further using the Bayesian Network in Chapter 
162 
 
5. The assessment also identified the failure factor with the highest probability of 
occurrence as being third-party related pipeline failure.  
6.2.2 Developing the Evaluation Matrix 
The second step in the analysis is the identification and development of the 
evaluation matrix. The matrix that will be used depends on the problem at hand 
but will include the general attributes, the basic attributes, the alternatives and 
their interconnectivity. In identifying and developing these attributes, reference 
will be made to the literature including industrial and international standards and 
other jurisdictional guidance documents, which identify the risk control measures 
necessary for reducing the threat of third-party related pipeline damage.  
6.2.3 Weights and Belief Degrees Development Using Experts’ Elicitation 
The third step in the process is the calculation of the weight of each of the identified 
general and basic attributes. The belief degrees of the attributes must also be 
determined. Such information informs the evaluation grades and ensures that the 
attributes and alternatives have a relationship in terms of their effectiveness with 
respect to the overall analysis.  
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the pairwise comparison method were 
used to determine both the weight and belief degrees by utilising experts’ 
elicitation for qualitative assessment through questionnaires. The AHP process has 
been described in Section 5.3.4.2. A questionnaire is developed to address the 
subjective questions which form part of the input of the ER. The questionnaire has 
two parts: part one assesses the weighting of the basic attributes for each of the 
main attributes, while part two assesses the belief degrees associated with each 
attribute.  
A minimum of five experts were invited to give their professional opinion based 
on their expertise and experience. The experts all have experience in the pipeline 
industry supply chain – varying from operators to consultants and academics. 
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Their input forms the foundation of the assessment and ensures that a wide view 
is taken on board for the assessment. 
6.2.4 Determine the Basic Probability Mass 
The ER approach utilises a belief structure to represent an assessment as a 
distribution. Assuming there is a threat of a loss of containment in a pipeline and 
intervention measures are to be evaluated and assuming the problem has D 
alternatives ( 1,...., )jO j D= , an upper-level criterion called ‘general attribute’ or an 
RCO and lower-level criteria ( 1,..... )iC i L=  called ‘basic attributes’. The ER decision 
matrix is developed by: 
i. Assigning weightings  1, ..,iW w i L= =   to the basic attributes which 
show their relative importance. The weights of the basic attributes need to 
be normalised, such that 
1






=   . L is the number of basic 
attributes sharing the same general (RCO) attribute.  
ii. Defining a set of evaluation grades (H) to enable alternatives of the basic 
attributes to be assessed and can be represented as  = 1, ..{ , }nH H n N= 
where Hn is evaluation grade n.  
Using the evaluation grades, the assessment S of an attribute iC  
on an alternative 
jO , denoted by (( ))i jS C O , can be represented as: 
,( )) {( ( ), ), 1,.... , 1,..... ; 1,..... }( i j n i j nS C O O H n N i L j D= = = =   (6-1) 
where 
,1 0n iB   represents the degrees of belief that an attribute iC  
is assessed to 
an evaluation grade nH  to a degree of ,n iB  
(x100%) for an alternative jO . The 
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it is considered 
an incomplete assessment. 
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To aggregate the two assessments, the ER approach employs an algorithm that is 
different from the traditional MCDM approaches because it aggregates average 
scores only. Continuing from the previous example of preventing loss of 
containment in the pipeline, there are five evaluation grades to assess the 
effectiveness of a certain intervention, such that: 
 
1 2 3 4 5  ,  ,  ,  ,  
     ,  ,  , ,
{
   
}H H H H H H




Furthermore, suppose two assessments are represented by Equations 6-2 and 6-3: 
( )( )1 1 1 1,1 2 2,1 3 3,1 4 4,1 5 5,1{( ) ( ), ,  , ,  , ,  , ,  ,( ) ( ) ( )}S C O H H H H H    =  (6-2) 
( )( )2 1 1 1,2 2 2,2 3 3,2 4 4,2 5 5,2{( ) ( ), ,  , ,  , ,  , ,  ,( ) ( ) ( )}S C O H H H H H    =  (6-3) 
The steps below are followed to determine the basic probability mass as part of the 
aggregation of the two assessments. 
Combining the evidence requires the belief degrees to be transformed into a basic 
probability mass. Supposing both assessments are complete to generate a 
combined assessment of the two ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 2 1 S C O S C O . Let: 
, , ( 1,...., ; 1,.... ; 1,2)n j i n im w n N i L j= = = =     (6-4) 
, ,
1
1 ( 1,...., ; 1,.... ; 1,2)
N
H j i n i
n
m w n N i L j
=
= − = = =    (6-5) 
,n jm  
is the basic probability mass and ,H jm  is the remaining belief for attribute j, 
unassigned to any of the evaluation grades 1,( .. )nH n N=  .  iw  is weighting of the 
ith attribute, ,n i  represents the degrees of belief. 
Applying Equations 6-4 and 6-5, the basic probability mass for 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 2 1 S C O S C O aggregation will be: 








= −   
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6.2.5 Aggregate Basic Probability Mass for Combined Probability Mass 
The ER algorithm requires the aggregation of the basic probability masses to 
generate combined probability masses, represented as , ( 1) ( 1,... )n I jm n N+ =  
and 
, ( 1)H I jm +  
using the following equations: 
, ( 1) ( 1) , , 1 , 1 , , , 1( ), 1,.. ; 1,.. 1n I j I j n j n j n j H j n j H jm k m m m m m m n N j L+ + + + += + + = = −  (6-6) 
, ( 1) ( 1) , , 1( )H I j I j H j H jm k m m+ + +=         (6-7) 
where  
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         (6-8) 
Applying the above equations to ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 2 1 S C O S C O , the aggregation will give: 
, (2) (2) ,1 1,2 ,2 ,1 ,1 ,2( )n I I n n H n Hm k m m m m m m= + + ; 


















𝑘𝐼(2) is the normalising factor so that for example
5
, (2) , (2)
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6.2.6 Belief Degrees Combination 
The next step is the combination of the belief degrees 𝛽𝑛 as part of the decision-


























= −  
Applying it to this example, 











𝛽𝐻 is the belief degree that is unassigned to any individual evaluation grade after 
all of the basic attributes have been properly assessed. It indicates assessment 
incompleteness (Liu et al., 2005). 
Thus, the combined assessment for the alternative 
1O  can be represented as  
( ) 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 51 , ,  , ,{( ) ( ) ( ) , ,  ( ) ( ),  }, ,S H H HO H H    =  
6.2.7 Ranking of the Attributes 
The final stage is the ranking of the attributes based on their aggregated belief 
degrees from the ER approach. This uses a utility assessment method. If an 
evaluation grade, 
nH , is denoted by ( )nu H , the utility of the evaluation grade must 
be predetermined. If there are five evaluation grades, 
1( )u H  will be taken as zero 
whilst 
5( )u H  is taken as one. If there is no information with which to give a selection 
preference, then the values of ( )nu H  can be taken to be equally distributed as shown 
below: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 3   0,  0.25,  0.5,  4 0.75,  5 1nu H u H u H u H u H u H= = = = = =   (6-10) 
and the utility for the attributes, denoted as (Oj), for the given sets of evaluation 
grades is given as: 
1




u O u H 
=
=         (6-11) 
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( )nu H is the utility of the n-th evaluation grade of nH  as established in Equation 6-10 
for an assumption that it is equidistantly distributed. n  is as defined in Equation 
6-9. 
 
 Case Study: Application to Pipeline Third-Party Damage 
The proposed ER decision model is applied to model the risk control measures for 
theft/intentional third-party pipeline damage. This is based on a case study of a 
cross-country pipeline segment in Nigeria, specifically pipeline Section 2B, as 
described fully in Chapter 2. Pipeline 2B is representative of the country’s pipeline 
system as a whole with respect to third-party damage failure frequency, as it is in 
the middle quartile overall in the failure records across the country.  
In Chapter 5, theft/intentional third-party damage has been identified as the major 
cause of pipeline failure in Nigeria. Therefore, measures must be put in place to 
ensure the threat is reduced or eliminated. The ER approach is a suitable tool for 
this assessment as it allows for the aggregation of multiple attributes and sub-
attributes within the control measures, affording a ranking of alternatives.  
The literature survey (e.g. (Muhlbauer, 2004)) and the experts that have been 
interviewed to as part of this study have identified numerous control measures 
that can contribute towards risk reduction and control of the threat. The most 
significant ones and those that are practical for a geographical area like Nigeria 
have been grouped broadly into four general categories: 
1. Detection measures. 
2. Prevention measures. 
3. Mitigation measures. 
4. Other measures. 
Each of the four general attributes has basic attributes that outline the intervention 
that is being assessed for their effectiveness and ranking of alternatives.  
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6.3.1 Identification of the Predominant Failure Factor 
Identification of the major failure factors for the pipeline under consideration has 
been carried out in Chapter 4. The identified failure factors and their potential 
consequences have been assessed further using the Bayesian Network in Chapter 
5. This Bayesian Network assessment also identified the failure factor with the 
highest probability of occurrence, in this case, third-party related pipeline failure. 
The Bayesian Network analysis indicated that theft/intentional third-party damage 
contributes to about a third of all the pipeline’s failure probability. Additionally, 
the assessment has shown that any effort to reduce intentional third-party damage 
will reduce pipeline failure incidences significantly for the representative scenarios 
considered.  
Third-party damage /theft incidences are becoming a recurring issue for pipeline 
operators as they affect a number of countries, including developed economies. 
The latest Concawe report (Cech et al., 2018) shows that the number of intentional 
third-party damage incidents recorded on European pipelines since 2013 is almost 
ten times the number of incidents recorded in all of the preceding 40 years up to 
2012.  
Intentional third-party damage or theft could be the result of various factors, 
including product theft, an indirect attack against a government, a terrorism-
related attack or a protest for political, social and environmental reasons. Unlike 
other failure factors, an intentional third-party threat involves a focused human 
effort to cause a failure. Any aspect of the pipeline system can be a target. 
Therefore, the full suite of measures must be considered in an analysis for 
identifying effective risk control measures.  
6.3.2 Developing the Evaluation Matrix 
The Evidential Reasoning algorithm requires a structure to be developed that maps 
the variables and their attributes against the risk control measures. The algorithm 
also requires an outline of how it is to be applied in a particular case scenario. The 
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attributes that have been developed are tailored for a cross-country pipeline and 
the identified threat which is particular to geographical areas similar to that of 
Nigeria. However, other geographical areas may find that this model and the 
proposed solutions apply to them.  
As outlined earlier, the main attributes of the risk control measures are taken as 
detection, prevention, mitigation and other measures. Each of the main attributes 
has sub-attributes or basic attributes. These have been developed from the 
literature survey and the expert elicitation in this study and are shown to be the 
most effective in addressing third-party intentional damage (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
The attributes include: 
1. Detection Measures  
1.1. Surveillance: surveillance can take the form of video, with images recorded 
aerially using helicopters, drones or satellite surveillance. This is proven to 
be effective, especially for a pipeline system with a large geographical 
expanse, but it can be expensive in terms of financial outlay. However, for 
pipelines with records of hefty losses like the Nigerian pipeline system, the 
measure could be cost-effective.  
1.2. Leak detection: this is a very important aspect of the overall risk control 
measures as it provides early notice of a potential event and can then allow 
a quick intervention. The detection can be via Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA), acoustic methods, proprietary leak detection 
measures and human detection. 
1.3. SCADA/Staff measures: SCADA is the transmission of the pipeline’s 
operational status at various points along its length so that the operational 
health of the pipeline can be monitored remotely. This is integrated with 
staffing measures as the information relayed by SCADA needs to be acted 
upon by the staff. The SCADA information may include, for example, leak 
detection and overall system diagnosis.  
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1.4. Patrol: undertaking patrolling of the pipeline and its infrastructure at a 
relevant interval is very effective in both preventing and detecting pipeline 
damage due to third-party intervention. Patrol operation should be able to 
proactively detect impending or ongoing third-party activities, as any such 
activity requires preparation and machinery. It can also identify any 
encroachment onto the Right of Way or detect any recent activity in order 
to repair it. Due to the length of a cross-country pipeline, the frequency of 
the patrol and areas to concentrate on should be determined based on the 
level of threat and availability of resources. 
2. Prevention Measures  
2.1. Pipeline cover: pipeline cover includes all measures provided to protect the 
pipeline from any impact leading to its failure. Measures in this category 
include concrete coating, pipe casing, concrete slabs at the top of the 
pipeline and protection mesh. Wall thickness can also be included in this 
attribute. Any wall that is thicker than the minimum required for the 
design pressure and loading can help reduce the likelihood of damage. 
2.2. Burial depth: this is the minimum depth at which the pipeline is to be 
buried to help protect the pipe from the activities of any third party. The 
required burial depth across the industry varies depending on many 
factors, but generally, a depth of 900mm is the norm and required by many 
regulators. However, that depth may not be adequate and could be easily 
reached by potential saboteurs. The benefit of this attribute is that it is the 
most cost-effective when laying new pipelines. 
2.3. Public education: this attribute entails both the government and the 
pipeline operator to reach out to the public and educate them on the 
importance of pipeline infrastructure to the economy of the country and 
the community around its corridor. Experience has shown that public 
education can play a sizeable role in preventing theft/intentional third-
party activities (Muhlbauer, 2004). Even if public education does not stop 
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the perpetrators, it can make the community living where the 
infrastructure passes through be more vigilant, informing authorities of 
any suspicious activity.  
Examples of public education include regular visits and presentations to 
the community, door-to-door contact and informational pamphlets.  
2.4. Barriers: these are physical structures such as fences and alarms, aiming to 
provide some layer of defence on a specific segment of the pipeline that is 
more vulnerable to attack. 
3. Mitigation Measures  
3.1. Right of Way (RoW) control: the level at which the pipeline corridor is 
being maintained and inspected has a direct relation with intentional third-
party damage, especially in areas where there is a high level of physical 
development or human settlement. There have been several examples of 
incidences where houses built on top of a pipeline route are being used by 
criminals as a cover to get into the pipeline for product theft. Also, a clear 
RoW, especially where pipelines are located not far from the public road 
and with no vegetation, is likely to expose any criminal intent easily. In 
these instances, there is not enough vegetation cover for criminal activities 
to be carried out for a long time without being noticed.  
3.2. Spill response: the availability and effectiveness of the emergency response 
to a spill determine whether the consequences can be minimised, by 
minimising the spill volume.  
3.3. Industry cooperation: this is when the industry shares data, intelligence 
and best practices between one another. It can also mean pooling resources 
together to look after facilities, thus multiplying the effectiveness of the 
measures in place. Cooperation like this is often cost-neutral and very 
effective.   
4. Other Measures 
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4.1. Security forces: this could be government security, private security 
employed by the pipeline infrastructure company or a combination of the 
two. Depending on the circumstances, one approach is sometimes better 
than the other. For example, in the Nigerian delta, communities often 
complain that the presence of government security over-militarises the 
community, thus achieving the opposite of what is intended (Wennerbeck, 
2015).  
4.2. Punishment: strict enforcement and the fear of punishment is generally a 
deterrent for any criminal activity. This is more effective for those people 
that are not habitually criminals but may be contemplating engaging in 
such activity. Effective publicity of what awaits the perpetrators and well-
publicised cases of successful prosecutions are a good messaging point 
(Muhlbauer, 2004). Successful punishment also increases government 
perception as being in control of the situation, thus increasing their resolve 
to stop the crime.  
4.3. Community partnering: this can be said to be similar to public education, 
but it is more focused in that the aim is specifically to bring the community 
on board by making them supportive of the infrastructure. The support is 
best obtained when the community can see a tangible benefit to them 
(Muhlbauer, 2004), such as jobs for community members and the provision 
of infrastructures like pipe-borne water and electricity. Community 
partnering could generate the most benefit in reducing the threat to the 
pipeline if thought-out and implemented well.  
Figure 6-1 shows the graphical relationships between the main attributes, the basic 
attributes and the alternatives used in the analysis. All of the attributes contribute 
towards the control measures (alternatives), which are defined as management 
solutions, technical (or technological) solutions and government (or enforcement) 
solutions.  
6.3.3 Weight and Belief Degrees using Experts’ Elicitation 
The first step in the ER analysis is the calculation of the weight of each of the 
identified general and basic attributes, as outlined in Figure 6-1. The belief degrees 
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of these attributes must also be determined. Such information informs the 
evaluation grades and ensures that the attributes have a relationship in terms of 
their effectiveness to the overall analysis.  
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the pairwise comparison method are used 
to determine both the weight and belief degrees by utilising the elicitation of 
experts for qualitative assessment through questionnaires. The sample 
questionnaire and the anonymised results are provided in Appendix D. The 
questionnaire has two parts; part 1 assesses the weighting of the basic attributes 
for each of the main attributes while part 2 assesses the belief degrees associated 
with each attribute.  
Five experts have been asked to give their professional opinion based on their 
expertise and experience, ranking each attribute in relation to the others. The 
experts cut across the pipeline industry supply chain – from an operator to 
consultants and academics. Their input forms the foundation of this assessment 
and ensures that a wide range of views are taken on board. The expertise and 
experience of the experts who have responded are provided below:    
Expert 1 is currently in the employ of a major pipeline infrastructure owner and 
operator in Nigeria, holds a university qualification at an MSc level and has circa 
15 years of experience in pipeline operation, maintenance and management.   
Expert 2 is currently in the employ of a major pipeline infrastructure owner and 
operator in Nigeria, holds a university qualification at BSc level and has circa 11 




Figure 6-1: Attributes Matrix for the Control Measures  
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Expert 3 is currently in the employ of a major pipeline contracting company, holds 
a university qualification at PhD level and has circa 20 years of experience in 
pipeline design.   
Expert 4 is currently in the employ of a consulting company, holds a university 
qualification at an MSc level and has ten years of experience in consultancy.   
Expert 5 is employed by a Nigerian university as a senior lecturer and researcher. 
The expert has more than ten years of experience in research, consultancy and 
teaching of oil and gas in general and pipeline systems in particular. The expert is 
educated to a PhD level. 
The input provided by the experts allows for the completion of the belief degrees 
for the basic attributes. The belief degrees are arrived at by averaging the responses 
provided by all the experts for each of the attributes. The matrix and (normalised) 
weights of all attributes are demonstrated in Table 6-1. Additionally, the assessed 
belief degrees for each of the basic attributes are also shown in Table 6-1. 
The number of experts that have been chosen ensures a balance and a diversity of 
opinions, thus balanced belief degree inputs for the basic attributes. If more experts 
were to be involved, that could help refine and narrow the standard deviation of 
the results. Therefore, it is deemed unlikely that it would affect the overall 
assessment outcome. 
6.3.4 Aggregation of the Normalised Weight and Belief Degrees 
The weights and belief degrees of all the attributes as derived from the expert 
elicitation are shown in Table 6-1. The next step in the process is to extract the 





Table 6-1: Attribute Weightings and Belief Degrees 
General 
Attributes 
ω Basic Attributes  Ω 
Alternatives 
Management Solutions Govt Solutions Technical Solutions 




Surveillance (a1) ω11= 0.298 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.38 0.48 
Leak Detection 
(a2) 
ω12= 0.355 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.40 0.50 
SCADA/Staffing 
(a3) 
ω13= 0.211 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.44 0.28 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.20 0.00 






ω21= 0.161 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.60 0.27 0.00 
Burial Depth (b2) ω22= 0.214 0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.38 0.48 
Public Education 
(b3) 
ω23= 0.174 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 




Right of Way 
Control (c1) 
ω31= 0.553 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.42 0.26 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Spill Response 
(c2) 
ω32= 0.225 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.53 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry 
Cooperation (c3)  










0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.07 0.14 0.43 0.00 0.36 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Punishment (d3) ω43= 0.156 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.22 0.28 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Community 
Partnering (d4) 
ω44= 0.266 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 
 H1= Very Low H2= Low H3= Medium H4= High H5= Very High 
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An example is taken from Table 6-1 to demonstrate the calculation. The example 
uses the general attribute of Mitigation (c), which has three basic attributes: right 
of way control (c1), spill response (c2) and industry cooperation (c3). The weighting 
and the belief degrees for the attributes are shown below: 
Weights: 
Mitigation (c) ω3= 0.17 
Right of Way Control (c1) ω31= 0.553 
Spill Response (c2) ω32= 0.225 
Industry Cooperation (c3)  ω33= 0.222 
 
Belief degrees (government solutions): 
β1,1 = 0 β2,1 = 0 β3,1 = 0.32 β4,1 = 0.42 β5,1 = 0.26 
β1,2 = 0 β2,2 = 0.30 β3,2 = 0.30 β4,2 = 0.40 β5,2 = 0 
β1,3 = 0 β2,3 = 0.20 β3,3 = 0.50 β4,3 = 0.30 β5,3 = 0 
 
6.3.5 Determining the Basic Probability Mass 
Equation 6-4 is then used to calculate the basic probability masses. For example, 
𝑚1,1 = 𝑤31𝛽1,1 = 0.553 x 0 = 0. The rest of the results are given below. 
 
c1  c2  c3  
 m1,1= 0.000 m1,2= 0.000 m1,3 = 0.000 
       
 
m2,1= 0.000 m2,2= 0.0674 m2,3 = 0.0444 
       
 
m3,1 = 0.1748 m3,2 = 0.0674 m3,3 = 0.1110 
       
 
m4,1 = 0.2330 m4,2 = 0.0898 m4,3 = 0.0666 
       
 








 0.5534 ∑ 𝑚𝑛,2 =
5
𝑛=1




       
 
𝑚𝐻,1= 0.4466 𝑚𝐻,2 = 0.7754 𝑚𝐻,3 = 0.7780 
 
6.3.6 Determining the Combined Probability Mass 
The combined probability mass is calculated using Equations 6-6, 6-7 and 6-8. First, 
Equation 6-8 (reproduced below) is used to aggregate the first two attributes, c1 
and c2.  
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The staged calculation of the aggregation is shown here.  
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= 0        + 0.012     + 0.0157   + 0 = 0.0277 
 
       
       
       
       


























= 0          + 0.0157      + 0      + 0 = 0.0157 
 
       
       
       
       
= 0        + 0.0098       + 0.0157     + 0.0131 = 0.0386 
       
 
k1(2)= [1- (0 + 0 + 0.0277 + 0.0157 + 0.0386)]-1 = 1.0891 
 
Once the kI(2) value is obtained, Equations 6-6 and 6-7 (reproduced below) are used, 
together with the probability masses calculated earlier to calculate the combined 
probability masses. 
, ( 1) ( 1) , , 1 , 1 , , , 1( ), 1,... ; 1,2n I j I j n j n j n j H j n j H jm k m m m m m m n N j+ + + + += + + = =  
, ( 1) ( 1) , , 1( )H I j I j H j H jm k m m+ + +=  
       
 
     
      
 
      
      
      
 
      
 
      
      
 
      
      
 
  = 0.3771     
      
 
𝑚1,𝐼(2) = 𝑘1(2)(𝑚1,1𝑚1,2 + 𝑚1,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚1,2 )  = 0  
𝑚2,𝐼(2) = 𝑘1(2)(𝑚2,1𝑚2,2 + 𝑚2,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚2,2) = 0.0328 
𝑚3,𝐼(2) = 𝑘1(2)(𝑚3,1𝑚3,2 + 𝑚3,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚3,2 )   = 0.1932 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2) = 𝑘1(2) 𝑚𝐻,1 𝑚𝐻,2  
𝑚4,𝐼(2) = 𝑘1(2)(𝑚4,1𝑚4,2 + 𝑚4,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚4,2  ) = 0.2633 
𝑚5,𝐼(2) = 𝑘1(2)(𝑚5,1𝑚4,2 + 𝑚5,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚5,2  ) = 0.1230 








This is the end of the first stage aggregation, which is the aggregation of the c1 and 
c2. The next step is the combination of c3 with the aggregated c1 and c2 above. This 
is done by first using Equation 6-8 for k1(3).   
 
       
       
       
       
= 0    + 0    + 0    + 0 = 0 
 
       
       
       
       
= 0   + 0.0040   + 0.0020   + 0 = 0.0060 
       
 
       
       
       
= 0    + 0.0090    + 0.0130   + 0 = 0.0220 
 
       
       
       
       
= 0    + 0.0120    + 0.0290    + 0 = 0.0410 
 
       
       
       
       
= 0    + 0    + 0.0140   + 0.0080 = 0.0220 
 




Once k1(3) is obtained, the next step is to apply Equations 6-6 and 6-7, together with 
the basic probability masses to aggregate for the attributes (c1 ⨁ c2) and c3. 
 

































    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
6.3.7 Combining Degrees of Belief 
The next step is using Equation 6-9 (reproduced below) to calculate the combined 
























= −  
 
β1 =  0/(1 - 0.32) = 0 
 
   
    
 
    
β2 =  0.048/(1 - 0.32) = 0.0710 
    
    
 
    
β3 =  0.235/(1 - 0.32) = 0.3470 
    
    
    
𝑚1,𝐼(3) = 𝑘1(3)(𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3 + 𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3 ) = 0    
𝑚2,𝐼(3) = 𝑘1(3)(𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚2,3 + 𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚2,3  ) = 0.0481 
𝑚3,𝐼(3) = 𝑘1(3)(𝑚3,(𝐼)2𝑚3,3 + 𝑚3,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚3,3  ) = 0.2350 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(3) = 𝑘𝐼(3) 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2) 𝑚𝐻,3 = 0.3228 
𝑚4,𝐼(3) = 𝑘1(3)(𝑚4,(𝐼)2𝑚4,3 + 𝑚4,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚4,3  ) = 0.2722 













β4 =  0.272/(1 - 0.32) = 0.4020 
 
   
    
 
    
β5 =  0.105/(1 - 0.32) = 0.1554 
    




   = 1 
    
βH   =  0 
 
The step above completes the assessment. The effectiveness of the mitigation 
approach as part of the risk control measures, using the attributes right of way 




= {(very low, 0), (low, 0.071), (medium, 0.347), 
(high, 0.402), (very high, 0.155)} 
 
 ER Results and Analysis 
The assessment carried out in Section 6.3 examines the general attributes of 
mitigation and their basic attributes under government solutions. This assessment 
has been repeated for other RCOs and under all the proposed solution groupings. 
Table 6-1 shows the number of the general attributes, their corresponding basic 
attributes and the proposed solution grouping that each basic attribute belongs to. 
The calculations have been carried out on Microsoft Excel following the Yang and 
Xu (2005) approach, as Excel allows for more flexibility. The results for aggregation 
are shown in Figure 6-2 through to Figure 6-5. H1 is when an approach has a very 
low likelihood of being effective, H2 is when an approach has a low likelihood of 









being effective, H3 is when it is medium, H4 is when it is high and H5 is when it 
has a very high likelihood of being effective.  
Figure 6-2 shows the detection attributes aggregation for management, 
government and technical solutions. The results show that technical solutions have 
a higher very high (H5) belief degree, meaning that it is more effective than other 
proposed solutions. The government solutions have the highest H1 and virtually 
no H5 rating. This is consistent with the types of basic attributes under the 
detection main attribute, which are mostly technical.    
 
Figure 6-2: Detection Attributes Aggregation for the Solution Groupings 
 
Figure 6-3 shows the aggregation results of the prevention attributes against the 
three proposed solutions. The results do not indicate clearly the most effective 
solution but they did show that, overall, technical solutions are better than the 
other two solutions. Again, government solutions are shown to have the highest 
H1 score. Although technical solutions do not have the highest H5 rating, they have 
the fewest H1 and H2 ratings. Their individual ranking will be better appreciated 




Figure 6-3: Prevention Attributes Aggregation for the Solution Groupings 
 
Figure 6-4 shows the aggregation of the mitigation attributes. The results indicate 
technical solutions as the least effective solution. This is understandable since the 
basic attributes of mitigation are the RCOs that require management and 
government solutions. Such RCOs include ensuring that the right of way control 
enforced, that there is adequate provision for spill control and the presence of 
industry cooperation.   
Figure 6-5 shows the aggregation of the ‘other measures’ attributes. These are the 
risk control measures not included under the three measures above. The results 
show that management and government solutions have a highest belief degree of 
providing better control over identified third-party pipeline failure. The technical 
solutions are the least effective. The basic attributes for these RCOs include 





Figure 6-4: Mitigation Attributes Aggregation for the Solution Groupings 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Other Measures’ Attributes Aggregation for the Solution Groupings 
 
Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 show the overall aggregation results based on the 
assessed risk control options and intervention solutions respectively. The results 
show a clustering of attributes, making it difficult to identify which of attributes 
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have the most effective likelihood of success across all the main RCO groupings. 
To address this and calculate the ranking in a numerical format, Equations 6-10 
and 6-11 are utilised to calculate their utility values.  
 
Figure 6-6: General Attributes Aggregation 
 
 
Figure 6-7: Aggregation of Alternatives for their Effectiveness 
 
If the utility for an evaluation grade 
nH  is denoted by ( )nu H , the utility of all the 
evaluation grades must be predetermined such that u(H1) will be taken as zero 
whilst u(H5) is taken as one. If there is no information for a giving selection 
preference, then the values of ( )nu H  can be taken to be equally distributed as in 
Equation 6-10, reproduced here: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 3   0,  0.25,  0.5,  4 0.75,  5 1nu H u H u H u H u H u H= = = = = =  
and the utility for the attributes, denoted as 𝑂𝐽, for the given sets of evaluation 
grades is as in Equation 6-11, reproduced below: 
1




u O u H 
=
=  
𝛽𝑛 determines the likelihood that 𝑂𝐽 is assessed to a grade 𝐻𝑛 on the lower 
boundary whilst 𝛽𝑛 +  𝛽𝐻 determines the same likelihood but from the upper 
boundary, assuming a complete belief degree. If there is an incomplete belief 
degree, then the rank of each attribute can be determined from the equations 
below. Assuming the least effective intervention is H1 and the most effective is HN, 
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With the above equation, a single utility value can be calculated for each main 
attribute and the overall effectiveness of the intervention options to allow ranking. 
For example, for the mitigation general attribute (for government solutions) that 
was calculated in Section 6.3 above, the utility value (complete belief) can be 
calculated as: 
𝑈(𝑆(𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑣′𝑡 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 )) 
  = 𝑢(𝐻1)𝛽1 + 𝑢(𝐻2)𝛽2 + 𝑢(𝐻3)𝛽3 + 𝑢(𝐻4)𝛽4 + 𝑢(𝐻5)𝛽5 
= (0 x 0) + (0.25 x 0.071) + (0.5 x 0.347) + (0.75 x 0.402) + (1 x 0.155)} 
  = 0.65 
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This utility calculation has been carried out for all the main attributes and also the 
risk control solutions. The assessment also combines the overall effectiveness of all 
of the attributes and risk control solutions to enable ranking for decision-making.  
Table 6-2 shows the utility value and ranking for the detection attribute. It can be 
deduced that, for detection measures – which have basic attributes that include 
surveillance, leak detection, SCADA/staffing measures and patrols – technical 
solutions have a higher belief degree of being the most effective. The assessment 
shows that they are the most effective measures in reducing the risk of pipeline 
failure due to third-party activities.  





















0.203 0.136 0.303 0.311 0.048 0.47 2 
Gov’t Solutions 0.672 0.283 0.018 0.027 0.000 0.10 3 
Technical 
Solutions 
0.053 0.111 0.183 0.335 0.362 0.73 1 
 
For the prevention main attribute, Table 6-3 shows that the most effective risk 
control solutions are technical solutions. The prevention main attribute has 
pipeline cover, burial depth, public education and physical barriers as its basic 
attributes. When compared with Figure 6-3, it can be seen that the higher ranking 
of technical solutions is because they have the smallest negative grade (H1).  
 
Table 6-3: Utility Values and Ranking for the Prevention Main Attribute 
Prevention 






















0.757 0.095 0.030 0.020 0.098 0.15 3 
Technical 
Solutions 
0.117 0.096 0.320 0.395 0.080 0.56 1 
 
For the utility calculation and ranking of the mitigation main attribute, Table 6-4 
indicates that government solutions emerge as the most effective intervention in 
reducing the threat, followed by management solutions. The mitigation main 
attribute has as its basic attributes RoW control, spill response and industry 
collaboration. The enforcement of RoW control and spill response is mainly driven 
by government intervention.  
Table 6-4: Utility Values and Ranking for the Mitigation Main Attribute 
Mitigation 

























0.664 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.08 
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The ‘other measures’ main attribute has as its basic attributes as intelligence, 
security forces, punishment and community partnering. Table 6-5 shows the utility 
values and the ranking. Surprisingly, management solutions, not government 
solutions, emerge as the most effective intervention. This may have been due to 
the experts believing that the over-militarization of pipeline security in Nigeria’s 
delta region has not yielded any positive results for a long time. The experts, 
therefore, believe that a less combative and more collaborative approach with the 
host community along the pipeline corridor would produce better results.  





















0.000 0.052 0.116 0.145 0.687 0.87 1 
Gov’t 
Solutions 
0.007 0.267 0.278 0.184 0.273 0.62 2 
Technical 
Solutions 
0.480 0.450 0.061 0.009 0.000 0.15 3 
 
Table 6-6 shows the total ranking taking into account all the main and basic 
attributes. The technical solutions emerge as the set of intervention options that 
will provide the most effective tool to reduce the threat of third-party activities on 
the pipeline. The next most effective set of options are management solutions, 
followed by government intervention. The results are deemed consistent in that 
technical solutions are mostly aimed at preventing the third-party incident in the 
first instance. The technical solutions make any attempt to get to the pipeline 
difficult. If technical solutions are effective, then only a minimal amount of 
sabotage attempts will be successful. 
Table 6-6: Utility Values and Rankings for Overall Effectiveness of Different 
Interventions 
Overall 

















0.130 0.419 0.194 0.136 0.121 0.42 2 
Gov’t 
Solutions 
0.537 0.162 0.103 0.101 0.095 0.26 3 
Technical 
Solutions 
0.223 0.173 0.203 0.276 0.142 0.49 1 
 
Assessment has been carried out also using Non-linear utility grade ( )nu H  
assuming a risk seeking approach such that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 3   0,  0.8,  0.9,  4 0.95,  5 1nu H u H u H u H u H u H= = = = = =  
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The results of the rankings for all the attributes and the interventions remain 
unchanged even with the different utility grades. This further indicates the 
stability of the results. 
Table 6-7 shows the comparison and the ranking for the two utility grades.  The 
next subsection reviews the sensitivity analysis of the results.  
Table 6-7: Utility Values and Rankings Comparison for Linear and Non-linear 
Utility Grades 
Grades Linear Utility Non-linear Utility 
u(Grades) u (Total) Ranking  u (Total) Ranking  
Detection  Management 
Solutions 
0.47 2 0.72 2 
Govt Solutions 0.10 3 0.27 3 
Technical Solutions 0.73 1 0.93 1 
Prevention Management 
Solutions 
0.27 2 0.69 2 
Govt Solutions 0.15 3 0.22 3 
Technical Solutions 0.56 1 0.82 1 
Mitigation Management 
Solutions 
0.53 2 0.89 2 
Govt Solutions 0.65 1 0.906 1 
Technical Solutions 0.08 3 0.27 3 
Other Measures Management 
Solutions 
0.87 1 0.97 1 
Govt Solutions 0.62 2 0.91 2 
Technical Solutions 0.15 3 0.42 3 
 
6.4.1 Sensitivity Studies 
To ensure that the model is working as expected when different and varied inputs 
are provided, a sensitivity study has been carried out. The sensitivity analysis uses 
the same general and basic attributes examples that have been utilised in Section 
6.3. The general attribute of mitigation has the three basic attributes of the right of 
way control (RoW), spill response and industry cooperation. The weighting of 
RoW, with a value of 0.55, is twice as high as that of the other two attributes, hence 
it will have the most impact on the aggregation of this particular main attribute.  
192 
 
The sensitivity process entails varying the weighting of the baseline input by +5%, 
+10%, -5% and -10% respectively for the basic attributes RoW, spill response and 
industry cooperation. If, for example, RoW inputs are the subject of the sensitivity 
analysis, to ensure the total of all the weights comes to 100%, the weightings of the 
other basic attributes will need to be adjusted in a similar proportion. If, for 
instance, RoW control is increased by 10%, the spill response and industry 
cooperation would have to be decreased by 5% each. Table 6-8, Table 6-9 and Table 
6-10 show the new weights for each of the basic attributes when the main 
sensitivity analysis weight variation is carried out for one attribute. The tables also 
show the results of the normalisation process that ensures all the weights for the 
three attributes sum up to 100%. 
Table 6-8: Sensitivity Analysis - RoW Control Weighting Variation 
Right of Way Control 













10.0% 0.609 5.0% 0.236 5.0% 0.233 1 
5.0% 0.581 2.5% 0.230 2.5% 0.228 1 
0.0% 0.553 0.0% 0.225 0.0% 0.222 1 
-5.0% 0.526 -2.5% 0.219 -2.5% 0.216 1 
-10.0% 0.498 -5.0% 0.213 -5.0% 0.211 1 
 













Sum of weightings 
10.0% 0.247 5.0% 0.233 5.0% 0.581 1 
5.0% 0.236 2.5% 0.228 2.5% 0.567 1 
0.0% 0.225 0.0% 0.222 0.0% 0.553 1 
-5.0% 0.213 -2.5% 0.216 -2.5% 0.540 1 



















Sum of Weightings 
10.0% 0.244 5.0% 0.236 5.0% 0.581 1 
5.0% 0.233 2.5% 0.230 2.5% 0.567 1 
0.0% 0.222 0.0% 0.225 0.0% 0.553 1 
-5.0% 0.211 -2.5% 0.219 -2.5% 0.540 1 
-10.0% 0.200 -5.0% 0.213 -5.0% 0.526 1 
 
The results of the analysis and the comparison between the utility values of the 
basic attributes are shown below. Figure 6-8 shows the utility values across three 
basic attributes for a 5% variation from +10% to -10%. The results show that the 
three attributes are all trailing each other in terms of the impact they have on the 
results. However, as expected, RoW control has the most impact of the three 
attributes. The behaviour of the model for the input variation follows an expected 
pattern. As the weighting is varied between 0 and +10%, the utility values decrease 
whilst a reduced weighting of the same magnitude results in increased utility 
values. 
6.4.2 Validation 
Validation is used to ensure that the model is fit for its intended purpose and meets 
the expected requirements. There are four axioms that the model needs to satisfy 
to ensure that it is fit for use and can produce the expected outcome for a range of 
inputs (Loughney, 2017; Yang & Xu, 2002). These axioms are Independence, 





Figure 6-8: Sensitivity Analysis – Weighting Variation of Basic Attributes and How 
it affects Utility Values 
 
• Independence axiom: this synthesis axiom gauges that if no basic attribute is 
assessed to an evaluation grade at all, then the general attribute should not be 
assessed to the same grade either. Continuing with the “mitigation” general 
attribute evaluated in Section 6.3, it can be seen that the general attribute grade 
‘very low’ is assessed as zero., i.e., 0n = . The basic attribute grade ‘very low’, 
, 0n i =  for i = 1, 2, 3 is also assessed as zero. The assessment thus follows the 
principle of this axiom.  
• Consensus axiom: this synthesis axiom determines that if all basic attributes 
are precisely assessed to an individual grade, then the general attribute should 
also be precisely assessed to the same grade. On this assessment, there are no 
identical basic attributes that have been precisely assessed to the same 
individual grade to afford direct validation for this axiom. However, the RoW 
control (C1), spill response (C2) and industry cooperation (C3) initial belief 
degrees for low (H2) and medium (H3) grades (management solutions) are (H2, 
C1 =0.50, H2, C2=0.11, H2, C3=0.00) and (H3, C1=0.50, H3, C2=0.16, H3, C3=0.00) 
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and are therefore similar. Hence the axiom could be said to be satisfied if the 
aggregated value produces similar aggregated results.  
When the general attribute is aggregated, the belief degrees for the low (β2) 
and medium (β3) grades are 0.353 and 0.366 respectively. The results share a 
close similarity. Therefore, they can be taken as evidence that the axiom is 
satisfied.  
• Completeness: this axiom determines that, if all basic attributes are completely 
assessed to a subset of grades, then the general attribute should be completely 
assessed to the same subset as well. This axiom is satisfied throughout the 
analysis as all the aggregation has been carried out using the five evaluation 
grades of very low, low, medium, high and very high. 
• Incompleteness: this axiom determines that, if any basic assessment is 
incomplete, then a general assessment obtained by aggregating the incomplete 
and complete basic assessments should also be incomplete with the degree of 
incompleteness properly assigned. As there are not any incomplete belief 
degrees in this assessment, this axiom is satisfied. The initial belief degrees for 
both the general and basic attributes are all equal to one. The aggregated belief 
degrees for all the general attributes are also equal to one.  
The model is therefore deemed validated as it satisfies the four axioms. The 
model’s methodology and procedure are, therefore, fit for purpose and behave as 
expected.  
 
 Cost and Benefit Estimation and Ranking 
The loss of containment of a pipeline is associated with the financial cost, and so 
are the risk control measures that would be put in place to minimise or mitigate 
such losses. The cost of pipeline losses could broadly be categorised into: 
1. Cost of compensation for loss of life or injuries sustained (including hospital 
treatment and other compensation for the injured). 
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2. Cost of damage to the environment, habitat, population livelihood and 
physical property. 
3. Cost as a result of economic loss, which includes production losses, contract 
penalties and repair losses.  
Obtaining a total cost of each of the individual cost components above is difficult 
due to different variables. Additionally, Nigeria’s Employee’s Compensation Act 
(Federal Government of Nigeria, 2010) has created an agency with the 
responsibility to compensate the families of employees that suffer work-related 
injuries or fatalities. However, the law does not outline the compensation 
procedure if the accident affects a third party (that is, members of the public). 
Evidence from previous incidents shows that the majority of those affected by 
pipeline accidents are members of the public, not the personnel working for the 
pipeline operator or the pipeline contractor (Carlson et al., 2015). The affected third 
parties often resort to civil law for compensation by the courts in the absence of 
any specific relevant law. 
The main cost associated with any loss of containment in a pipeline in Nigeria, 
therefore, includes all three components – cost due to loss of life or injury, direct 
economic loss cost and the cost of environmental restoration. Sections 6.5.1, 6.5.2 
and 6.5.3 shows how the those costs have been estimated. Section 6.5.4 provides 
the total cost. 
6.5.1 Loss of Life and Injury-Related Costs 
The costs associated with the loss of life or due to injury can be included in the 
analysis in several ways, including using one of the following approaches, Cost of 
Saving Lives (CSX) value, willingness to pay (WTP), human capital, life-quality 
index (LQI) or value of statistical life (VSL) (Arends et al., 2005; Sánchez-Silva & 
Klutke, 2016). The most widely used approaches are LQI and VSL. 
The LQI uses a criterion to define a threshold that separates efficient from 
inefficient lifesaving investments, where the cost of saving lives is used as a 
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restriction in the analysis, as opposed to a direct cost. The VSL approach, on the 
other hand, consists of estimating the potential number of casualties and assigning 
them a value often based on the value of statistical life. VSL is assessed as the value 
assigned for compensation to the relatives of any individual in case of an accident. 
VSL is deemed as the most appropriate analysis to use for the purpose of 
ascertaining the direct cost for compensation. 
VSL is defined as Robinson, Hammitt and O’Keefe (2019): 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑡 = 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑏 × (
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑏
)𝑛      (6-12) 
where 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑡 is the VSL for the target country, 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑏 is the VSL for the baseline 
country, 𝑌𝑡 is the target country’s income and 𝑌𝑏 is the baseline country’s income, 
both in GNI (Gross National Income) per capita. n is the elasticity which measures 
the rate at which VSL changes with income.  
The VSL for Nigeria can thus be calculated from Equation 6-12), as outlined below. 
 






𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑔 is Nigeria’s VSL, to be calculated,  
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑈𝑆 is the baseline country VSL, in this case the USA, with a value of $9.6 million, 
𝑌𝑁𝑖𝑔 is Nigeria’s income in GNI per capita which is $2,820, 
𝑌𝑈𝑆 is the USA’s income in GNI per capita which is $ 55,980, and 
n is the elasticity, which is taken as 1. 









The $485,000 compares well with the average VSL for a lower middle-income 
economy of $420,000 (Viscusi & Masterman, 2017). Therefore, based on a statistical 
value of life of $485,000, the expected annual economic benefit of averting 652 
fatalities per year is equal to $315.3 million. The estimates for the annual fatalities 
and how it is arrived at is given below. 
Qualitative assessment of the consequence of a pipeline accident in terms of life 
safety would use the guidance provided in industrial standards (IMO, 2018; 
Norske Veritas, 2010) and the results of the FMEA carried out in Chapter 4. The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) guide (IMO, 2018) and the Der Norske 
Veritas (DNV) recommended practice (Norske Veritas, 2010) have qualitative 
rankings for safety consequences as outlined in Table 6-11. 
Table 6-11: Safety Consequence Qualitative Ranking 
DNV Guide IMO Guide 
Category Description  Category Description Equivalent 
fatalities 
1 (low) No person(s) 
are injured 
1 (minor) Single or minor 
injury 
0.01 
2  (not used) 2 (significant) Multiple or severe 
injuries 
0.1 
3 (medium) Serious injury, 
one fatality 




4 (not used) 4 (catastrophic) Multiple fatalities  10 
5 (high) More than one 
fatality 
5  (not used)  
 
The rankings for the DNV guide and the IMO guide differ slightly but are all 
consistent, although the two rankings both use less than five categories. On the 
other hand, the FMEA ranking used in Chapter 4 uses five categories. This research 
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adapts the two qualitative rankings in Table 6-11 to develop a five-category 
ranking that will be compatible with the FMEA results. This is shown in Table 6-12. 
Table 6-12: Modified Safety Consequence Qualitative Ranking (Modified from 
Table 6-11) 
Category Description Equivalent Fatalities 
1 (negligible) No person(s) are injured 0.001 
2 (marginal) Single or minor injury 0.01 
3 (moderate) Multiple or severe injuries 0.1 
4 (critical) Single fatality or multiple severe injuries  1 
5 (catastrophic) Multiple fatalities  10 
 
The FMEA assessment has been carried out using expert elicitation with the 
experts’ details outlined in Table 4-6. The FMEA results for third-party damage 
shows that the three experts have assigned consequence severity rankings of 5, 4 
and 4 respectively. This would put the consequence severity of pipeline accidents 
in Nigeria’s System 2B to be between critical and catastrophic. However, not all 
third-party pipeline damage results in a fire, explosion or any safety consequences. 
Nevertheless, the few pipeline accidents that result in safety consequences do have 
significantly higher fatalities than the 10-fatality value assigned for the 
catastrophic ranking. For example, Carlson et al. (2015) report several pipeline 
accidents in Nigeria where more than 100 people were reported dead. It could, 
therefore, be reasonably argued that using a conservative approach, where it is 
assumed that each pipeline incident is assigned a ranking of five – catastrophic – 
is more appropriate. However, this research takes a less conservative approach of 
assigning a ranking of four – critical – for assessing life safety consequences, with 
sensitivity assessment carried out in section 6.5.5 to assess the changes to the 
results if different ranking is used.  
The number of equivalent fatalities is based on the number of annual pipeline 
accidents. Table 6-13 shows the annual pipeline failures for a decade up to 2015, 
which gives an average of 652 failures annually. As noted earlier, the majority of 
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these failures do not result in any life safety consequence. However, the few that 
result in fires and explosions often record higher fatality or fatality equivalent 
numbers. 
Table 6-13: 10-Year Failure Statistics for Pipeline System 2B (NNPC, 2016) 
Year Number of Pipeline Failures Product Loss ('000 mt) 
2006 486 183 
2007 479 142 
2008 530 13 
2009 609 110 
2010 191 145 
2011 468 127 
2012 481 163 
2013 1080 269 
2014 1077 333 
2015 1114 471 
Annual Average 652 196 
 
With a critical consequence severity assumption equivalent to one fatality per 
accident, the estimated number of fatalities for the number of incidents stands at 
652 per year. This figure is higher than the annual average of circa 250 incidents 
for the previous decade up to 2006 (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). This should not be 
surprising since the spate of pipeline damage due to third-party events has 
increased significantly in the decade up to 2015 compared to the previous decade. 
Previously reported incidents (Hopkins, 2008; Carlson et al., 2015) also indicate that 
one accident can result in several hundred fatalities.  
6.5.2 Direct Economic Cost to the Operator 
This covers the cost of business interruption, including loss of production, contract 
penalties, the cost of repair or replacement of the affected pipeline section. As the 
costs increase, the more time it takes to repair the pipeline, which is often assumed 
to be a linear relationship. Previous research (Ekwo, 2011) has estimated the 
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approximate number of pipeline failures and their total cost due to product shut-
in and repairs. Therefore, these figures can be obtained for the System 2B pipeline. 
However, there are no details of the distribution of the size of the damage; as a 
result, there is no precise cost based on the size of the pipeline damage. This 
analysis will, therefore, take the average cost per damage as an indication of the 
direct economic cost per failure. Table 6-13 shows the number of System 2B 
pipeline failures for a decade up to 2015. The average annual cases of pipeline 
failure, the cost of repair, the product loss and the estimated economic cost are 
shown in Table 6-14.  
Table 6-14: System 2B Average Annual Damage and Economic Costs (Ekwo, 2011) 










2B 652 196 $ 51,865,983 $ 79,943 
 
Note that this figure is of a very high level and only includes the actual repair cost 
and the cost of product loss due to spillage. The figure may not include the cost of 
lost revenue due to shut-in or third-party liabilities which could be an order of 
magnitude higher. 
6.5.3 Environmental Damage and Restoration Cost 
The cost associated with oil spills is traditionally divided into two: the cost to clean 
up the spill and the cost to make good the damage made by the spill in terms of its 
social, environmental and resource-based damages. This section only looks at the 
cost of cleaning the environment post-spill.  
Various derivations of the oil spill clean-up cost have been developed, including 
work carried out by Etkin (2000; 1999) and Kontovas et al., (2011b; 2011a). The work 
of Kontovas et al., (2011b; 2011a) has subsequently been adopted in the IMO Formal 
Safety Assessment guidelines (IMO, 2018). The two works derived their data 
primarily for spills on water, but the Kontovas et al., (2011b; 2011a) approach has 
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been used in studies of pipelines, including onshore pipeline spills (Eglington et 
al., 2012; Gunton & Broadbent, 2015).  
Using the dataset from the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 
(IOPCF) for the period between 1979 and 2006, Kontovas et al., (2011b; 2011a) used 
a linear regression analysis to come up with a fitted model which calculates both 
the clean-up cost and a total cost of oil spills as a function of spill volume. The fitted 
curve for the total cost as adopted by the IMO is used here, as shown in Table 6-15. 
This assessment analyses the two spill datasets and compares it with the anecdotal 
evidence of suggested payments for spill clean-up in Nigeria (NNPC, 2012) to 
decide which is more appropriate for use. 
Table 6-15: Spill Clean-Up Cost Models 
Cost Dataset Equation  
Total cost All spills 67275 V 0.5893 
V>0.1 tonnes 42301 V 0.7233 
 
V is the spill volume in metric tonnes. The difference between the ‘all spills’ and 
spills with volumes greater than 0.1 tonnes equations is as a result of the datasets 
used, the IOPCF and the OSLTF (US Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund), with one 
overestimating the volumetric total clean-up cost compared to the other.  
Using the derivations and adjusting for inflation (US inflation figures to 2015 
prices), the annual oil spill volume of 196,000 metric tonnes for the System 2B 
pipeline gives a total cost of $107 million using the ‘all spills’ dataset. If the dataset 
that excludes small spills is used, the cost increases to $345 million, as shown in 
Table 6-16. The costs are adjusted from 2005 prices to 2015 prices so that they align 
with the life safety and economic costs which are set at 2015 prices. This assessment 
discounts the cost-increase trend over time, as highlighted by Etkin (1999). 
Anecdotal evidence and discussion with field operatives indicate that the most 
appropriate equation to use is the total costs equation for spills greater than 0.1 
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tonnes. This is also in line with the types of spills encountered, as the spills are in 
the order of hundreds or thousands of tonnes. 
Table 6-16: Total Spill Cost.   
Spill Volume (mt) Formula 2005 prices 2015 Prices 
Total Cost (all spills) 196,000  67275 V0.5893 $88,426,047  $107,306,570  
Total Cost (V>0.1t) 196,000  42301 V0.7233 $284,602,985  $345,370,750  
 
6.5.4 Total Failure Cost 
The estimated failure cost of pipeline 2B includes the cost of human losses, the 
direct economic cost and the environmental damage and restoration cost, which 
have all been outlined in Sections 6.5.1, 6.5.2 and 6.5.3. The failure cost in Section 
6.5.1 has been estimated using VSL assessment and the FMEA. The failure cost in 
Section 6.5.2 has been obtained directly from the system 2B infrastructure operator, 
whilst the cost in Section 6.5.3 is estimated using the IMO derivation.  
The direct economic cost is calculated as an average of the losses over 10 years to 
2015 and is estimated at $51.9 million. The environmental cost is estimated as 
$345.4 million at 2015 prices. The cost associated with life safety, in equivalent 
fatalities, is estimated as $315.3 million, also at 2015 prices. The total cost of the 
three components is, therefore, $712.6 million.  
6.5.5 Cost of Risk Reduction and Control Measures 
An assessment has been carried out to determine the financial costs required to 
implement the identified risk reduction and control measures. Based on the ER 
aggregation results shown in Section 6.4, some measures are more effective than 
others. However, for this assessment, it is assumed that all measures may be 
implemented. The cost of each RCO varies and so does its effectiveness. First, the 
failure likelihood of the baseline intervention options needs to be established. This 
is achieved by using the failure likelihood derived for intentional third-party 
damage from Figure 5-3, which is 0.30, and the belief degrees provided by the 
204 
 
experts, which is represented as the weightings in Table 6-1. The two values are 
then used to estimate the failure likelihood for the inadequate provision of the 
basic attributes. For example, to obtain the failure likelihood estimates relating to 
inadequate surveillance the following are used: the intentional third-party damage 
failure likelihood of 0.300, the detection general attribute weight of 0.290, from 
Table 6-1, and the surveillance basic attribute weight of 0.298, also from Table 6-1. 
This gives inadequate surveillance a failure likelihood of 0.0263, that is, 0.300 x 
0.290 x 0.298. The failure likelihood of the rest of the attributes is shown in Table 
6-17. The total of the entirety of Table 6-17 should be equal to 0.3, which is the 
likelihood of failure due to intentional third-party damage estimated in Chapter 5. 
Table 6-17: Failure Likelihood for Baseline Studies - System Without any RCO 
S/N Lack of or Inadequate Provision the Basic Attributes Failure Likelihood (/yr) 
1 Lack of or Inadequate Surveillance 0.0263 
2 Leak Detection 0.0313 
3 SCADA/Staffing Measures 0.0186 
4 Patrol 0.0120 
5 Pipeline Cover 0.0215 
6 Burial Depth 0.0287 
7 Public Education 0.0233 
8 Barrier 0.0606 
9 Right of Way Control 0.0277 
10 Spill Response 0.0112 
11 Industry Cooperation  0.0111 
12 Intelligence 0.0121 
13 Security Forces 0.0038 
14 Punishment 0.0043 
15 Community Partnering 0.0073 
 
To obtain the estimated cost of intervention, two levels of risk reduction options 
for each of the attributes have been identified: the basic RCOs and advanced RCOs. 
The “as-installed” provisions are cost-neutral because they are already installed 
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and therefore do not require any additional budgetary expenditure. These “as-
installed” provisions are included only for completeness. The basic RCO 
provisions are the options that minimise expenditure whilst providing an 
improvement on the existing provisions. The advanced RCO provisions are the 
detailed provisions that aim to reduce the likelihood of a threat being realised to 
significantly low levels. The downside of advanced RCO provisions is the high 
level of expenditure associated with their provision. Note that the majority of RCO 
provisions aim to reduce the likelihood of a failure event happening. Some RCOs, 
such as patrols, could reduce the failure likelihood as well as the eventual 
consequences when a failure event happens. However, as consequence analysis 
has not been carried out as part of this research, assessment of the consequence 
reduction potential of the RCOs have not been investigated. 
Table 6-18 shows the RCOs and their estimated cost in dollars (set at 2015 prices) 
for each of the intervention provisions. There are three cost options for each RCO. 
The first is for the operator to do nothing, the second is for a basic implementation 
of the RCO and the last involves advanced RCO provisions. The majority of the 
estimated costs are obtained from literature which looks at similar interventions 
and in some cases is adjusted to reflect the Nigerian environment. Where no 
information is available in the literature or there is no unpublished in-house data 
from the pipeline operator, expert opinion has been elicited. Where information 
has been obtained or adapted from a source, a reference has been provided in Table 
6-18, against the relevant RCO cost estimate. 
The assigned value for reduction in failure likelihood is subjectively assessed with 
the support of experts based on the perceived effectiveness of each RCO and the 
level of the intervention. For example, advanced RCOs have been assumed to be 
capable of reducing the failure likelihood by more than 99%. 
The estimated cost (total) includes the initial purchase of the equipment, its 
maintenance, spare parts and repairs. In order to arrive at the present value, these 
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cost components have been calculated and added to the final figure. The present 












  where i is the discount rate or the interest rate, Rt is the 
outlay cost and t is the number of years.  
For example, the costs for a real-time transient leak detection facility includes a 
purchase cost of $1,000,000, annual maintenance costs of $2,000 per year and 
repairs/spare parts cost of $500 per year for an expected service lifetime of 25 years. 
The cost of the capital or interest rate is assumed to be 10%. 
The cost components will be: 
1. Purchase cost = $1,000,000 
2. PV(maintenance) = ∑ (
2,000
(1+10%25)






) = $18,154.08 
3. PV(spares) = ∑ (
500
(1+10%25)






) = $4,538.52 
The total cost is therefore $1,022,693. Table 6-18 provides the estimated costs for 
implementing each of the RCOs. As outlined earlier, the assigned values for the 
reduction in failure likelihood is subjectively assessed with the support of experts 
based on the perceived effectiveness of each RCO. 
Table 6-18: Costs for Implementing Risk Reduction Measures 
General  
Attributes 






Cost in $ 
(/yr.) 
Reference 
Surveillance No surveillance - -  (PPMC, 





Basic LDS (e.g., pressure/flow 
monitoring) 
- -    (Hill, 2011) 
Mid-range LDS (e.g., real time 
transient model) 
0.1999 1,022,693 
Advance LDS (e.g., fibre optics 
leak detection) 

















No SCADA and minimal staff 
monitoring 
-   -    (Oriental 
Consultan
ts, 2011) Basic SCADA and limited staff 
monitoring 
0.0999 487,085  
Advanced SCADA and robust 
staff monitoring 
0.0001 1,948,339  
Patrol Irregular and ineffective patrol  - 473,388  (PPMC, 
2014) 





No cover -  -    (Knoope, 
2016) Reinforced concrete slab, etc., 
above the pipeline 
0.0999 62,150,000  
Reinforced concrete slab or high 
tensile netting plus visible 
warning above the pipeline 
0.0001 62,274,300  
Burial Depth ≤ 0.4 -  -     (Knoope, 
2016) ≤ 1.0 0.4999 19,662,000  
>1.6 0.0001 36,047,000  
Public 
Education 
No public education -  -    (USDT, 
2012) Good, less effective public 
education  
0.2999 500,000  
Very good and effective public 
education 
0.0001 2,000,000  
Barrier No barrier -  - 
 
Basic physical barrier to the most 
vulnerable segment of the 
pipeline  
0.0999 925,000  
Fence, alarms and CCTV on all 
segments of pipeline subject to 
attack 
0.0001 2,259,000  
Right of Way 
Control 
No effective RoW enforcement  -  (Rui et al., 
2011) 
 
Less effective RoW control with 
pockets of incursions in some 
corridors 
0.4999  
Strick RoW control  0.0001 578,314  
Spill 
Response 
No specified emergency spill 
response  
-  -    (O&G UK 
& OPOL, 
2012) Facility response plan in place 
but no coordination with outside 
entities 
0.3157 101,376  
Well planned emergency spill 
response including facility 
response plan, coordination and 
cooperation with nearby 
facilities and robust coordination 











Cost in $ 
(/yr.) 
Reference 




No cooperation  -  -   
Uncoordinated and informal 
cooperation  
0.3477 250,000  
Detailed coordination and 
cooperation with the rest of the 
industry and especially a formal 
coordinated approach to tackling 
asset threat 
0.0001 1,000,000  
Intelligence No intelligence gathering and 
sharing 
-  - (Amunwa, 
2012) 
 
Some intelligence is gathered but 
actions are inconsistent. 
0.1303 1,216,021  
Optimum intelligence gathering 
and sharing with and between 
all relevant parties. Actions are 
taken based on intelligence.  
0.0001 4,864,083  
Security 
Forces 
Inconsistent and uncoordinated 
security provision 




Less effective security provisions 0.3999 4,864,083  
Robust, coordinated and 
effective security provisions by 
both the companies and govt 
0.0001 19,456,333  
Punishment No fear of punishment to serve 
as a deterrent 
-  -   
Some provision in place such 
that a fear exists of punishment if 
apprehended 
0.2777 1,216,021  
Robust provision in place such 
that absolute fear of the 
consequence of any pipeline 
vandalization or interference 
exists 
0.0001 4,864,083  
Community 
Partnering 
Bad relationship with the 
community and relevant interest 
groups 
- -   
A somewhat good relationship 
but the community does not play 
an active role in pipeline security 
0.2544 500,000  
Excellent relationship with the 
community and interest groups 
within the community help in 
pipeline security  




Assuming that all RCOs are to be implemented, basic provisions will cost about 
$96 million whilst advanced provisions are expected to cost about $10 billion. In 
reality, the limited budget and cost effectiveness imply that not all RCOs will be 
implemented. Therefore, the operator may decide to explore different options, 
such as assessing the cost effectiveness of implementing all basic provisions, for 
example, or only a selection of basic provisions. Table 6-19 shows the RCO 
provisions, the cost of the RCOs and the net benefit for each of the intervention 
combinations chosen. Other different combinations are possible, and each 
combination affords the user the opportunity to calculate the cost implication of 
their selection and the net benefit.    













0.3000 $712,608,000  $ 0 $-712,608,000  
2 Basic RCO 
provisions - 
implement all 
0.076962 $182,812,456  $96,469,411  $433,326,133  




0.035200 $83,612,672  $68,329,445  $560,665,883  
4 Advanced RCO 
provisions 
0.000030 $71,261  $10,093,123,948  $-9,380,587,209  
Note: only seven of the thirteen RCOs including surveillance, leak detection, SCADA, 
patrol, pipeline cover, public education and physical barriers are assumed to be 
implemented under item 3. 
 
From Table 6-19, it can be seen that, although doing nothing costs the operator zero 
dollars in intervention expenditure, as they do not have to budget for any 
intervention, it results in estimated losses of $712.61 million annually, as calculated 
in Section 6.5.4. On the other extreme, implementing all the advanced RCO 
provisions would cost about $10.09 billion, but will reduce pipelines losses from 
$712.61 million per annum to $71,261 per annum. The net benefit of the 
intervention will be circa minus (loss of) $9.38 billion, due to the huge expenditure 
required. Clearly, this will not be effective either in terms of return on investment 
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or in terms of effective utilisation of the available funds. The basic RCO provisions 
would seem to provide the best opportunity for cost-effective solutions. If all the 
basic provisions are implemented, this would cost about $96.47 million and will 
reduce the pipeline losses from $712.61 million per annum down to $182.81 million 
per annum. The net benefit of the interventions would be circa $433.33 million in 
the first year. On the other hand, if the available budget does not allow full 
implementation of the basic provisions, the operator may choose to implement 
those provisions that have the most impact on risk reduction. As an example, if the 
operator were to implement basic provisions of the seven out of the thirteen RCOs 
with the highest positive effect on reducing the failure likelihood, this would result 
in a net benefit of about $560.67 million in the first year.  Specifically, the RCOs 
include surveillance, leak detection, SCADA, patrols, pipeline cover, public 
education and physical barriers. 
Those effective RCOs fall largely within the technical solutions (surveillance, leak 
detection, pipeline cover, physical barriers) and management solutions (SCADA, 
patrol). This is consistent with the results of Table 6-6, which shows these solutions 
to be the most effective interventions – technical solutions first, followed by 
management solutions.  
A sensitivity assessment investigates the impact of reduced or increased fatalities 
to the overall results in order to test how sensitive the results are to the 
assumptions made regarding the calculated number of fatalities. Implementing the 
basic RCO provisions or implementing the selected (most effective) basic RCOs 
gives a net positive cost-benefit, even if the costs due to loss of life are excluded 
from the assessment. The two options are still cost-beneficial if the assessment 
assumes a catastrophic consequence which results in 10 fatalities per incident, as 
opposed to one fatality per incident. Conversely, implementing advanced RCO 
provisions will still have a negative cost-benefit even if a catastrophic consequence 
is assumed. Advanced RCOs only become positively beneficial when 30 fatalities 
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per pipeline failure are recorded, giving about 19,000 total fatalities per annum. 
These significant fatalities cannot be countenanced. In summary, the CBA criterion 
is met by implementing either all RCO provisions or only selected basic RCO 
provisions, even if the life safety aspect of the calculation is excluded from the 
analysis. Conversely, implementing the advanced RCO provisions will not be cost-
beneficial, even if each of the more-than-six-hundred incidents are assumed to 
have caused ten fatalities. 
 
 Discussion 
The analysis carried out in this chapter provides a set of tools that a pipeline 
operator may use to reduce their exposure to loss of containment as a result of 
intentional third-party damage. The model, employing ER, expert elicitation and 
CBA, identifies the most effective set of interventions that the pipeline operator 
could take to reduce the identified threat.  
The expert elicitation used in this assessment, where the majority of the experts 
approached are operating within the Nigerian environment, led to some 
interesting results. The decision-making alternatives are grouped into control 
solutions: those that are expected to be provided for by the government and their 
agencies and those that the pipeline operator can provide through its management 
systems. The control solutions can also be achieved through technical solutions, 
which require the use of technology and/or physical features. The model divides 
the RCOs based on their main attributes, which are detection, prevention, 
mitigation and ‘other measures’. Figure 6-1 shows the connections between the 
general attributes and their alternatives. 
The failure factor analysed is intentional third-party damage, which is usually 
driven by political, economic and social factors. Therefore, it would have been 
expected that the government intervention alternative – via the use of security 
personnel to prevent and provide deterrence for criminal actions – is the most 
212 
 
effective. However, the results indicate that such solutions are the least effective. 
The results instead identify the technical solutions alternative to be the most 
effective, followed by the operator’s implementation of management systems. The 
technical solutions make it difficult for the saboteur to get to the pipeline in the 
first instance.  
The results can be explained by local experience and the recent history of 
interventions by government agencies in regard to criminal activities around the 
pipeline in Nigeria, especially in the delta region. The government’s intervention 
approach in the past several years has not resulted in a reduction of third-party 
damage losses (NNPC, 2016). Rather, it has emboldened criminals to be more 
daring (Aghedo & Osumah, 2015). It could be argued that government 
intervention was always badly planned and implemented, in addition to the 
occurrence of internal sabotage by means of leaking government plans to the 
criminal factions (Katsouris & Sayne, 2013).  
The experts’ belief that technical solutions are the most effective is perhaps based 
on the expectation that, once implemented, access to and damaging of the pipelines 
becomes difficult, thus eliminating the need for government and/or management 
solutions. In reality, one set of control solutions or alternatives alone will not 
address the challenge and a combination of control solutions are required. 
Identifying the most effective combination of solutions can be better appreciated 
by interrogating the basic attributes and their contribution to risk reduction and 
control measures. Interrogating the basic attributes indicates that the attribute with 
the most effective impact is the provision of a physical barrier to the exposed and 
the most vulnerable sections of the system, such as pumping stations and river 
crossings. The attribute which is least effective is the provision of security forces, 
which directly corroborates with the results that show government intervention 
solutions as being the least effective, as outlined earlier. 
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The resulting cost-benefit analysis of the possible interventions provides guidance 
on the net benefit of any one intervention or set of solutions. This allows the 
pipeline operator access to an easy and straightforward tool to decide on the 
interventions that are the most effective or the ones that the operator’s current 
budget could allow. The assessment indicates that implementing advanced RCOs 
will have a significant budget outlay but will almost entirely put a stop to third-
party damage. However, that intervention is not cost-effective, with a net benefit 
of minus $9.4 billion. Conversely, the basic RCO interventions are the most cost-
effective, in that they require a lower financial outlay of $96 million, significantly 
less than the operator’s estimated losses annually. The net benefit for basic RCOs 
is circa $433 million.  
When the operator decides to implement only part of the basic RCO provisions, 
then selecting seven out of the eleven RCOs would cost about two-thirds ($68 
million) of what the operator would spend when compared to the implementation 
of all the basic RCOs, which would cost $96.5 million with a net benefit of $560.7 
million. The net benefit of implementing the seven most effective RCOs is higher 
than the $433.3 million worth of benefits for implementing all eleven basic RCOs. 
A sensitivity assessment has been carried out in Section 6.5.5, which shows that the 
CBA criterion has been met for the implementation of RCO provisions, or the 
selected basic RCO provisions, even if life safety aspects are discounted in the 
analysis. Conversely, implementing advanced RCO provisions will not be cost-
beneficial, even if each of the more-than-six hundred incidents is assumed to have 
caused ten fatalities. 
Although the assessment is detailed and complete, both the ER-based decision-
making and CBA have a number of areas that can be improved upon. The most 
significant part is the dearth of directly applicable data for the geographical area 




In terms of the decision-making, a more refined aggregation and a higher number 
of evaluation grades than the five used could provide more granular results, which 
can be of better help to decision makers by providing visibility of the impact of a 
very small intervention to the overall aggregation results. However, the more 
evaluation grades or attributes are introduced, the more complex the analysis 
becomes. Also obtaining expert inputs via questionnaire becomes burdensome. 
Using a higher number of evaluation grades has been shown by Ren, et al. (2005) 
to provide better and more accurate basic attributes belief degrees.  
The subjectivity of the initial utility estimation of the basic attributes obtained from 
the experts can also be reduced by introducing some probability analysis methods. 
This assessment has had to disqualify a number of expert judgements due to 
inconsistency. Perhaps if the grades were determined in a similar way as described 
in Yang and Xu (2002), a more robust utility estimation would have been derived. 
Yang and Xu (2002)’s study determines the lowest and highest utility grade in a 
similar way as is estimated in this study. However, the remaining three grades are 
attained by asking the experts to identify two extreme points and choose a value 
at which the probability of the worst and best performance is equidistant. This 
applies for each of the three grades. The experts then determine what value the 
probability holds at a given evaluation grade.  
Additionally, a future research that look at the probability estimation of all the 
RCOs including probability of success of those interventions would provide more 
detailed tool to the operator not only to identify the most effective tool but also the 
one with the most likely success rate.  
 
 Conclusions 
This chapter assesses the decision-making to be taken for a pipeline loss of 
containment threat as a result of third-party activities and the most effective RCOs 
available to reduce or eliminate the threat. The representative pipeline system in 
Nigeria is chosen as a case study consistent with the system chosen in the previous 
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chapters. Four broad RCOs were identified, including detection, prevention, 
mitigation and other measures. These main RCOs are designated as general 
attributes. Each of the main RCOs has a number of sub-attributes and is further 
linked to solution groupings or alternatives, which include technical solutions, 
management solutions and government solutions. The number of attributes and 
their different hierarchies and assigned degrees of belief call for a complex 
decision-making algorithm that takes into account all the required attributes and 
their importance, eventually arriving at the most effective solutions. The ER 
algorithm has been applied to this problem, aggregating the attributes and 
hierarchies of each of the RCOs. The assessment results identify the most optimal 
alternative as being technical solutions in reducing the threat of a pipeline loss of 
containment due to a third party. The assessment results can also be investigated 
further to a sub-attribute level to find out the most effective basic attribute(s) that 
contribute more than others in reducing the loss of containment threat. 
A CBA has also been carried out to estimate the current financial losses that are 
being encountered as a result of third-party damage to the pipeline system. The 
assessment relies on publicly available information from the operator, 
unpublished proprietary operator information, other available literature and 
calculations of the cost of the spill using IMO guidance. It has been estimated that 
the annual loss, based on data up to 2015, is circa $713 million. The CBA then 
calculated the expected expenditure required to implement the RCOs for different 
levels of details and the loss reduction that such RCOs would provide. The cost of 
implementing the RCOs varies from $68 million to $10 billion. The most cost-
effective measure is not a no-loss scenario, which can be achieved if $10 billion is 
expended, but a reduced loss scenario such that the net benefit is at its maximum. 
That option entails implementing some of the RCOs under basic provisions, 
specifically, the following RCOs: surveillance, leak detection, SCADA, patrols, 
pipeline cover, public education and physical barriers. The net benefit of 
implementing these options is estimated to be circa $561 million.  
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The chapter will provide pipeline operators with easy-to-apply tools that will 
hopefully allow them to prioritise their investment in reducing the loss of 
containment threat. It will also give them a good idea of the relative effectiveness 
of the many RCOs available and their estimated costs. Due to limited directly 
applicable data, the CBA uses data from other countries, and where no relevant 
data is available, a number of assumptions were made. Therefore, the estimated 
cost may vary within a real-life assessment but the relative costs of one option 
compared to the other should be reasonably in line with the actual differences 
between the options. For decision-making processes, that relative difference may 
be the most important factor. 
This chapter and the two preceding ones formed the main technical contribution 
towards the onshore cross-country pipeline risk assessment. The models and the 
framework developed ties in together for a holistic assessment.  The results of each 
preceding chapter serve as an input into the next chapter. The results of the 
preliminary assessment chapter, Chapter 4, identified leak and rupture as the 
failure mode with the highest likelihood of causing loss of containment. Therefore, 
failure due to leak or rupture serves as the top event in the BN analysis chapter, 
Chapter 5. The BN assessed all the contributing failure factors and identified third 
party damage as having the most significant contribution to the failure likelihood. 
This chapter, Chapter 6, then assessed the main attributes contributing towards 





This chapter provided the conclusions of the work carried out in this thesis 
including the results, its implications, the envisaged contribution and limitations. 
It also highlights the need for the research, the research objectives and whether 
such objectives have been met. The contribution of this thesis to the body of 
knowledge and the challenges currently encountered by operators is outlined, 
including limitations to the application of this work in the field. This chapter also 
enumerates areas where this study would benefit from further research and 
investigation.   
 
 Main Conclusions of the Research 
The likelihood of loss of containment, as a result of pipeline failure in general and 
for onshore cross-country products pipelines in particular, is reducing in most 
countries due to improvements in the technical, operational and risk management 
systems already in place. However, in certain countries, such as Nigeria, the 
frequency of such incidents has been on the increase, driven mainly by incidents 
relating to human intervention. The sparse available data from the pipeline 
operator (NNPC, 2016) indicates a fourfold increase in the 5-year moving average 
of pipeline failures from 2003 to 2016. The majority of the increase is as a result of 
third-party damages. The human, environmental and economic losses associated 
with these incidents are significant and so are the political consequences. The 
absence of reliable failure data, the lack of adequate maintenance and the lack of a 
risk management regime make it difficult for any appropriate tool to be put in 
place to reduce, control or mitigate the risks of such failures. There is, therefore, a 
need to develop models that will help with pipeline risk assessment, but which 
take into consideration the unreliability of the data in Nigeria and similar 
geographical areas.  
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Having identified the research needs, this thesis aimed to achieve the objectives 
that have been outlined in Section 1.3. All the objectives have been achieved as 
summarised in the paragraphs below.   
The first objective has been achieved by carrying out an in-depth literature review 
and interviews with field staff working for the pipeline operator. The past and 
current trends of reported incidences, and the operational statistics regarding the 
integrity management of the European, American and Nigerian cross-country 
pipelines, have been reviewed, thus identifying the main drivers behind the 
increasing failure frequency of the pipelines, especially in Nigeria and similar 
geographical areas. Globally, the increase in the price of petroleum product is 
driving the rate of intentional pipeline damage for product theft as both Nigerian 
(NNPC, 2016; PPMC, 2014) and European data (Cech et al., 2018) have shown. In 
2015, 90% of all petroleum product pipeline-related failure was due to product 
theft in Europe. Depending on which data one reviews, Nigeria’s share of 
petroleum product pipeline failure due to deliberate third-party activities range 
between 88% (PPMC, 2014) and 99% (NNPC, 2016) of all failures for the period 
between 2006 and 2013.  
Another driver is uncontrolled development and encroachment onto pipeline 
corridors due to population growth: Nigeria’s population has increased by more 
than 60 million in the decade leading up to 2017 (World Bank, 2017). Other drivers 
include lack of adequate maintenance and criminal collusion with pipeline 
operator staff to destroy the pipeline so that repair contracts can be awarded 
(Katsouris & Sayne, 2013). 
The second objective has been achieved in Chapter 4 by developing a model for 
identifying and ranking failure modes by modifying the FMEA process to 
accommodate uncertainty due to inadequate data. The modified process uses the 
Fuzzy Rules Base and Grey Relations Theory. Similar to the FMEA, the modified 
process assesses the potential pipeline failures and qualitatively ranks them in 
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terms of the likelihood of the failure to occur. It also assesses any detection in place 
to reveal the failure and the likely severity in terms of human safety, environmental 
damage and economic loss. Unlike FMEA, rather than using numerical values to 
rank the failures, the Fuzzy Rules Base and Grey Relations Theory use linguistic 
terms where the experts are asked whether, for example, the likelihood of an event 
happening is low or high. A membership function diagram is then used to generate 
the related linguistic terms and membership functions for each failure mode and 
an IF-THEN analysis is carried out to obtain the consequential linguistic terms and 
beliefs degree. The final linguistic expressions are then converted into a ranking 
using a utility value formula. Grey Relation Theory approach has also been used 
to rank the failure modes. This entails the calculation of the difference between the 
comparative series and the standards series, using Klein’s expression to obtain the 
degree of relations, which is the ranking of the failure modes.  
The rankings using the modified approaches and those using the traditional FMEA 
have been compared. It shows a number of agreements but with differences on 
certain failure modes. Since the aim of the modified approach is to address the 
identified weaknesses of the traditional FMEA model, such as the assumption that 
the three failure factors have the same weight and also that all the experts 
approached have the same level of experience, the difference in the rankings 
highlights the benefits of the new approach. All three approaches show that 
pipeline failure due to a leak or a rupture as the failure modes with the highest 
ranking. This forms the basis for addressing the next objective which is the 
identification of the likelihood of the failure mode with the highest risk ranking. 
The model developed in Chapter 5 addressed the third objective, by using 
Bayesian Networks (BN) to develop the failure probability of the identified failure 
mode – pipeline failure due to a leak or rupture – under uncertainty. The 
uncertainty arises due to the lack of or inadequate data, which is the case in 
Nigeria’s onshore cross-country pipeline. Nigeria’s pipeline data obtained from 
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the three different sources are disparate, conflicting and incomplete. The Bayesian 
Network approach is best suited for addressing this objective because, in addition 
to accommodating data uncertainty, it can also integrate expert knowledge. The 
model is especially good at updating uncertainty whenever new data becomes 
available. 
Calculating the failure likelihood requires identification of the primary and 
secondary failure factors and determining their Conditional Probability Tables 
(CPTs). The CPTs are then inserted as marginal probabilities, helping to determine 
the pipeline leak and rupture probabilities. The marginal probabilities for the 
primary factors, which are the root events in the Bayesian Networks, have been 
obtained from the pipeline operator and the failure data of other operators where 
such data exists. Where the data is unavailable or inadequate, expert elicitation 
using AHP has been employed. Expert elicitation has also been used, together with 
the Symmetric method, to fill in the data for the child nodes.  
The results indicate that the failure likelihood of pipeline leak and rupture for the 
case study pipeline system, in terms of marginal probabilities, is 14.72% and 7.51% 
respectively. The interrogation of the results indicates that the failure factor with 
the most impact on the results is third-party damage, contributing about 33.8% of 
the failure. Evidence propagation has been carried out to assess the likely impact 
of improvements to the marginal probability contribution of third-party damage 
to the pipeline failure likelihood. If both the government and the operator institute 
effective security and political intervention, for example, then that reduces the 
marginal probability of third-party damage happening from 33.8% to 7%. The 
overall failure likelihood of pipeline failure due to leaks and ruptures is then 
reduced from 14.7% and 7.5% to 3.9% and 3.3% respectively.  
Chapter 6 demonstrates that the final two objectives, which includes risk-based 
decision-making and the cost-benefit analysis have been achieved. An Evidential 
Reasoning model has been developed to aid risk management decision-making, 
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whilst cost-benefit calculations have been carried out that estimate the financial 
outlay required for each Risk Control Option (RCO), the benefit of implementing 
such options and the costs associated with pipeline failure. 
The BN analysis has identified third-party damage as one of the major failure 
factors, the Evidential Reasoning algorithm has been used to assess risk control 
solutions or options that will reduce the likelihood of pipeline failure due to third-
party damage, especially intentional third-party damage. The risk control 
solutions include technical, government and management solutions, which in the 
ER algorithm are labelled as the alternatives, have been compared with each other 
to identify and rank their effectiveness. The risk control measures, which are the 
general attributes in the ER algorithm, include detection, prevention, mitigation 
and ‘other measures’. The ER process evaluates the general attributes and ranks 
the alternatives by means of an evaluation grade ( )nu H  using a predetermined 
number of ratings. 
The results of the different attributes and alternatives indicate that overall the 
technical or technological solutions as an alternative have more likelihood of being 
the most effective intervention. This is followed by management intervention 
alternative and, lastly, government intervention alternative, which is deemed to be 
the least effective.  
A cost and benefit estimate has also been carried out to provide insight into 
financial losses relating to third-party damage to the pipeline, based on life safety 
consequences, environmental damage and direct economic losses.  
 
 Research Contribution 
The main contributions of this research include the following: 
i. Identification of the parameters and the reasoning behind the high failure 
incidents of cross-country pipelines in Nigeria and elsewhere.  
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ii. Development of a model that identifies, assesses and ranks pipeline failure 
hazards under uncertainty by using linguistic terms and belief degrees. The use 
of modified FMEA, incorporating the Fuzzy Set and Grey Relations Theory, 
ensures that some of the weaknesses of the traditional FMEA are addressed. 
This also ensures that field staff experience is captured in the assessment and 
makes the overall assessment accessible to the field operatives that may struggle 
with numerical analysis.  
iii. A framework for estimating the failure likelihood using a Bayesian Network 
model, which enumerates the cause-and-effect relationship that can be 
established between failure factors and the pipeline failure condition for 
pipeline systems with inadequate or unreliable data. The Bayesian Network 
provides an intuitive visual representation that allows modelling of pipeline 
damages with a rigorous mathematical basis in Bayesian probability, outlining 
the cause-and-effect relationship between and among factors. The Bayesian 
Network model is easier to update, allowing for new predictions when fresh 
data becomes available. This feature is important, as the model needs 
continuous improvement when new knowledge becomes available. The model 
is capable of combining diverse data, expert knowledge and empirical data for 
parameter estimation. 
iv. A decision-making framework for a pipeline loss of containment threat as a 
result of third-party activities using Evidential Reasoning and the most effective 
RCOs in reducing or eliminating the threat. 
v. A cost-benefit estimates model for the financial losses encountered as a result of 
the assessed third-party damage to the pipeline system, as well as the cost of 




 Limitations  
This research has some limitations, which can be summarised as follows: 
1. Although the modified FMEA approach improves on the traditional FMEA 
model, the high level of reliance placed by the model on subjective input 
from experts limits the model’s ability to produce comparable results for the 
same case study if a different set of experts were asked to assess the pipeline. 
For regulatory compliance purposes, regulators often want to know that 
any approach adopted is repeatable and can provide the same or very 
similar results.  
2. The BN model developed in Chapter 5 incorporated only two states for most 
of the nodes, either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This became necessary in order to reduce 
the complexity of the CPTs within the nodes and due to the lack of data 
required to fill in complex CPTs. This approach limits the model in many 
ways and also limits the validation and verification process so that only a 
partial validation has been possible. However, the complexity of inference 
associated with the model grows beyond tractability when more states are 
added, and more effective algorithms may very well be needed.  
3. The ER decision-making approach could not use a more refined aggregation 
and a higher number of evaluation grades than the five used. This limits the 
granularity of the results and limits further interrogation in obtaining 
greater insight. Obtaining expert inputs via the questionnaire also becomes 
burdensome. Using a higher number of evaluation grades has been shown 
by Ren et al. (2005) to provide better and more accurate basic attributes belief 
degrees.  
4. The CBA model has had to use a high level of subjective judgement and 
assumptions due to the lack of public data on the compensations due to 
people who have been affected by pipeline accidents in Nigeria. In most 
cases, the compensation is treated as confidential, including those settled in 
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the courts. Therefore, the cost calculated is representative and may not be 
the exact figure for the losses estimated for the case study pipeline.   
 
 Future Research  
This thesis has developed tools and models that will help the operators of onshore 
cross-country oil and gas pipelines in Nigeria and similar countries to identify and 
assess the driving factors behind loss of containment, especially when historic data 
is not available or unreliable. The thesis identified research questions and 
objectives and addressed those adequately. However, during the course of this 
research, more questions have arisen, and these could benefit from further study 
to build upon the work already carried out. These include:  
1. Modelling the consequence of pipeline failure due to failure factors 
prevalent in developing countries. The work presented in this thesis did not 
include consequence modelling and therefore, the work could be more 
useful as a complete risk assessment tool with consequence assessment 
included. Carrying out a consequence analysis of onshore cross-country 
pipeline failure as a result of third-party damage will provide a better 
understanding of the pipeline failure.  
2. The models for the failure likelihood, decision-making and cost-benefit 
analyses have focused on pipeline failure due to third-party interference. 
Analysing other failure factors, such as operational damage, corrosion and 
mechanical damage, would help in providing a better picture of the overall 
threat. 
3. The BN model developed in Chapter 5 required CPT construction, which in 
this analysis used AHP and the symmetric method in the absence of hard 
data. The symmetric method is one of several methods that could be used 
to construct the CPTs. It may be worthwhile using the other technique – 
Noisy-OR – to build the CPTs, such as was applied by Matellini (2013), to 
compare which approach yields better results.  
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4. The main factor in carrying out a risk assessment in geographical areas 
similar to Nigeria is the lack of data or the high level of data uncertainty. 
This necessitates the use of assumptions, subjective judgements and 
opinions in the reasoning process. For the hazard identification process, the 
approximate reasoning approach is used to address the uncertainty in the 
process. Future research can carry out the hazard identification process 
using other approaches that are capable of addressing uncertainty, 
combining it with expert judgement and empirical data. This can then be 
compared with approximate reasoning, which will further validate this 
approach and provide the pipeline operator with further optional tools they 
could use. 
5. The ER-based risk management decision-making support model and the 
CBA has been carried out with the operator in mind. Future research that 
accommodates the regulator’s requirements at the same time as that of the 
operators is a strong starting point, since their objectives and expectations 
are often different. Regulators are often preoccupied with minimising risks; 
operators may be preoccupied with trying to maximise profit. The MCDM 
approach that accommodates all these objectives and results in a ranking 
that is satisfactory to both will be of great benefit to the industry.  
6. The models developed have been applied to a case study pipeline in 
Nigeria. It would be desirable if the models could be tested on pipelines 
located in other similar geographical areas where a high level of third-party 
related pipeline damage is being encountered. The models could also be 
applied to offshore pipelines where data is scarce or unreliable.  
7. As part of the ER decision-making approach, the initial utility estimation of 
the basic attributes had to rely on the subjective judgement of the experts. 
This can be improved upon by introducing probability analysis methods 
that calculate the utilities of the evaluation grades. This can be carried out 
by determining the lowest and highest utility grade in a similar way as it is 
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estimated in this work. However, when determining the intervening three 
grades, experts can then be asked to identify two extreme points and choose 
a value at which the probability of the worst and best performance is 
equidistant for each of the three grades. The experts would then determine 
what value the probability holds at a given evaluation grade.  
8. A future research that look at the probability estimation of all the RCOs 
including probability of success of those interventions would provide more 
detailed tool to the operator not only to identify the most effective 
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Appendix A  125 IF-THEN Rules 
 
The 125 IF-THEN rule, originally developed by (Wang, 1997), has been updated 
for this research to include belief structure such that the consequent risk linguistic 
terms include belief degree.  
The original IF-THEN rule, for instance, does not distinguish the consequent risk 
of the first two combinations of the likelihood, detection and severity of “very low, 
highly likely, negligible” and “very low, likely, marginal” respectively. They all 
have “very low, low” as the consequent risk. However, using the belief structure, 
the consequent risks become “1 very low, 0 low” and “0.57 very low, 0.43 low” 
respectively. This is arrived at first by allocating numerical value to the linguistic 
variables of likelihood, detection and severity such that very low is allocated value 
1, and low the value of 2, etc. The full numerical values are given in Table A1.1. 
 
Table A1.1: Numerical Ranking of the Variables 
Likelihood Detection Severity 
very low 1 highly likely 1 negligible 1 
low 2 likely 2 marginal 2 
average 3 reasonably likely 3 moderate 3 
high 4 unlikely 4 critical 4 
very high 5 highly unlikely 5 catastrophic 5 
 
For consequent risks, the lowest risk linguistic term is “very low” which is the 
product of “very low” likelihood, “highly likely” detection and “negligible” 
severity and the corresponding belief is therefore 1 × 1 × 1 = 1. Conversely, the 
highest linguistic terms in terms of risk is “very high” and it is the product of “very 
high” likelihood, “highly unlikely” detection and “catastrophic” severity, with the 
corresponding belief of 5 × 5 × 5 = 125. All other combinations of the three variables 
and the consequent risks lie in between these two ends. The aim of the belief 
structure is to situate any consequent risk in relation to its position within this 
numerical value spectrum. For example, the combination of “very low” likelihood, 
“likely” detection and “marginal” severity produces 1 × 2 × 2 = 4 numerical value. 
This situates the consequent risk to be between “very low” with 1 × 1 × 1 = 1 value 
and “low” with 2 × 2 × 2 = 8. This places it at ((4-1)/ (8-1)) = 0.43 to the “low” end 
and hence 0.57 (i.e., 1-0.43) to the “very low” end; thus, the consequent risk with 
the belief structure is “0.57 very low, 0.43 low”. Table A1.2 below shows the 
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complete 125 IF-THEN and the consequent risks with belief structure as used in 
the research.  
 
Table A1.2: 125 IF-THEN Rules with Belief Structure 
S/N Likelihood Detection Severity 
Risk with Belief 
Structure 
1 very low highly likely  negligible 1 very low, 0 low 
2 very low likely marginal  0.57 very low, 0.43 low 
3 very low reasonably likely moderate 0.95 low, 0.05 moderate 
4 very low unlikely critical  0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
5 very low highly unlikely catastrophic 0.89 moderate, 0.11 low 
6 low highly likely  negligible 0.86 very low, 0.14 low 
7 low likely marginal  1 low, 0 moderate 
8 low reasonably likely moderate 0.53 moderate, 0.47 low 
9 low unlikely critical  0.86 moderate, 0.14 high 
10 low highly unlikely catastrophic 0.62 high, 0.38 moderate 
11 average highly likely  negligible 0.71 very low, 0.29 low 
12 average likely marginal  0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
13 average reasonably likely moderate 1 moderate, 0 high 
14 average unlikely critical  0.57 high, 0.43 moderate 
15 average highly unlikely catastrophic 0.82 high, 0.18 very high 
16 high highly likely  negligible 0.57 very low, 0.43 low 
17 high likely marginal  0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
18 high reasonably likely moderate 0.76 moderate, 0.24 high 
19 high unlikely critical  1 high, 0 very high 
20 high highly unlikely catastrophic 0.59 very high, 0.41 high 
21 very high highly likely  negligible 0.57 low, 0.43 very low 
22 very high likely marginal  0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
23 very high reasonably likely moderate 0.51 moderate, 0.49 high 
24 very high unlikely critical  0.74 high, 0.26 very high 
25 very high highly unlikely catastrophic 1 very high, 0 high 
26 very low highly likely  marginal  0.86 very low, 0.14 low 
27 very low likely moderate 0.71 low, 0.29 very low 
28 very low reasonably likely critical  0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
29 very low unlikely catastrophic 0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
30 very low highly unlikely negligible 0.57 low, 0.43 very low 
31 low highly likely  marginal  0.57 very low, 0.43 low 
32 low likely moderate 0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
33 low reasonably likely critical  0.84 moderate, 0.16 low 
34 low unlikely catastrophic 0.65 moderate, 0.35 high 
35 low highly unlikely negligible 0.89 low, 0.11 moderate 
36 average highly likely  marginal  0.71 low, 0.29 very low 
37 average likely moderate 0.53 moderate, 0.47 low 
38 average reasonably likely critical  0.76 moderate, 0.24 high 
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S/N Likelihood Detection Severity 
Risk with Belief 
Structure 
39 average unlikely catastrophic 0.89 high, 0.11 moderate 
40 average highly unlikely negligible 0.63 low, 0.37 moderate 
41 high highly likely  marginal  1 low, 0 moderate 
42 high likely moderate 0.84 moderate, 0.16 low 
43 high reasonably likely critical  0.57 high, 0.43 moderate 
44 high unlikely catastrophic 0.74 high, 0.26 very high 
45 high highly unlikely negligible 0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
46 very high highly likely  marginal  0.89 low, 0.11 moderate 
47 very high likely moderate 0.92 moderate, 0.08 high 
48 very high reasonably likely critical  0.89 high, 0.11 moderate 
49 very high unlikely catastrophic 0.59 very high, 0.41 high 
50 very high highly unlikely negligible 0.89 moderate, 0.11 low 
51 very low highly likely  moderate 0.71 very low, 0.29 low 
52 very low likely critical  1 low, 0 moderate 
53 very low reasonably likely catastrophic 0.63 low, 0.37 moderate 
54 very low unlikely negligible 0.57 very low, 0.43 low 
55 very low highly unlikely marginal  0.89 low, 0.11 moderate 
56 low highly likely  moderate 0.71 low, 0.29 very low 
57 low likely critical  0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
58 low reasonably likely catastrophic 0.92 moderate, 0.08 high 
59 low unlikely negligible 1 low, 0 moderate 
60 low highly unlikely marginal  0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
61 average highly likely  moderate 0.95 low, 0.05 moderate 
62 average likely critical  0.84 moderate, 0.16 low 
63 average reasonably likely catastrophic 0.51 moderate, 0.49 high 
64 average unlikely negligible 0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
65 average highly unlikely marginal  0.92 moderate, 0.08 high 
66 high highly likely  moderate 0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
67 high likely critical  0.86 moderate, 0.14 high 
68 high reasonably likely catastrophic 0.89 high, 0.11 moderate 
69 high unlikely negligible 0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
70 high highly unlikely marginal  0.65 moderate, 0.35 high 
71 very high highly likely  moderate 0.63 low, 0.37 moderate 
72 very high likely critical  0.65 moderate, 0.35 high 
73 very high reasonably likely catastrophic 0.82 high, 0.18 very high 
74 very high unlikely negligible 0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
75 very high highly unlikely marginal  0.62 high, 0.38 moderate 
76 very low highly likely  critical  0.57 very low, 0.43 low 
77 very low likely catastrophic 0.89 low, 0.11 moderate 
78 very low reasonably likely negligible 0.71 very low, 0.29 low 
79 very low unlikely marginal  1 low, 0 moderate 
80 very low highly unlikely moderate 0.63 low, 0.37 moderate 
81 low highly likely  critical  1 low, 0 moderate 
82 low likely catastrophic 0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
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S/N Likelihood Detection Severity 
Risk with Belief 
Structure 
83 low reasonably likely negligible 0.71 low, 0.29 very low 
84 low unlikely marginal  0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
85 low highly unlikely moderate 0.92 moderate, 0.08 high 
86 average highly likely  critical  0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
87 average likely catastrophic 0.92 moderate, 0.08 high 
88 average reasonably likely negligible 0.95 low, 0.05 moderate 
89 average unlikely marginal  0.84 moderate, 0.16 low 
90 average highly unlikely moderate 0.51 moderate, 0.49 high 
91 high highly likely  critical  0.58 low, 0.42 moderate 
92 high likely catastrophic 0.65 moderate, 0.35 high 
93 high reasonably likely negligible 0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
94 high unlikely marginal  0.86 moderate, 0.14 high 
95 high highly unlikely moderate 0.89 high, 0.11 moderate 
96 very high highly likely  critical  0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
97 very high likely catastrophic 0.62 high, 0.38 moderate 
98 very high reasonably likely negligible 0.63 low, 0.37 moderate 
99 very high unlikely marginal  0.65 moderate, 0.35 high 
100 very high highly unlikely moderate 0.82 high, 0.18 very high 
101 very low highly likely  catastrophic 0.57 low, 0.43 very low 
102 very low likely negligible 0.86 very low, 0.14 low 
103 very low reasonably likely marginal  0.71 low, 0.29 very low 
104 very low unlikely moderate 0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
105 very low highly unlikely critical  0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
106 low highly likely  catastrophic 0.89 low, 0.11 moderate 
107 low likely negligible 0.57 very low, 0.43 low 
108 low reasonably likely marginal  0.79 low, 0.21 moderate 
109 low unlikely moderate 0.84 moderate, 0.16 low 
110 low highly unlikely critical  0.65 moderate, 0.35 high 
111 average highly likely  catastrophic 0.63 low, 0.37 moderate 
112 average likely negligible 0.71 low, 0.29 very low 
113 average reasonably likely marginal  0.53 moderate, 0.47 low 
114 average unlikely moderate 0.76 moderate, 0.24 high 
115 average highly unlikely critical  0.89 high, 0.11 moderate 
116 high highly likely  catastrophic 0.63 moderate, 0.37 low 
117 high likely negligible 1 low, 0 moderate 
118 high reasonably likely marginal  0.84 moderate, 0.16 low 
119 high unlikely moderate 0.57 high, 0.43 moderate 
120 high highly unlikely critical  0.74 high, 0.26 very high 
121 very high highly likely  catastrophic 0.89 moderate, 0.11 low 
122 very high likely negligible 0.89 low, 0.11 moderate 
123 very high reasonably likely marginal  0.92 moderate, 0.08 high 
124 very high unlikely moderate 0.89 high, 0.11 moderate 
125 very high highly unlikely critical  0.59 very high, 0.41 high 
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Effects - Local Effects - System Safeguards 
1 2B 1 1 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupture 
External leakage from 
pinhole, flange or following 
impact, welding failure, etc. 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms, surveillance, 
third party reporting. 
Flammable 
hydrocarbon leak 
and or a pool 
Unable to operate pipeline 
leading to supply disruption, fires 
and or explosion that may take 
the system out of action for a long 
time. 
Pipeline leak detection system, buried 
pipeline with impact protection at 
crossings, increased inspection. 
2 2B 1 2 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/Rupture 
Deliberate - pipeline 
interdiction for product 
theft or vandalism 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms, surveillance, 
third party reporting. 
Flammable 
hydrocarbon pool  
Unable to operate pipeline 
leading to supply disruption, fires 
and or explosion that may take 
the system out of action for a long 
time. 
Pipeline leak detection system, theft 
and vandalism prevention, e.g., by 
deep burying of pipeline with impact 
protection, regular patrols and 
adoption of technology aim at 
deterring the threat. 
3 2B 1 3 Oil Pipeline Product 
Leak/rupture 
Pipeline failure due to  
- corrosion  
- structural weakness  
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms, surveillance, 
third party reporting. 
Flammable 
hydrocarbon leak 
and or a pool 
Unable to operate pipeline 
leading to supply disruption, fires 
and or explosion that may take 
the system out of action for a long 
time. 
Pipeline leak detection system, buried 
pipeline, providing adequate support 
where pipelines are exposed, regular 
inspection to monitor corrosion and 
identify and prevent failures. 
4 2B 1 4 Oil Pipeline Blockage Line restricted by partial or 
complete blockage. 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms 
Reduced or no 
hydrocarbon flow in 
pipeline 
Unable to operate pipeline or part 
of it or operation at reduced 
capacity. 
Pressure alarms, flow alarms 





External leakage from 
pinhole, flange or following 
impact, welding failure, etc. 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms, surveillance, 
third party reporting. 
Flammable 
hydrocarbon leak 
and or a pool 
Unable to operate pipeline 
leading to supply disruption, fires 
and or explosion that may take 
the system out of action for a long 
time. 
Leak detection system, regular 
inspection 





Deliberate - interdiction for 
product theft or vandalism 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms, surveillance, 
third party reporting. 
Flammable 
hydrocarbon pool  
Unable to operate pipeline 
leading to supply disruption, fires 
and or explosion that may take 
the system out of action for a long 
time. 
Leak detection system, theft and 
vandalism prevention, e.g., by deep 
burying of pipeline with impact 
protection, regular patrols and 
adoption of technology aim at 
deterring the threat. 





Pipeline failure due to  
- corrosion  
- structural weakness  
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms, surveillance, 
third party reporting. 
Flammable 
hydrocarbon leak 
and or a pool 
Unable to operate pipeline 
leading to supply disruption, fires 
and or explosion that may take 
the system out of action for a long 
time. 
Leak detection system, buried 
pipeline, providing adequate support 
where pipelines are exposed, regular 
inspection to monitor corrosion and 
identify and prevent failures. 
8 2B 2 4 Pipeline 
Manifold/Blo
ck Valve 
Blockage Line restricted by partial or 
complete blockage. 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms 
Reduced or no 
hydrocarbon flow in 
pipeline 
Unable to operate the intended 
pipeline, could lead to the system 
being shutdown resulting in 
product supply disruption 
Pressure & flow alarms 





Actuated valve fails shut Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms 
No flow to the 
intended pipeline 
system 
Supply disruption, may lead to 
pipeline failure resulting in fires 
and or explosion 
Pressure & flow alarms 





Actuated valve fails open Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms 
Hydrocarbon flow 
misdirected to an 
unintended part of 
the system 
Supply disruption, may divert 
supplies resulting in unintended 
consequences 
Pressure & flow alarms 





Actuated valve fails partly 
open 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms 
Hydrocarbon flow 
may be misdirected 
to an unintended 
part of the system 
Unable to operate the intended 
pipeline at required capacity, 
could lead to fluid being diverted 
to other pipeline systems 
























Effects - Local Effects - System Safeguards 
12 2B 3 1 Pumps Product Leak External leakage from 
pinhole, flange, seals, 
following impact or 
sabotage 





and or a pool 
Unable to operate pipeline, may 
affect other connected pipelines 
Regular inspection, seal leak detection 
13 2B 3 2 Pumps Pump Fault Pump reduced performance 
due to bearing or impeller 
problem or partial blockage 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms 
Reduced 
hydrocarbon flow in 
pipeline 
Reduced supply – may be 
addressed with standby pumps 
Pump pressure and flow monitoring, 
following manufacturers/industry 
standard maintenance requirements, 
standby pump 
14 2B 3 3 Pumps Pump Failure Pump stops due to power 
loss or shaft breakage, etc. 
Pump pressure and 
flow monitoring, 
control unit alarm 
No hydrocarbon 
flow in pipeline 
Supply disruption – may be 
addressed with standby pumps 
Pump pressure and flow monitoring, 
following manufacturers/industry 
standard maintenance requirements, 
keeping spares, standby pump 
15 2B 3 4 Pumps Pump Failure Pump stops due to loss of 
common power supply 
Pump pressure and 
flow monitoring, 
control unit alarm 
No hydrocarbon 
flow in pipeline 
Supply disruption – may be 
addressed with standby pumps 
Pump pressure and flow monitoring, 
motor control unit alarms, standby 
pump 
16 2B 3 5 Pumps Pump Failure Standby pump fails to start 
on demand when duty 
pump fails 
Pump pressure and 
flow monitoring, 
control unit alarm 
No hydrocarbon 
flow in pipeline 
Supply disruption - no pumps 
available, no flow 
Pump pressure and flow monitoring, 
motor control unit alarms 
17 2B 4 1 Utility Loss of supply Loss of utility or power Monitoring Key equipment 
unable to function 
Unable to operate pipeline Monitoring, system to be designed to 
shutdown safely 
18 2B 4 2 Utility Reduced 
supply 
Restriction in supply due to 
faulty instrument, valve, 
controller or pump 
Monitoring Key equipment 
unable to function 
effectively 
May affect the ability to operate 
pipeline at required capacity 
Monitoring and inspection, regular 
maintenance 
19 2B 4 3 Utility Electrical over 
supply 
High supply due to power 
surge 
Monitoring Damage to electrical 
equipment 
Unable to operate pipeline Electrical protection, e.g., circuit 
breakers 




Flow mismatch or 
inaccurate reading 
Pressure alarms, flow 




Could be a safety trigger if more 
product is being delivered than it 
is recorded 
Metering self-checking, QA between 
injection and delivery stations to 
reconcile product volume 
21 2B 5 2 Metering 
Package 
Product Leak Leakage from pinhole, 
flange, following impact or 
sabotage 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarm, operator check 
Hydrocarbon leak Unable to operate pipeline Leak detection system, regular 
inspection and checks 
22 2B 5 3 Metering 
Package 
Blockage Line restricted by partial or 
complete blockage. e.g. 
stuck sphere 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarm, operator check 
Reduced or no 
hydrocarbon flow in 
pipeline 
Unable to operate pipeline at 
required capacity or completely 
Pressure alarms, flow alarms 





Leakage from pinhole, 






and or a pool 
Unable to pig pipeline and 
operate the pipeline. 
Personnel present during pigging, pig 
unit isolated/ empty at all other times 
24 2B 6 2 Pig 
Launcher/ 
Receiver 
Blockage Line restricted blockage. 
e.g. stuck sphere across 
main isolation valve 
Pressure alarms, 
Operators present 
Unable to isolate pig 
launcher/receiver 
from pipeline 
Unable to operate pipeline at 
required capacity, interrupting 
supply. 
Pressure alarm, following established 
operator procedure 
25 2B 6 3 Pig 
Launcher/ 
Receiver 




Unable to isolate pig unit 






Unable to isolate pig 
launcher/receiver 
from pipeline 
Unable to operate pipeline at 
required capacity, interrupting 
supply. 
Pressure alarm, following established 
operator procedure 
26 2B 6 4 Pig 
Launcher/ 
Receiver 
Door Failure Unable to seal pig unit due 




Unable to isolate pig 
launcher/receiver 
from pipeline 
Unable to pig pipeline Pressure alarm, following established 
operator procedure 




External leakage from 
pinhole, flange, following 
impact or sabotage. 
Pressure alarms, flow 
alarms, surveillance, 
third party reporting. 
Flammable 
hydrocarbon leak 




Appendix C  AHP Questionnaire for the BN Analysis 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this study is to determine which factors have a greater influence on 
Nigeria’s cross-country pipeline system – System 2b – in the pipeline failure/loss 
of containment.  
The risk criteria focus on five general attributes:  
i) third party damage,  
ii) operational factor,  
iii) material defect,  
iv) corrosion and  
v) natural hazard 
These are the parameters to be evaluated utilizing the pair-wise comparison 
technique.  
To proceed with the Pair-wise Comparison technique, one should first understand 
the weighting measurement used in the study. Table 1 contains two weighting 
scales for “Important” and “Unimportant”, along with an explanation of what 
each weighting denotes.  
Table 1: Weighting Scale for the Pair-Wise Comparison 
 
IMPORTANT UNIMPORTANT 
Numerical Weighting Explanation Numerical 
Weighting 
Explanation 
1 Equally important 1 Equally important 
3 A little important  1/3 A little unimportant 
5 Important  1/5 Unimportant 
7 Very important  1/7 Very unimportant 
9 Extremely important  1/9 Extremely 
unimportant 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate 
important values 





Using Table 1 as a reference, it is required that possible judgement to all 
questions is to be given based upon one’s expertise and experience in the Pipeline 
Risk and Integrity Management. The judgement provided should be focused on 
the objectives presented for each section, and to do this please ‘mark’ (*) the 
importance weighting of each general attribute or intermediate hazard event in 
the presented column. The following is a brief example of how to apply Table 1. 
Objective: To select the most important elements of a car. 
 
Explanation of the example: 
• The Steering Wheel is 9 times more Important that the Radio/Sound System. 
This is because it is still possible to operate the car if the Radio/Sound System 
is not functioning. 
• The Steering Wheel is 3 times more Important than the Rear View Mirror. This 
is because, while it is harder to operate a car without the rearview mirror, one 
can still navigate with the side mirrors and moving one's head to see traffic. 
The Steering Wheel is 1/9 times more Unimportant that the Engine. This is 
because, without the engine, the car would not function 
 
  
1) The Steering Wheel  
    Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the 
stated objective, 
how important is 
a Steering Wheel, 
compared to the 
Radio/Sound 
System? 
                                * 
To achieve the 
stated objective, 
how important is 
a Steering Wheel, 
compared to a 
Rear View 
Mirror? 
                    *             
To achieve the 
stated objective, 
how important is 
a Steering Wheel, 
compared to the 
Engine? 




Material Defect  
Objective: To select the most important factor resulting into pipeline failure  
1. Material Defect 
Unimportant 
Equally 
Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a design failure, compared to the 
construction failure?                                   
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a design failure, compared to the 
failure due to material quality?                                   
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a construction failure, compared 





Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is an external corrosion, compared 
to the internal corrosion?                                   
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is an external corrosion, compared 
to the stress cracking?                                   
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is an internal corrosion, compared 




3. Third-Party Damage 
Unimportant 
Equally 
Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is an accidental damage, 
compared to the incidental damage?                                   
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is an accidental damage, 
compared to the intentional damage?                                   
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is an incidental damage, 
compared to the intentional damage?                                   
 
4. Operational damage 
Unimportant 
Equally 
Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a system malfunction, 
compared to the human error?                                  
 
5. Natural Hazards 
Unimportant 
Equally 
Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a ground movement, compared 




6. Human Intervention 
Unimportant 
Equally 
Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is an operational failure, 
compared to 3rd party damage?                                  
 
7. Mechanical failure 
Unimportant 
Equally 
Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a material defect, compared to 
corrosion?                                  
 
8. Failed Pipeline 
Unimportant 
Equally 
Important  Important 
1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a human intervention, 
compared to the mechanical damage?                                  
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a human intervention, 
compared to the natural hazards?                                  
To achieve the stated objective, how 
important is a mechanical damage, compared 
























Appendix D1: AHP Results for ER Decision Making 
General Attributes 
Attributes Abbreviation 
Detection  D 
Prevention P 
Mitigation M 
Other Measures Others 
 
Pairwise comparison for General Attributes 
  D P M Others 
D 1.00 0.80 2.08 2.50 
P 1.25 1.00 4.25 4.25 
M 0.48 0.24 1.00 3.00 
Others 0.40 0.24 0.33 1.00 
Total 3.13 2.27 7.67 10.75 
 
Relative weight table      
Weight 
D 0.32 0.35 0.27 0.23 0.29 
P 0.40 0.44 0.55 0.40 0.45 
M 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.28 0.17 
Others 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.09 
Total 1 1 1 1 100% 
 
Consistency check 
  D P M Others Sum row Sum weight 
D 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.23 1.23 4.18 
P 0.37 0.45 0.71 0.39 1.91 4.28 
M 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.28 0.69 4.13 
Others 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.37 4.03 
 
lamda max = total sum weight/number of matrix  
= 4.15 
Consistency Index = lamda max-4/4-1 
= 0.05 







Surveillance  S 
Leak Detection LD 
SCADA/Staffing Measures SCADA 
Patrol Patrol 
 
Pairwise comparison for Detection Attributes 
  S LD SCADA Patrol 
S 1.00 0.88 2.00 1.55 
LD 1.14 1.00 2.08 2.50 
SCADA 0.50 0.48 1.00 2.55 
Patrol 0.65 0.40 0.39 1.00 
Total 3.29 2.76 5.48 7.60 
 
Relative weight table  
Weight 
S 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.20 0.30 
LD 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.35 
SCADA 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.34 0.21 
Patrol 0.20 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.14 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 
 
  S LD SCADA Patrol sum row sum weight 
S 0.30 0.31 0.42 0.21 1.24 4.17 
LD 0.34 0.35 0.44 0.34 1.48 4.16 
SCADA 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.92 4.37 
Patrol 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.14 0.59 4.33 
 
lamda max = total sum weight/number of matrix  
= 4.26 
Consistency Index = lamda max-3/3-1 
= 0.09 







Pipeline Cover  PC 
Burial Depth BD 
Barrier Barrier 
Public Education PE 
 
Pairwise comparison for Prevention 
Attributes 
  PC BD Barrier PE 
PC 1.00 1.18 0.71 0.26 
BD 0.85 1.00 1.38 0.63 
Barrier 1.41 0.73 1.00 0.36 
PE 3.78 1.60 2.75 1.00 
Total 7.04 4.50 5.83 2.25 
 
Relative weight table  
Weight 
PC 0.14 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.16 
BD 0.12 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.21 
Barrier 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 
PE 0.54 0.36 0.47 0.44 0.45 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 
 
  PC BD Barrier PE sum row sum weight 
PC 0.16 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.65 4.08 
BD 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.87 4.07 
Barrier 0.23 0.13 0.21 0.16 0.73 4.21 
PE 0.61 0.28 0.48 0.45 1.81 4.01 
 
lamda max = total sum weight/number of matrix  
= 4.09 
Consistency Index = lamda max-4/4-1 
= 0.03 





3. Mitigation  
Attributes Abbreviation 
Right of Way Control  RoW 
Spill Response SR 
Industry Cooperation IC 
 
Pairwise comparison for Mitigation Attributes 
  RoW SR IC 
RoW 1.00 2.75 2.25 
SR 0.36 1.00 1.13 
IC 0.44 0.89 1.00 
Total 1.81 4.64 4.38 
 
Relative weight table  
Weight 
RoW 0.55 0.59 0.51   0.55 
SR 0.20 0.22 0.26   0.22 
IC 0.25 0.19 0.23   0.22 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00   100% 
 
  RoW SR IC sum row sum weight 
RoW 0.55 0.62 0.50 1.67 3.02 
SR 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.68 3.01 
IC 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.67 3.01 
 
lamda max = total sum weight/number of matrix  
= 3.01 






4. Other Measures  
Attributes Abbreviation 
Intelligence  I 
Security Forces SF 
Community partnering CP 
Punishment P 
 
Pairwise comparison for Other Measures Attribute 
  I SF P CP 
I 1.00 4.00 4.25 1.00 
SF 0.25 1.00 1.43 0.49 
P 0.24 0.70 1.00 1.11 
CP 1.00 2.05 0.90 1.00 
Total 2.49 7.75 7.58 3.60 
 
Relative weight table  
Weight 
I 0.40 0.52 0.56 0.28 0.44 
SF 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.14 
P 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.31 0.16 
CP 0.40 0.26 0.12 0.28 0.27 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 
 
  I SF P CP sum row sum weight 
I 0.44 0.55 0.67 0.27 1.92 4.38 
SF 0.11 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.60 4.34 
P 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.30 0.65 4.17 
CP 0.44 0.28 0.14 0.27 1.13 4.25 
 
lamda max = total sum weight/number of matrix  
= 4.28 
Consistency Index = lamda max-3/3-1 
= 0.09 












Appendix F  Published Conference Proceedings 
 
Hassan, S., Wang, J., Bashir, M. and Kontovas, C. (2019). Application of Bayesian Model 
for Third Party Damage Assessment of Cross-Country Oil Pipeline under Uncertainty. In: 
M. Beer and E. Zio, eds., Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability 
Conference 2019. [Online] Hannover, Germany: European Safety and Reliability 
Association. Available at: http://itekcmsonline.com/rps2prod/esrel2019/e-
proceedings/index.html [Accessed 30 Jan. 2020]. 
Hassan, S., Wang, J., Muhammad, CA. (2019). Cross Country Pipeline Risk-Based Failure 
Prediction using Hybrid Fuzzy Rule and Grey Theory in FMEA – A Case Study. 
In:  Proceedings of the 14th Pipeline Technology Conference 2019. [Online] Berlin, 
Germany. Available at: https://www.pipeline-conference.com/abstracts/cross-country-
pipeline-risk-based-failure-prediction-using-hybrid-fuzzy-rule-and-grey [Accessed 30 Jan. 
2020]. 
Hassan, S., (2018). Cross Country Pipeline Risk-Based Failure Prediction Using Hybrid 
Fuzzy Approximate Reasoning in FMEA. In: Proceedings of the 19th International HSE 
Biennial Conference on the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria, 26 – 28 Nov 2018, Lagos 
Nigeria. 
 
 
